April 20, 1998

 To:Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee

 From:City Clerk

 Subject:Toronto Transit Commission:

Need for Expansion of Union Subway Station

  Recommendations:

 The Urban Environment and Development Committee on April 20, 1998, recommended to:

 (A)the Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee, and Council, the adoption of Recommendation No. (2) of the Toronto Transit Commission, embodied in the communication dated February 26, 1998, from the General Secretary of the Commission, viz:

 "The Commission took the following action:

 (2)approved requesting the City of Toronto Council to:

 (a)establish a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions toward the cost of expanding Union Subway Station; and

 (b)direct City staff to establish a mechanism for obtaining private-sector contributions to this fund as a condition of approval of all new developments within the catchment area of Union Subway Station, including the Railway Lands and Harbourfront; that is, those developments which contribute to the overcrowding of the station;"; and

 (B)the Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee that this matter be submitted to the meeting of City Council scheduled to be held on May 13, 1998.

    The Urban Environment and Development Committee reports, for the information of the Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee, and Council, having:

 (1)requested the Chief Administrative Officer and the Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer to submit a joint report directly to Council, for consideration with this matter on May 13, 1998, demonstrating how the establishment of a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions toward the cost of expanding Union Subway Station, and a mechanism for obtaining such contributions, can be achieved;

 (2)referred the issue of the development of a crowd control management plan to the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services, with a request that she submit a report thereon to the meeting of the Urban Environment and Development Committee scheduled to be held on June 15, 1998; and

 (3)received the aforementioned communications (March 31, 1998) from Mr. Tom Anselmi, Vice-President and Project Director, Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, and (April 17, 1998) from the General Secretary, Toronto Transit Commission.

  Background:

 The Urban Environment and Development Committee had before it the following communications:

 (i)(February 26, 1998) from the General Secretary, Toronto Transit Commission (Commission), advising that the Commission on February 25, 1998, considered report No. (6), entitled "Need for Expansion of Union Subway Station"; and setting out the action taken by the Commission with respect thereto;

 (ii)(March 31, 1998) from Mr. Tom Anselmi, Vice-President and Project Director, Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, in response to the foregoing communication from the General Secretary, Toronto Transit Commission; and respectfully advising that Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited is not prepared to consider contributing to the expansion of Union Subway Station; and

    (iii)(April 17, 1998) from the Chief General Manager, Toronto Transit Commission, submitting a letter dated April 17, 1998, addressed to Mr. Tom Anselmi, Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, in response to Mr. Anselmi's letter of March 31, 1998; and urging Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited (MLGL) to reconsider its position regarding a contribution toward a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions toward the cost of expanding Union Subway Station.

       City Clerk

 N. Rickford/lv

 Attachment

 Item 1

h:\1998prod\ud\reports.98\report5\042001.tra

 (Communication dated February 26, 1998, addressed to the City Clerk

from the General Secretary, Toronto Transit Commission.)

 At its meeting on Wednesday, February 25, 1998, the Toronto Transit Commission (Commission) considered the attached report, entitled ANeed for Expansion of Union Subway Station@.

 The Commission took the following action:

 (1)received the report for information, noting that:

 -as indicated in the staff report, entitled ATTC=s Ability to Serve Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station@, which was considered by the Commission at its meeting on May 13, 1997, the capacity of Union Subway Station, under realistic operating conditions, is insufficient to accommodate the peak demands which would occur if high-attendance events at both SkyDome and the Air Canada Centre were to conclude at the same time;

 -an interim crowd control management plan must be developed, jointly between the Air Canada Centre, SkyDome, Toronto Police, and the TTC, to restrict the volumes of customers entering the station, right at the station entrances, whenever customer demand reaches a critical level;

 -the platform area of Union Subway Station should be enlarged as a permanent means of accommodating both the peak customer demand related to stadium events, and the increased weekday peak period demands resulting from intensification and future development near Union Station;

 -staff have developed a functional plan for increasing the station capacity which involves constructing a new platform south of the existing subway tracks; this would be a very costly improvement, and additional funding would have to be found outside of the TTC=s current Capital Budget for this purpose;

 -staff will be requesting funds, in the 1999-2003 Capital Budget submission, for the preparation of a detailed design and cost estimate for this expansion;

 (2)approved requesting the City of Toronto Council to:

 (a)establish a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions toward the cost of expanding Union Subway Station;

 (b)direct City staff to establish a mechanism for obtaining private-sector contributions to this fund as a condition of approval of all new developments within the catchment area of Union Subway Station, including the Railway Lands and Harbourfront; that is, those developments which contribute to the overcrowding of the station;

 (3)approved requesting Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited to make the initial contribution to this fund in conjunction with its plans to integrate the Air Canada Centre with Union Station itself; and

 (4)aproved forwarding a copy of this report to City of Toronto Council, the City of Toronto Planning Department, the Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Toronto and Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited.

 The Commission also requested the Chair and the Chief General Manager to meet with the Mayor of the City of Toronto to impress upon him the importance of capital needs for Union Station.

 The foregoing is forwarded to City Council, the City of Toronto Planning Department, the Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Toronto and Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited for information and appropriate consideration of the requests noted above.

 (Toronto Transit Commission Report No. 6, entitled

"Need for Expansion of Union Subway Station".)

 Recommendations:

 It is recommended that the Commission:

 (1)receive this report for information, noting that:

 -as indicated in the staff report, entitled "TTC's Ability to Serve Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station", which was considered by the Commission at its meeting on May 13, 1997, the capacity of Union Subway Station, under realistic operating conditions, is insufficient to accommodate the peak demands which would occur if high-attendance events at both SkyDome and the Air Canada Centre were to conclude at the same time;

 -an interim crowd control management plan must be developed, jointly between the Air Canada Centre, SkyDome, Toronto Police, and the TTC, to restrict the volumes of customers entering the station, right at the station entrances, whenever customer demand reaches a critical level;

 -the platform area of Union Subway Station should be enlarged as a permanent means of accommodating both the peak customer demand related to stadium events, and the increased weekday peak period demands resulting from intensification and future development near Union Station;

 -staff have developed a functional plan for increasing the station capacity which involves constructing a new platform south of the existing subway tracks; this would be a very costly improvement, and additional funding would have to be found outside of the TTC's current Capital Budget for this purpose;

 -staff will be requesting funds, in the 1999-2003 Capital Budget submission, for the preparation of a detailed design and cost estimate for this expansion;

 (2)request City of Toronto Council to:

 (a)establish a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions toward the cost of expanding Union Subway Station;

 (b)direct City staff to establish a mechanism for obtaining private sector contributions to this fund as a condition of approval of all new developments within the catchment area of Union Subway Station, including the Railway Lands and Harbourfront; that is, those developments which contribute to the overcrowding of the station;

 (3)request Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited to make the initial contribution to this fund in conjunction with its plans to integrate the Air Canada Centre with Union Station itself; and

 (4)forward this report to the City of Toronto Council, the City of Toronto Planning Department, the Chief Administrative Officer of the City of Toronto, and Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited.

 Background:

 In April, 1997, in reaction to the announcements by Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited and the Toronto Raptors Basketball Club to build separate new stadiums close to Union Station, TTC staff conducted a review of Union Subway Station and its ability to serve the surge demands on the subway system from the SkyDome and one other stadium.

 At its meeting on May 13, 1997, the Commission considered the staff report, entitled "TTC's Ability to Serve Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station", which advised that, if a new stadium and SkyDome both held high-attendance events which ended at the same time, Union Subway Station, under realistic operating conditions, would be unable to accommodate an unrestricted volume of customers choosing to take transit.

 Staff concluded that an interim crowd control management plan would have to be developed to restrict customers from entering the station whenever customer demand were to reach a critical level. Further, in order to provide a more permanent solution to this problem, and to accommodate the future growth in demand from continuing intensification and development of the area, the capacity of the station's platform would have to be increased.

 This report provides an update on the matter.

 Discussion:

 As noted in the attached May 13, 1997 report, Union Subway Station, which is the focal point for transit travel to/from the downtown stadium area, is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers. Its platform is unusually small and disjointed; there are very narrow spaces adjacent to the stairways and escalators leading to and from the platform; escalators deliver customers into very constrained platform areas; and passenger movement is significantly limited by the presence of elevators, escalators, stairways, and structural supports.

 The passenger demand versus capacity problem is two-fold. The analysis in the previous report focused primarily on the surge demands which would result from coincident events at two sports stadiums. This remains a concern as the Air Canada Centre proceeds. There are similar concerns with Union Station's ability to accommodate the projected increases in transit use in this area on a typical weekday. Extensive developments planned in the surrounding areas, such as those recently approved on the Molson lands, the Grand Adex mega-development in the Railway Lands, and ongoing development in the Harbourfront area, all promise to add to the demands on Union Station, eventually, and push it past its practical capacity.

 TTC staff have done preliminary design work pertaining to the expansion of Union Subway Station and recommend constructing a new subway platform, south of the existing tracks, which would be dedicated for use by customers waiting to travel north via the Yonge Subway line. The existing centre platform could then be dedicated entirely for use by customers travelling north via the University Subway Line.

 A very preliminary estimate of the cost of this station expansion is $40 million. The TTC's current capital budget does not include any funding for the expansion of Union Subway Station. Given the serious financial pressures facing the City of Toronto, and the fact that there will be no further contributions to the TTC's capital program from the Province, it will be necessary to look for new sources of funding, from the logical beneficiaries of an efficient and safe Union Station, to supplement whatever funding the City of Toronto may be able to provide.

 It is recommended that a special reserve fund be established for the expansion of Union Subway Station. Recognizing that Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd. will be integrating the Air Canada Centre with Union Station, and given the increased levels of activity in Union Subway Station which will result from this new development, it would be appropriate that Maple Leaf Gardens Ltd. be requested to make the initial contribution to that fund in conjunction with their planned improvements.

 In addition, City of Toronto staff should be requested to develop a mechanism whereby approval of future developments in the downtown would be conditional on a contribution to this fund. Although, in the past, City staff have avoided the use of special development levies, there may be strategies which would not result in any additional costs to developers. For example, the Railway Lands Transportation Study (September, 1995), discussed a strategy whereby any contribution to transit made by a developer could be offset through a reduction in the amount of parking required by the municipal by-law. Alternatively, current development charges could include an amount earmarked for this project. Such strategies could be used to obtain contributions for the expansion of Union Subway Station while, at the same time, helping to achieve the relatively high transit market share which is projected for future development in this area and which is appropriate for an area of such high density.

Summary:

 Union Subway Station is the focal point for transit travel to/from the downtown area. It is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers because its platform is unusually small and disjointed, with many features which constrain customer movement and distribution.

 If the Air Canada Centre and SkyDome were to both hold high-attendance events which were to end at the same time, Union Subway Station, under realistic operating conditions, would be unable to accommodate an unrestricted volume of customers choosing to take transit.

 There are many planned or in-progress developments, in the area surrounding Union Station, which will add to the typical weekday demands on the station and which will, eventually, push it past its practical capacity.

 The only long-term solution to this capacity problem is to expand the platform capacity of this station by constructing a new subway platform, south of the existing tracks, which would be dedicated for use by customers waiting to travel north via the Yonge Subway line. Such an expansion would cost an estimated $40 million which is not included in the TTC's current Capital Budget.

 Given known funding constraints at the City of Toronto, and in the absence of any further capital funding from the Province, it would be appropriate, and likely necessary, to obtain some proportion of the funds for such an expansion from new developments within the Union Subway Station catchment area, which would be the logical beneficiaries of an expanded, efficient, and safe subway station. Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, builders of the new Air Canada Centre, which will be directly connected to the Union Station, should be the first contributor to a special reserve fund for the expansion of Union Subway Station.

 (Toronto Transit Commission Report dated May 13, 1997,

entitled "TTC's Ability to Serve

Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station.")

 Recommendations:

 It is recommended that the Commission:

 (1)receive this report, and the accompanying discussion paper, for information, noting that:

 (a)staff support the development of stadiums in the downtown core as a means of increasing TTC ridership and transit market share;

 (b)staff support the enlargement of the Union Station platform area to accommodate growing customer demand on the station, and to support future development and intensification;

 (c)additional funding for expansion of the station must be found outside of the TTC's current Capital Budget. The stadium currently under consideration is just one contributor to the demand at Union Station;

 (d)an interim crowd control management plan must be developed, jointly between the stadiums, Metro Police, and the TTC, to restrict the volume of customers entering the station, right at the surface-level entrances, whenever customer demand reaches a critical level;

 (e)Union Subway Station, which is the focal point for transit travel to/from the downtown stadium area, is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers because its platform is unusually small and disjointed, with very narrow spaces adjacent to stairways and escalators, escalators which deliver customers into very constrained areas, and passenger movement significantly limited by the presence of elevators, escalators, and stairways;

 (f)if a new stadium is built close to Union Station, and that stadium and SkyDome hold high-attendance events at the same time, the percentage of customers using transit to get to and from the stadiums will increase from current levels because traffic congestion in the area would be severe and parking would be costly and difficult to find;

 (g)if the stadiums were relatively full and the events end at the same time, then, under realistic operating conditions, the customer demand at Union Station in a peak 20-minute period following the end of the events would exceed the practical and safe capacity of the stairways, escalators, and subway platform at Union Station;

 (h)in a situation of continual heavy demand, which would be generated by two concurrent stadium events, a delay in subway service of even one to two minutes, which is manageable during normal peak period operation on weekdays, would create a dangerous overcrowding condition on the constrained subway platform of Union Station; and

 (2)request that a copy of the report be forwarded to Metropolitan Toronto Council, City of Toronto Council, the Metropolitan Toronto Planning Department, the City of Toronto Urban Development Services, Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, The Toronto Raptors Basketball Club, and SkyDome Corporation.

 Background:

 The TTC supports and encourages development and intensification in existing transit corridors to increase ridership and improve public transit's share of travel in the city.

 The construction of stadiums in downtown Toronto is an opportunity for the TTC to provide enhanced public transit in support of local development.

 The 40-year-old Union Station will reach a capacity limit, under certain operating conditions. This will necessitate expansion of the platform area in order to provide safe and convenient public transit, and to accommodate further development and intensification in the surrounding area.

 Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited and the Toronto Raptors Basketball Club have both announced their intention to build new stadiums close to Union Station. At least one new stadium will be built, and this means that two major stadiums - SkyDome and a new stadium - will be within a relatively close distance of Union Subway Station.

 It is appropriate to review the TTC's ability to effectively and safely serve the customer demand which could be generated by two such stadiums close to Union Station.

 Discussion:

 The attached discussion paper presents a number of possible scenarios of stadium events and the resulting customer demand which would occur at Union Subway Station, under a number of explicit assumptions regarding stadium attendance, transit market share, supplemental service arrangements, and the physical constraints of Union Subway Station.

 The paper concludes that Union Subway Station, which is the focal point for transit travel to/from the downtown stadium area, is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers because its platform is unusually small and disjointed.

 If a new stadium is built close to Union Subway Station, and that stadium and SkyDome hold high-attendance events which end at the same time, then Union Station, under realistic operating conditions, would be unable to accommodate the volume of customers choosing to take transit.

 Under conditions of a constant high volume of customers entering the station, such as from two concurrent stadium events, even small delays to subway train service can quickly result in unsafe crowding conditions on the platform at Union Subway Station. If the TTC were serving the customer demand from two stadium events, and any service delays were to occur, then, under every tested volume of customer demand, demand would exceed station capacity, and overcrowding in the station would occur - at increasing levels of danger and risk to customers.

 Union Station is one of the least suitable platforms to handle surge passenger loads. In order to accommodate any future growth in demand as a result of area development/intensification, the configuration of the station must be improved.

   (Discussion Paper, entitled

"TTC's Ability to Serve Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station".)

Introduction:

 This report discusses the ability of the TTC to carry the highly-concentrated customer demands which could be generated by two major events ending at the same time, in the immediate vicinity of Union Subway Station: one at a new stadium and one at SkyDome.

 Major Assumptions:

 (a)Facilities and Capacity/Attendance:

 SkyDome - 50,000 customers; New Stadium - 20,000 customers.

 (b)Situation Which Would Generate Highest Level of Customer Demand:

 Two events conclude at the same time: one at SkyDome, and one at New Stadium.

 (c)Stadium Clearance Times:

 20 minutes.

 (d)Pattern of Customer Arrivals at Union Subway Station:

 Because the proposed New Stadium is relatively close to Union Station, all transit customers from this stadium would arrive at Union Station, at an even rate, within a 20-minute period following the conclusion of an event. Because SkyDome is further from Union Station and requires customers to walk a greater distance, in a worst case, 75 percent of SkyDome customers who are destined for Union Station would arrive there within this same 20-minute period.

 (e)Percentage of Stadium Customers Who Travel by Transit:

 Based on the TTC's most recent ridership counts, 16 percent of people attending a SkyDome event travel by subway (13.6 percent to/from Union Station and 2.4 percent to/from St. Andrew Station), and 20 percent of people attending an event at the current Maple Leaf Gardens travel by subway. These transit market shares are explicitly altered in the scenarios which are discussed in this paper.

 (f)Direction of Subway Travel from Union Station:

 It is assumed that, of all customers using the subway from Union Station, the majority travel north via the Yonge subway line. The exact distribution between the Yonge line and the University-Spadina line varies slightly according to the scenario under discussion.

 (g)Time of Day of Events:

 If two stadium events were to conclude at the same time, this would most likely occur later in the evening on weekdays or Saturdays. This situation would be unlikely to occur during the afternoon peak period on a weekday, based on historical observations regarding the time of major stadium events in Metro Toronto.

 Other minor assumptions are stated explicitly, where applicable, in the scenarios which follow.

 Possible Scenarios of Stadium Events and

Resulting Customer Demand at Union Subway Station:

 Scenario 1:One Event at New Stadium; Existing Transit Market Share:

 In this scenario, 20 percent of New Stadium customers would use the subway, resulting in a peak demand of 4,000 customers within 20 minutes.

 Scenario 2:Two Concurrent Stadium Events; Existing Transit Market Share:

 In this scenario, 13.6 percent of SkyDome customers, and 20 percent of New Stadium customers, would use the subway. This would result in a demand of 9,100 customers within a 20-minute period at Union Station.

 Scenario 3:Two Concurrent Stadium Events; Higher Transit Market Share:

 Simultaneous major events at two stadiums which are very close to each other would be expected to make driving to these events much less desirable, because parking would be costly and difficult to find, and traffic congestion in the area would be severe. This would result in more people using transit to get to the stadiums in the area. The percentage of customers who would use transit would be increased to 17 percent to/from SkyDome, and to 25 percent to/from New Stadium. This would result in a demand of 11,400 customers at Union Station within a 20-minute time period.

 Scenario 4:Two Concurrent Stadium Events; Even Higher Transit Market Share:

 In the near future, a number of the parking facilities in the downtown stadium area may be replaced by development, resulting in a further increase to transit's share of this travel market. The percentage of customers who would use transit under this scenario would be increased to 20 percent to/from SkyDome and to 30 percent to/from New Stadium. This would result in a demand of 13,500 customers at Union Subway Station within a 20-minute period.

 Customer Capacity at Union Subway Station:

 The TTC's ability to accommodate extremely large volumes of customers within a very short time period (defined here to be a constant, highly-concentrated level of demand over a 20-minute period of time, following which customer demand would gradually diminish) is governed by four major factors:

 -the capacity of turnstiles, and stairs and escalators;

 -the capacity or standing room available on the subway platform;

 -the train capacity which can be operated through the station; and

 -uncontrollable operational problems which can reduce the capacity of any of these components, but especially train capacity.

 (i)Turnstiles, and Stairways and Escalators:

 The existing collectors' booths and turnstiles at Union Station would be supplemented by customer service "crash" gates which would expedite fare collection. Collectively, with all collectors' booths, turnstiles, and supplemental crash gates in operation, the number of customers who could be served through these facilities would exceed the capacity of the stairways and escalators at Union Station. There are four stairways and three escalators between the mezzanine level and the subway platform. With all three escalators operating down to the subway platform, and assuming a minimal volume of customers travelling in the opposing upward direction on stairways, it would be possible to have 600 customers per minute travel down to the subway platform level.

 (ii)Subway Platform Capacity:

 In very crowded conditions, such as would be expected to occur with customer demand from two concurrent stadium events, each customer would be able to occupy less platform space than would be the norm during, say, an afternoon peak period situation. In this crowded condition, each customer would occupy approximately 0.5 square metres of platform space and, assuming that customers are relatively well-distributed over the entire platform area, the current platform at Union Station could theoretically accommodate approximately 1,400 customers. This is shown in Exhibit 1, in which each of the "dots" represents a person standing on the platform. If all stairways and escalator two leading to the platform were operating at capacity, the platform would become fully occupied within two minutes and 20 seconds.

 Union Station is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers. The platform at Union Station is very small and disjointed, and features very narrow spaces adjacent to stairways and escalators, and escalators which deliver customers to physically-constrained sections of the platform. The inefficient platform layout makes it difficult, even under moderately crowded conditions, for customers to move along the platform to try to fill up less crowded areas. Therefore, under heavy-demand conditions, crowding is likely to occur very quickly near stairways and escalators. This means that the practical capacity of the platform would be lower than the rated capacity mentioned above and shown in Exhibit 1.

 (iii)Subway Train Capacity:

 As discussed under the earlier section, entitled "Major Assumptions", the highest level of customer demand would be most likely to occur later in the evening on weekdays or Saturdays. After 9:30 p.m. on weekdays, and after 9:50 p.m. on Saturdays, the scheduled interval between trains at Union Station, heading northbound via Yonge, is six minutes (effective September, 1997). This means that, over a 20-minute period, three subway trains would be scheduled to pass through Union Station in each direction. In response to an expected very high level of customer demand, additional non-scheduled "standby" trains would be stored off the main line and held in readiness to go into service at the appropriate times to serve customers at Union Station. Including these extra "standby" trains, it would theoretically be possible to operate eight trains, in the peak direction, through Union Station over a 20-minute period. Each subway train can reasonably carry approximately 1,200 customers, and each of the standby trains would arrive at Union Station with no customers on board; the regularly-scheduled trains would be assumed to arrive at Union Station with five percent of their capacity already occupied by customers.

 Eight subway trains in the peak direction over a 20-minute time period would be equal to a train every 2'30", on average. This is approximately the same interval between trains as is operated on the Yonge-University-Spadina Subway line during the AM peak period, and it is the practical limit of subway train capacity under the current physical configuration of the TTC's subway system. Current daily operating experience would indicate that this frequency of service is rarely sustainable, without an interruption or gap, over a significant period of time.

 (iv)Uncontrollable Operating Problems:

 Two operational problems, which cannot be easily controlled, could affect the capacity of the station and the volume of customers which could move through it:

 (1)if an escalator were to break down, then the escalator's capacity would be reduced to that of an equivalent-width stairway. This would reduce the total stairway and escalator capacity, leading down to the subway platform, from 600 people per minute to 550 people per minute; and

 (2)a subway train could be delayed or could experience a mechanical failure. A delay could occur reasonably easily, given that the operation of a train every 2'30", on average, in the peak direction, would be done on a non-scheduled basis, requiring that trains be dispatched from special holding tracks at just the right moment, and slotted in-between the regularly-scheduled subway trains. A delay in subway service of as little as one minute, in a situation of continual heavy customer demand, would result in significant overcrowding on the subway platform, as customers would continue to arrive on the platform at a faster rate than train capacity could carry them out of the station. This is illustrated in Exhibit 2 which shows that, with virtually any delay or gap in the planned service level of 2'30", the build-up of crowds on the platform would quickly exceed the capacity of the platform at Union Station.

 This situation of platform overcrowding due to service delays would be especially bad at Union Station because the platform is in the centre, between the two tracks, and is, therefore, "shared" between customers heading in either direction. So, if a service delay were to occur in one direction, customers waiting to travel in that direction would quickly fill up the platform space, making it impossible for customers wishing to travel in the other direction to get onto the platform. A delay in one direction, then, would effectively block off customer travel in the other direction.

 In the event of a mechanical failure of a train, with the possible consequence that one or more of the trains designated to serve the station during the peak 20-minute period would be unable to do so, there would be a significant loss of customer-carrying capacity, and customer demand at the station would exceed the train capacity during this period.

 If either of these type of service incidents were to occur, the result would be a dangerous level of overcrowding on the subway platform.

 Comparison of Customer Demand and Union Station Capacity:

 The tables on the pages following Exhibit 2 compare the volume of customers which would be expected to use Union Station under different stadium event scenarios, and the capacity of different components of Union Station, in three cases:

 (a)ideal operating conditions, where maximum train capacity over the 20-minute peak period is achieved;

 (b)where a small operating problem occurs, such as a mechanical failure on one of the trains, resulting in the loss of one train's worth of capacity in the 20-minute peak period; and

 (c)where a larger operating problem occurs, such as a mechanical failure on one of the trains which, in turn, blocks the two trains behind it, resulting in the loss of three train's worth of capacity in the 20-minute period.

   Comparison of Union Station Capacity

and Customer Demand Generated by Stadium Events

 Case A - Optimum Operating Conditions: Maximum Train Capacity

  Case B - Small Operating Problem: Loss of One Train's Capacity

 Scenarios:

 (1)20 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(2)13.6 percent of SkyDome, 20 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(3)17 percent of SkyDome, 25 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(4)20 percent of Sky Dome, 30 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

 Train Capacity:

 (A)Three scheduled trains plus two standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

(B)Three scheduled trains plus five standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

(C)Three scheduled trains plus four standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

 (D)Three scheduled trains plus two standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

  Case C - Bigger Operating Problem: Loss of Three Trains' Capacity

 Scenarios:

 (1)20 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(2)13.6 percent of SkyDome, 20 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(3)17 percent of SkyDome, 25 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

(4)20 percent of Sky Dome, 30 percent of New Stadium customers use transit.

 Train Capacity:

 (A)Three scheduled trains plus two standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

(B)Three scheduled trains plus five standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

(C)Three scheduled trains plus four standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

(D)Three scheduled trains plus two standby trains; arriving scheduled trains are five percent occupied.

 The tables show that Union Station should be able to handle the customer demand which would be generated by a single event at New Stadium (Scenario 1).

 If two major stadium events were held concurrently, the significant traffic congestion and the increased demand and cost for parking spaces would result in a higher transit market share, so Scenario 3 would be the most likely scenario in these tables. Under this scenario, if subway service were operating perfectly at maximum capacity, as in the "Case A" table, the capacity of Union Station would just match customer demand, even with the special supplemental measures mentioned earlier, including additional crash gates for fare collection, operating all escalators down to the subway platform level, and operation of additional standby trains up to the maximum capacity of the subway system. For this to work, all of these conditions would have to apply:

 (a)customers arrive relatively consistently and evenly-distributed over the peak 20-minute time period;

 (b)all components of Union Station (the turnstiles, gates, stairways, escalators, and platforms) are used to their maximum capacity which, in turn, is premised on customers distributing themselves relatively evenly over the length of the platform; and

 (c)subway trains arrive evenly spaced over the 20-minute period, and there are no delays in service or other unforeseen problems.

 However, realistically, it is unlikely that all of these conditions would apply simultaneously. The biggest risk would be the occurrence of a train-related problem, such as a delay or mechanical failure similar to what customers may experience during normal peak period travel on the TTC. In the second table, entitled "Case B", a very small operating problem is introduced into the picture: the loss of one train's worth of capacity during the peak 20 minutes. All numbers have been held constant in that table, except for the subway train capacity via the Yonge line, which has been reduced. As a result, in Scenario 3, the carrying capacity in the peak direction becomes less than the customer demand in that same direction, and this would lead to overcrowding on the subway platform.

 In the "Case C" table, where a mechanically-disabled train blocks the following two trains from entering the station, the customer demand, under even the most modest of two-event demand assumptions (Scenario 2), significantly exceeds the train capacity which would be provided through the station. If the transit market share were larger than present (Scenario 4 of Case C), the loss of service due to mechanical problems would result in the customer demand to travel north via the Yonge line being almost twice as large as the train capacity, and crowding on the platform would be at a dangerously high level.

 Under conditions of a constant high volume of customers entering the station, if a service delay were to occur, it would be very difficult to slow down the flow of customers into the subway station. Given that the Union Station platform would fill up in just over two minutes, a delay of even one minute in the arrival of a subway train would cause the subway platform to be at almost 150 percent of capacity. The constrained and disjointed nature of this platform would make this level of platform occupancy a dangerous situation. The charts in Exhibit 3 show how even small delays to subway train service can quickly result in unsafe crowding conditions on the platform at Union Subway Station.

 It is not known how often two stadium events would be held at the same time. This would depend on co-ordination between the different stadium operators regarding the scheduling of their events; however, even such co-ordination could be ineffective in achieving staggered adjournment times because the duration of sporting events, concerts, and other attractions are often unpredictable.

 Conclusions:

 Union Subway Station, which is the focal point for transit travel to/from the downtown stadium area, is the worst station in the TTC system for serving large volumes of customers because its platform is unusually small and disjointed, with very narrow spaces adjacent to stairways and escalators, escalators which deliver customers into very constrained areas, and passenger movement significantly limited by the presence of elevators, escalators, and stairways.

 If a new stadium is built close to Union Subway Station, and that stadium and SkyDome hold high-attendance events which end at the same time, Union Station, under realistic operating conditions, would be unable to accommodate the volume of customers choosing to take transit. This would happen despite TTC measures to augment customer capacity through use of crash gates and additional standby trains. Any service, scheduled or supplementary, is subject to unpredictable and uncontrollable delays or problems; this is particularly true when operating trains only 2'30" apart.

 Under conditions of a constant high volume of customers entering the station, even small delays to subway train service can quickly result in unsafe crowding conditions on the platform at Union Subway Station.

 If the TTC were serving the customer demand from two stadium events, and any service delays were to occur, then, under every tested volume of customer demand, demand would exceed station capacity, and overcrowding in the station would occur - at increasing levels of danger and risk to customers.

 In the longer term, the configuration of Union Station would have to be improved. TTC staff have done some preliminary design work pertaining to the expansion of Union Station's mezzanine, and the construction of a new platform, south of the existing tracks, which would be dedicated for use by customers travelling north via the Yonge Subway line. This expansion has been estimated to cost $40 million.

 This report has been prepared based on a number of explicit assumptions. A more thorough analysis of possible stadium event scenarios and resulting customer demand at Union Station is required in order to determine what improvements to Union Station are necessary to ensure safe accommodation of the very high levels of customer demand associated with concurrent stadium events.

 The Urban Environment and Development Committee also submits the following communication (March 31, 1998) from Mr. Tom Anselmi, Vice-President and Project Director, Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited:

 I am in receipt of a copy of a letter to the City dated February 26, 1998, from the General Secretary of the Toronto Transit Commission, which attached TTC reports dated February 25, 1998, and May 13, 1997, respectively.

 The letter requests the City of Toronto to establish a mechanism for obtaining private sector funding for the expansion of Union Subway Station and, further, that Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited should be requested to make the initial contribution to the fund as a result of the proposed Air Canada Centre/Union Station development.

 The attached TTC reports indicate the capacity/demand problem is a result of potential surge demand from two sports stadiums with coincident events and from the extensive developments planned for surrounding areas such as Harbourfront, the Railway Lands and Grand Adex. The May 13, 1997 report, however, was written on the basis of, and debated at a time when the Maple Leafs were considering a separate arena from the Air Canada Centre and concerns at that time were about a second downtown arena in addition to the SkyDome stadium. The May 25, 1997 report recommends that Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited should make the initial contribution because of a perceived increase in activity in Union Station as a result of the proposal to integrate the Air Canada Centre with Union Station; however, there is nothing to substantiate such an assumption.

 If expansion to Union Subway Station is required in the future to accommodate further downtown development, this expansion should be financed through an increase to the TTC capital program, similar to the Scarborough RT and the North York City Centre Stations. We are of the opinion that public sector investment should be used to attract development as opposed to a new private sector "tax" which discourages it.

 Notwithstanding the ultimate policy decision by the City, it is our position that the Air Canada Centre, the redevelopment of Union Station and/or the integration of the two projects is not responsible for the under-capacity of Union Subway Station in its larger context.

 Our position is based on the following:

 (1)the station was built approximately 40 years ago when downtown density was dramatically different;

 (2)the Air Canada Centre already went through a rigorous approval process and was required to make significant infrastructure capital investments, all of which have been honoured. The expansion of Union Subway Station was not included at that time;

 (3)capacity of the Air Canada Centre is 20,000 of which approximately 6,000 (30 percent) will arrive by transit. Most events are in the evening (7:00 p.m. to 7:30 p.m. start time and 10:00 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. finish). These demands are significantly less, and at a different time, than peak rush hour demand;

 (4)the SkyDome was not assessed a contribution to the expansion of Union Subway Station at the time of its development even though it is a significantly higher contributor (capacity 50,000--modal split 40 percent) than an arena. The SkyDome development did, however, contribute extensively to other forms of infrastructure;

 (5)a comparison of the 1998 Raptor and Leaf schedules with the SkyDome event schedule indicates little overlap, even without any co-ordination. By co-operating in the selection of start and finish times of coincident events, the risk of coincident events exiting at the same time can be essentially eliminated;

 (6)a variety of crowd control measures an be implemented to reduce the impact in the unlikely event that events at the Air Canada Centre and the SkyDome exit at the same time; and

 (7)the redevelopment of Union Station will not significantly increase activity at Union Station. Additional floor space will not be created and the impact of the redevelopment will be insignificnt when compared to the proposed increases in capacity being suggested by GO Transit, and other transportation tenants at Union Station.

 Accordingly, we respectfully advise that Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited is not prepared to consider contributing to the expansion of Union Subway Station.

 The Urban Environment and Development Committee also submits the following communication (April 17, 1998) from the Chief General Manager, Toronto Transit Commission:

 Attached is an April 17, 1998 letter from myself to Mr. Tom Anselmi, Vice-President and Project Director of Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited. It is a response to Mr. Anselmi's letter which is listed as Item No. (1)(a) on the City Urban Environment and Development Committee meeting scheduled for Monday, April 20, 1998.

 Please make arrangements for the attached letter to be considered at the same time the Committee addresses Item No. (1)(a).

 (Letter dated April 17, 1998, addressed to

Mr. Tom Anselmi, Vice-President and Project Director,

Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, from the

Chief General Manager, Toronto Transit Commission.)

 Thank you for your letter of March 31, 1998, in which you state that Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited is not prepared to consider contributing financially to the expansion of Union Subway Station.

The decisions to locate the Air Canada Centre, SkyDome, and a host of other large developments near Union Station were clearly driven, to a large extent, by the superior accessibility provided to that area by the public transportation systems which operate out of Union Station. The Air Canada Centre location has been made more desirable, convenient, and valuable by the huge amounts of public money which have been invested over time developing high-quality transportation infrastructure there.

 Union Subway Station, a critical part of that infrastructure, is now being outgrown by the increasing demands which are being placed on it by the intensification of development in the area. The subway station platform is already uncomfortably crowded during peak commuting hours and during heavily-attended events at SkyDome. The demand which will be placed on the station by the Air Canada Centre is one of the additional factors which will result in the station being inadequate to meet the transportation needs of the area over the coming years.

 The Air Canada Centre, and the other major developments which were mentioned in the February 25, 1998 TTC report, will benefit significantly from the availability of high-capacity, high-quality transit service at Union Station. These beneficiaries, including Maple Leaf Gardens, Limited, should be prepared to contribute to the improvement of this station to ensure that the needs of your customers are met, as well as those of the visitors, shoppers, and commuters which will make your investment in Union Station more valuable.

 The City of Toronto recently approved a development charges by-law which will apply a per-square-foot charge to developments within the zone of influence of North York Centre Subway Station and of stations along the new Sheppard Subway Line. This is intended to recapture the significant additional value which accrues to developments near subway stations. The strength of this argument is undeniable. It is on this basis that we have requested the City of Toronto Council to establish a special reserve fund for private-sector contributions towards the cost of expanding Union Subway Station. We intend to pursue this at City Council, and I urge you to reconsider your position regarding a contribution toward such a reserve fund, in light of the significant convenience and benefits which transit will bring to your customers and the significant value which transit adds to your investment.

 (A copy of Exhibits 1, 2 and 3, referred to in the foregoing TTC Discussion Paper, entitled "TTC's Ability to Serve Multiple Sports Stadiums at Union Station", is on file in the office of the City Clerk.)