

May 26, 2010

Charley Beresford
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Dear Ms. Beresford:

Re: Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA)

Canada is currently negotiating a Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with the European Union (the "EU"). The following provides an assessment of the potential impacts of this proposed trade agreement on municipal government authority.

The federal government has described CETA as the most ambitious free trade initiative to be undertaken by Canada. In truth, many provisions of the proposed text replicate those of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Both agreements greatly expanded the scope of international trade law to encompass spheres of domestic policy and law that have little to do with international trade in any conventional sense, including those within the jurisdiction of municipal governments. Indeed the actions of local governments – including those related to waste management, the delivery of water services, and land use planning – can and have been challenged for offending the requirements of international trade law.

The following analysis does not provide a comprehensive assessment of the full scope of CETA rules that are likely to impact municipal governments, for as noted, much of this terrain has already been charted under NAFTA and WTO rules. For example, Canada proposes to provide corporations with a virtually unfettered right to invoke international arbitration to seek damages where they claim a Canadian government or other public body has failed to comply with the investment rules of the regime. While including such provisions in a comprehensive international trade agreement would be unprecedented for the EU, Canada has been dealing with the consequences of according private investors such extraordinary rights for over a decade.

Even so, the consequences of exposing Canadian governments to investor-state claims by countless EU-based corporations are not to be discounted. Because of the serious risks engendered by such investment rules, we have included an example of these litigation risks below in regard to water supply services in light of the EU's pointed demand that such services

be subject to CETA rules and the dominant position of EU-based water service corporations in this sector.

However, the primary focus of the following assessment is on procurement. In this area, CETA proposals would substantially expand the application of trade rules to municipal governments and other public bodies, and the inclusion of sub-national procurement in CETA is arguably the EU's foremost demand. For the moment, the procurement practices of provincial and municipal governments remain largely untrammelled by international treaty obligations. For these reasons, and because procurement can play such an important role in a modern economy, the following analysis provides a detailed assessment of proposed CETA procurement rules.

SUMMARY

[The term "municipalities" is used throughout this analysis as a short form for all MASH sector entities, including schools, hospitals, libraries, power and water utilities, and virtually all other public bodies and institutions which under present proposals would also be subject to CETA procurement rules.]

The current procurement practices of Canadian municipalities are typically open and transparent. EU companies are as entitled to bid in response to municipal tenders as are their Canadian counterparts, and only very rarely do tender calls require some proportion of the goods and services to be provided locally. However, municipalities also recognize the important role that procurement can play towards achieving economic, social, or environmental goals.

Indeed the FCM has stressed the important relationship between infrastructure investment and job creation. Commenting on federal budget commitments, and under the heading "The Road to New Jobs" the FCM put it this way:

Turning federal budget commitments into new jobs does not happen automatically. A number of steps are required, with multiple decision points, complex problem-solving, and external barriers and challenges along the way. Each of these milestones must be met by one or more of the three orders of government involved in this national stimulus effort in order to turn a dollar figure shown in a federal budget document into real projects and jobs in Canadian communities.

Of course a critical decision point concerns the conditions of public procurement, and the FCM has also called upon the federal government to preserve the right of municipalities to insist on local content and job creation as conditions of procurement. In setting out the principles that should guide Canadian trade negotiations, the FCM has called stressed the importance of:

Canadian content for strategic industries or sensitive projects: A trade deal must recognize strategic and public interest considerations before barring all preferential treatment based on country of origin. There may be industries of strategic significance to a particular region, such as transit, or projects where considerations of quality, public benefit, environmental protection or business ethics means that a local

government may be allowed to implement minimum Canadian content levels, within reason.

To put it simply, proposed CETA rules would permanently remove the option of using procurement in this manner. Thus under CETA, municipalities would no longer be able to restrict tendering to Canadian companies, or stipulate that foreign companies bidding on public contracts accord some preference for local or Canadian goods, services, or workers. As a result, municipalities would lose one of the few, and perhaps the most important tool they now have for stimulating innovation, fostering community economic development, creating local employment and achieving other public policy goals, from food security to social equity.

At the same time, municipalities would bear significant administrative costs and litigation risks arising from having to expand the scope of their procurement practices; reporting upon, accounting for and defending their procurement choices; and from having to compensate unsuccessful bidders where CETA procedures and rules are not strictly observed.

Specifically, proposed CETA procurement rules would:

- i) prohibit municipalities from using procurement as a local economic or social development tool by restricting tender calls to local or Canadian companies or by requiring that bidders use some proportion of local or Canadian goods, services or labour in providing the goods and services being tendered;
- ii) prohibit municipalities from using procurement for strategic purposes, such as creating or supporting a market for innovative goods and services, including green technologies where the effect would favour Canadian producers or attract investment to Canada;
- iii) prohibit municipalities from using procurement for sustainable development purposes such as promoting food security by adopting “buy local” food practices;
- iv) require municipalities to shoulder the administrative costs associated with:
 - providing the federal government with information and statistics about their procurement practices and activities;
 - publishing detailed notices and announcements of intended procurements;
 - issuing tenders in accordance with CETA procedures and technical specifications;
 - accounting to unsuccessful suppliers for their procurement decisions; and
 - defending their actions if challenged, before domestic administrative, judicial and appellate bodies;

- v) put municipalities in jeopardy of their procurement processes being slowed or derailed by having to:
- provide unsuccessful EU bidders with sufficient time to appeal their decisions;
 - contend with an order suspending the procurement pending the resolution of such an appeal; or
 - pay damages to an unsuccessful bidder or bidders where they fail to comply with CETA rules.

The constraints imposed by CETA on municipal procurement options also go well beyond those of the Agreement in Internal Trade (AIT) which allow municipal procurement to favour Canadian goods and services, and which unlike CETA rules, exempt procurement relating to water and water related services.

The Importance of Due Diligence by Municipalities

Given the nature of these constraints, it is surprising that neither federal nor provincial governments have presented an assessment of their impact, nor have they offered any meaningful assessment of what municipalities might gain from abandoning their procurement prerogatives. However, it does appear to be conceded that Canada has little to gain from reciprocal access to EU procurement markets and so will be seeking gains in other areas.

For example, according to an account in a leading trade journal, recognizing that the EU has much more to gain from the inclusion of sub-national procurement in CETA, Canada's Trade Minister is poised to use sub-national procurement as a bargaining chip in exchange for new market access for Canadian beef, pork and grains.¹ We could not, however, find evidence that such a trade-off would be warranted, even if one accepts that it is reasonable to expect municipalities to bear the costs for benefits that other sectors and regions of the country might gain.

We have also included below a brief account of the outcome of recent bi-lateral procurement negotiations with the U.S. to belie the notion that one can rely upon the outcome of such negotiations to produce a balanced agreement that serves Canadian interests. The recently concluded Canada-U.S. Procurement Agreement is a remarkably one-sided agreement under which most benefits flow to U.S. companies, and this is particularly true for temporary provisions that require Canadian municipalities to comply with international procurement rules for the first time. Under these rules, Canadian municipalities must open procurement for construction and related services to U.S. companies, but U.S. states and municipalities, many of which maintain local preferences that effectively exclude Canadian bidders, are under no reciprocal obligation. It appears in that case that the federal government's political imperatives

¹ Inside Trade, 28-18-13.

overwhelmed its interest in achieving an outcome that furthered Canadian interests. We believe there are good reasons to be concerned that the same dynamics are at play in CETA negotiations.

If there is any further need to underscore the importance of due diligence by those representing municipalities on the trade file, it is provided by recognizing the permanent character of CETA commitments. The practical and political difficulties of amending an international agreement are such that it is virtually impossible to reinstate the prerogatives of governments once these are abandoned. Recognizing this difficulty, Canada has proposed an elaborate procedure for modifying the commitments it makes under the CETA regime.² But the right to modify commitments is highly qualified, and has not been accepted by the EU. Moreover, in our view Canada's proposal is unlikely to be accepted by the EU because it cuts so directly against the essential purpose of this proposed trade agreement, which is to establish binding and ongoing obligations that may not be amended domestically.

To underscore this point, we are aware of no instance of Canada seeking to amend NAFTA rules, notwithstanding serious dissatisfaction with aspects of the regime – the softwood lumber disputes and investor state claims being two examples. The only reasonable assumption for municipalities to make is that if procurement authority is ceded under CETA, it will not be recoverable.

In light of the outcome of 'Buy America' procurement negotiations with the U.S., and the sweeping constraints on municipal procurement powers engendered by proposed CETA rules, it would be reasonable in our view to call upon the federal government to:

- i) undertake and publish a thorough, timely and objective assessment of both the costs and benefits for municipalities of the CETA agenda;
- ii) provide an explanation of which sectors are most likely to be the principal beneficiaries of CETA, and how the purported benefits of this trade deal are to be distributed;
- iii) engage in effective consultations with municipalities following these analyses and before negotiations are pursued further; and
- iv) allow sufficient time for municipalities to solicit public comment from those potentially affected by present proposals.

Most importantly, given the failure of CETA proposals to preserve the right of municipalities to insist on Canadian content for strategic industries as the FCM called for, it would be reasonable to renew calls for the Federal Government to provide clear assurance that it will not trade away the authority of local governments to use procurement to achieve economic, social, environmental, sustainability and other valid public policy goals.

² See Article XVIII: Modifications and Rectifications to Coverage.

Finally, it is important that the Federal Government's international procurement objectives are being pursued in at least one other major venue – bi-lateral negotiations under CUSPA. Under that Agreement Canada is committed to future discussions to explore an expansion of commitments with respect to market access for procurement.

We believe that Canadian municipalities should be very clear that the preservation of such rights is a necessary precondition for any future support they might offer for the CETA agenda. .

Caveats

Finally by way of introduction, it is important to qualify the following assessment by noting that it is based on unofficial and leaked copies of draft negotiating texts.³ Many of the details of current proposals have yet to be ironed out, and in many instances the drafts set out, in bracketed text, the respective negotiating positions of the two parties which remain to be settled. While the federal government has provided ongoing briefings concerning the progress of negotiations it has not been willing to be transparent about the actual details and substance of those negotiations.

THE ROLE OF PROCUREMENT

Before describing the procurement rules set out in the draft CETA text, it is appropriate to describe how public procurement is now being used by Canada and its principal trading partners, for as noted, both the conventional and more innovative uses of procurement would be largely ruled out by these proposed trade rules.

The Conventional Use of Procurement

Public procurement typically involves the expenditure of public funds to acquire goods (eg. computers, transit vehicles and wind turbines) and services (eg. engineering, accounting, waste management and energy conservation) for use by government or other public bodies. Subject to certain requirements concerning transparency and fairness, Canadian municipalities are relatively free to adopt whatever procurement practices they deem to be in the public interest.

In fact, procurement remains one of the few economic levers still available to governments under free trade, and may still be used to promote local economic development and create jobs. The importance of this tool is also explained by the fact that such public spending represents approximately 15-20% of GDP in OECD countries.⁴

Because of their utility and importance, many of Canada's trading partners have also preserved their rights to use procurement for economic and public policy purposes. For example, in the U.S. procurement is routinely used to promote community and local economic development –

³ These documents can be found on the website of the Trade Justice Network: (<http://www.tradejustice.ca/>)

⁴ Joint Report on the EU-Canada Scoping Exercise, March 5, 2009.

and preferences for local companies and goods are a ubiquitous feature of dozens of state and local procurement regimes.

Procurement to Foster Innovation and Sustainable Development

In addition to the more conventional uses of public procurement, it is increasingly being seen as providing an important tool for spurring innovation and creating markets for new products and services. Sometimes described as *strategic procurement*, this utilization of public purchasing can create demand for innovative technologies, products or services which stimulate a broader market. In this way public demand can play an important role with respect to the diffusion of new or alternative technologies, since public demand for innovative products also sends strong signals to private users.

Green Energy In Ontario

This in fact is the approach that Ontario has recently adopted as part of a green energy initiative under which the government is using public funding and spending to attract and create a market for renewable energy products and producers.

Under the Ontario *Green Energy Act, 2009*, a preferential feed-in tariff programme has been established to encourage the use of renewable energy. The *Green Energy Act* includes significant domestic content requirements for the procurement of renewable energy projects. According to this new policy, at least 25% of wind projects and 50% of large solar projects must contain Ontario goods and labour. These percentages will increase for solar in 2011 (up to 60%), and for wind in 2012 (up to 50%). Ontario sees this initiative as a way to stimulate the economy, provide energy security for the province, and to achieve important environmental goals, including the reduction of greenhouse gases. It is telling that the EU has specifically identified the Act and these programs as offending the principles of the CETA procurement rules it is proposing.⁵

Sustainable Waste Water Treatment and Energy

Another example of strategic procurement is provided by present plans by the Capital Regional District (CRD) of British Columbia to establish sewage treatment works and related facilities. The CRD waste water treatment project is comprised of several elements, including a waste water collection system, two main waste water treatment plants, an energy centre for biogas, waste heat and other energy recovery projects, and resource recovery facilities for biosolids and other waste products.⁶ The CRD has identified criteria for assessing the various options for proceeding with its project, including “the ability for the delivery option to provide maximum

⁵ MAAC 2009 – List of Key Market Access Barriers in Canada under the Market Access Strategy.

⁶ Capital Regional District Core Area Wastewater Management Program Potential Program Delivery Options, January 6, 2010.

economic benefit to the CRD and British Columbia in terms of jobs and other economic benefits”.

But the CRD also sees procurement as means for promoting environmental innovation with respect to the management of wastewater.⁷ In this regard, the CRD plan is seen as an important means for “integrating wastewater management into sustainable water, storm water, solid waste and energy planning for the community.” For practical applications of wastewater treatment resources, the possibilities are endless.”⁸ This type of strategic procurement by the CRD can provide a market for innovative Canadian environmental and energy engineering services and technologies, while achieving its other stated goal of promoting economic development for the region and Canada.

But as we describe below, under CETA rules the CRD would be prohibited from including “offsets” in procurement contracts for the purpose of encouraging local development “such as the use of domestic content ... [or] licensing of technology....” This rule clearly precludes procurement terms that would require any bidder to source environmental engineering services or technologies from Canadian providers, and would defeat the dual purposes the CRD is attempting to achieve.

Food Security

Another potential casualty of proposed CETA rules is buy-local food policies such as Toronto’s “Local Food Procurement Policy” which was explicitly adopted to “reduce greenhouse gas and smog causing emissions generated by the import of food from outside of Ontario.” That policy commits Toronto City Council “to progressively increase the percentage of food being served at City-owned facilities or purchased for City operations from local sources”. “Local” is defined as “food that is grown in the Greater Toronto Area, the Greenbelt of Ontario and other regions of Ontario.”⁹

The benefits of Toronto’s commitment were described as including reductions in:

- climate change and greenhouse gas emissions associated with food transportation and production;
- harmful effects of agricultural chemicals, in particular pesticides and fertilizers;

⁷ As noted by the CRD business case “... the CRD is committed to implementing a large number of sustainability initiatives in these Programs. The CRD will demonstrate leadership in the field of wastewater treatment and beneficial reuse, and also aim for carbon neutrality.” [G.5 Resource Recovery And Carbon Neutrality - business case]

⁸ <http://www.wastewatertomadeclar.ca/environment/benefits.htm>

⁹ See discussion <http://www.torontoenvironment.org/campaigns/greenbelt/localfoodprocurement>

- the long-term effects of large scale monocultures; and
- increased reliance on imported food and food security issues related to breaks in the food chain due to emergencies or natural disasters.

Here again, proposed CETA rules would rule out these procurement goals.

Strategic Procurement in the EU

One of the ironies here is that Ontario is in many ways following the lead of European countries that have adopted very similar strategies for fostering the development of renewable energy technologies such as wind turbines (Denmark) and photovoltaic cells (Germany). In fact, in Europe these initiatives were often taken up by municipal governments.

For example, s. 2 of Germany's *Renewable Energy Sources Act*, provides for:

1. priority connection to the grid systems for general electricity supply of installations generating electricity from renewable energy sources and from mine gas within the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, including its exclusive economic zone (territorial application of this Act),

2. the priority purchase, transmission, distribution of and payment for such electricity by the grid system operators ...

The U.K. is also committed to using public procurement to foster innovation. Its policy is set out in a publication titled "Driving innovation through public procurement" which shows government departments how they can encourage suppliers to use their capabilities and know-how to innovate in ways that will benefit both public services and the wider economy. The U.K. regards public procurers as having an important part to play "in making the U.K. the best place in the world to be an innovative business or public sector or third sector organisation."

As its responsible Ministry explains:

*Innovation is a key element in driving greater value for money from public sector procurement. By encouraging suppliers to develop novel techniques to help deliver public services we will continue to drive improvements in the performance of public services.*¹⁰

Given the very asymmetrical outcome of procurement negotiations with the U.S., which are described more fully below, it is a real concern that the EU may see an opportunity to challenge Ontario's green power initiative while leaving similar EU programs intact.

CURRENT CANADIAN PROCUREMENT PRACTICES

¹⁰ http://www.ogc.gov.uk/documents/Innovation_policy_statement.pdf

It is beyond the scope of this assessment to canvass the diverse procurement practices of Canadian municipalities and MASH sector bodies. Anecdotal accounts, however, indicate that a great deal of Canadian procurement by these sectors engender few restrictions on the right of EU-based corporations to bid on public tenders. It is also uncommon for tender calls to stipulate that some or all of the goods and services involved be acquired locally or even in Canada. Nevertheless, there are notable exceptions to open tendering when municipalities or MASH institutions feel these are warranted. These, however, are clearly the exception.

IS IT PROTECTIONISM?

When the US government incorporated long-standing local preferences to recent stimulus legislation, Canada was quick to denounce these provisions as protectionist. Putting aside for the moment that similar domestic purchase and assembly requirements have been a feature of U.S. law since the 1930s, and are consistent with its international trade obligations, it isn't obvious that such measures fit the definition of protectionism in any respect.

To begin with, procurement was not, until the advent of the WTO, a subject for inclusion in an international trade agreement. Under free trade rules, governments must not interfere with trade in goods across international borders, but they have not historically been required to spend public funds on foreign goods or services when they choose not to. Moreover, proposed CETA rules apply to services as well as goods – such as the planning, design, engineering, environmental assessment and management services associated with establishing a green box composting program, not just the green bins, trucks and composters needed to operate such a system.

More important than the label, however, is the very practical question of whether Canada should abandon such an important economic development tool, and why it should do so given the determination of the U.S. and other trading partners to maintain this authority.

SCOPE AND APPLICATION

The EU has tabled its initial request for the application of CETA procurement rules, and is proposing the inclusion of all procurement contracts with a value in excess of \$200,000 by the following entities:

- All sub central government entities including those operating at the local, regional or municipal level as well as all other entities in all Canadian Provinces and Territories, including:
 - in Ontario: the municipalities of Ottawa, Toronto, Hamilton, London, Richmond Hill, Kitchener, Vaughan, Brantford, Windsor, Markham, Greater Sudbury, Burlington, Oakville, Oshawa, St. Catharine's-Niagara, Sherbrooke, Thunder Bay, Kingston, Barrie, Guelph

- in Québec: the municipalities of Montréal (and/or Ville de Montréal ex-CUM), Québec, Longueuil, Gatineau, Trois Rivières, Laval, Chicoutimi-Jonquière
- in Alberta: Calgary, Edmonton
- in British Columbia: Vancouver, Richmond, Coquitlam, Burnaby, Abbotsford, Victoria, Kelowna
- in Manitoba: Winnipeg
- in other provinces: Regina, Saskatoon, Halifax, St John's (Newfoundland).
- All entities operating in the so-called M.A.S.H sector (municipalities, municipal organizations, school boards and publicly funded academic, health and social service entities) as well as any corporation or entity owned or controlled by one or more of the preceding.
- All other entities whose procurement policies are substantially controlled by, dependent on, or influenced by central, regional or local government, and which are engaged in commercial or industrial activities in one or more of the activities listed below.

1. Airports – including many run by municipal or regional authorities.

2. Transport – including the public transit systems of Canada's largest cities

3. Ports

4. Drinking water

All entities, as per the above definition, which provide or operate fixed networks intended to provide a service to the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of drinking water, or supply drinking water to such networks, including:

- EPCOR Edmonton
- Toronto Water and Emergency Services
- Municipal water and wastewater treatment entities

5. Energy

- All entities, as per the above definition, which provide or operate fixed networks intended to provide a service to the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of electricity, or the supply of electricity to such networks including Toronto Hydro.
- Services already listed under Canada's current GPA commitments, including:

- engineering related scientific and technical consulting services and technical testing and analysing services
 - financial management consulting services, public relations services and other management consulting services
 - maintenance and repair of motor vehicles
 - market research and public opinion polling services
 - printing and publishing services
 - telecommunications services
 - courier services
 - construction services
- Works concessions contracts, when awarded by annex 1 , 2 and 3 entities, and provided their value equals or exceeds 5 000 000 SDR, are included under the national treatment regime. N.B: The definition of works concessions and the applicable rules are to be agreed upon during the next Rounds.

As noted, these requests would impose permanent constraints on the exercise of procurement authority by sub-national Canadian governments, including municipalities and other local public entities, for the first time.

THE SUBSTANTIVE REQUIREMENTS OF CETA PROCUREMENT RULES

The essential requirements for procurement under CETA are essentially threefold and require municipalities and other public bodies:

1. to remove any preference for local companies, goods or services as a requirement for or condition of procurement;
2. to carry out procurement in accordance with the specifications and procedures delineated by CETA; and
3. to accord EU bidders with recourse, including the right to claim damages, if CETA rules are not strictly met.

We consider these in turn.

1. Procurement May not Favour Local Companies, Goods, Services or Workers

First, municipalities must provide access to the domestic procurement markets on a non-discriminatory basis. Article IV provides:

Non-Discrimination

1. *With respect to any measure regarding covered procurement, each Party, including its procuring entities, shall accord immediately and unconditionally to the goods and services of the other Party and to the suppliers of the other Party offering such goods or*

services, treatment no less favourable than the treatment the Party, including its procuring entities, accords to [EU: its own] [CAN: domestic] goods, services and [EU: locally established] suppliers.

2. With respect to any measure regarding covered procurement, a Party, including its procuring entities, shall not:

(a) treat a locally established supplier less favourably than another locally established supplier on the basis of the degree of foreign affiliation or ownership; or

(b) discriminate against a locally established supplier on the basis that the goods or services offered by that supplier for a particular procurement are goods or services of the other Party.

Equally important is the fact that these local entities are prohibited from stipulating conditions to a procurement that are intended in any way to encourage local development. In the terminology of international trade law, such a condition is known as an “offset” and is defined under CETA as follows:

offset means any condition or undertaking that encourages local development or improves a Party’s balance-of-payments accounts, such as the use of domestic content, the licensing of technology, investment, counter-trade and similar action or requirement;¹¹

and, under Article IV:6

With regard to covered procurement, a Party, including its procuring entities, shall not seek, take account of, impose or enforce any offset.

The ban on offsets is arguably the more serious constraint imposed by the regime, and it is important to note that it applies to all procurement contracts regardless of the national pedigree of the prospective bidders.

This means that where CETA rules apply, procurement can no longer be used as a tool to foster local or Canadian economic or sustainable development, facilitate innovation, promote social goals, support food security, or address local or Canadian environmental problems. At a time when procurement is one of the few economic levers available to governments, CETA rules would take it out of the hands of government and other public bodies.

2. Procurement Must be Conducted in Accordance With CETA Rules

The second general obligation of municipalities is to adopt the procurement procedures and practices delineated by CETA. Because the administrative burden and costs of complying with

¹¹ Article I(k)

these rules may be significant, and because non-compliance may give rise to damage claims by would-be or unsuccessful bidders, these substantive and procedural rules are briefly described here.

To begin with, procurement documents such as tender requests and requests for proposals must be drafted in accordance with detailed technical specifications set out by the Agreement.¹² Municipalities must also allow sufficient time for EU suppliers to prepare and submit requests for participation and responsive tenders.

The federal government is obliged to publish information about the requirements, conditions and statistics related to public procurement including by municipal governments and the MASH sector.¹³ Much of that information would have to be gathered by municipalities and reported in some manner to the federal government.

Detailed and Summary Notices of Intended Procurements

Municipalities would have direct responsibility for publishing detailed notices¹⁴ of intended procurement,¹⁵ and according to EU proposals this information would be gathered and disseminated free of charge through “single point of access”.¹⁶ Municipalities are also to be

¹² Article IX

¹³ Article V, ss. 1-3

¹⁴ Article VI: 2. Except as otherwise provided in this Chapter, each notice of intended procurement shall include:

- (a) the name and address of the procuring entity and other information necessary to contact the procuring entity and obtain all relevant documents relating to the procurement, and their cost and terms of payment, if any;
- (b) a description of the procurement, including the nature and the quantity of the goods or services to be procured or, where the quantity is not known, the estimated quantity;
- (c) for recurring contracts, an estimate, if possible, of the timing of subsequent notices of intended procurement;
- (d) a description of any options;
- (e) the time-frame for delivery of goods or services or the duration of the contract;
- (f) the procurement method that will be used and whether it will involve negotiation or electronic auction;
- (g) where applicable, the address and any final date for the submission of requests for participation in the procurement;
- (h) the address and the final date for the submission of tenders;
- (i) the language or languages in which tenders or requests for participation may be submitted, if they may be submitted in a language other than an official language of the Party of the procuring entity;
- (j) a list and brief description of any conditions for participation of suppliers, including any requirements for specific documents or certifications to be provided by suppliers in connection therewith, unless such requirements are included in tender documentation that is made available to all interested suppliers at the same time as the notice of intended procurement;
- (k) where, pursuant to Article VIII, a procuring entity intends to select a limited number of qualified suppliers to be invited to tender, the criteria that will be used to select them and, where applicable, any limitation on the number of suppliers that will be permitted to tender; and
- (l) an indication that the procurement is covered by this Chapter.

¹⁵ Article VI 1-2

¹⁶ Idem

responsible for publishing “a summary notice that is readily accessible, at the same time as the publication of the notice of intended procurement, in English or French.”¹⁷ Municipalities are either to be “encouraged” [CAN] or required [EU] to also publish notices of planned procurements as early as possible in each fiscal year.

It is beyond the scope of this assessment to estimate the costs of gathering, translating, and reporting this information. Municipalities may also want to know how the costs of maintaining a single national procurement information system are to be allocated.

Post-Procurement Reporting Requirements

Municipalities would also be responsible for complying with significant post-contract reporting which would entail:

- providing an unsuccessful supplier with an explanation of the reasons why the entity did not select its tender and the relative advantages of the successful supplier’s tender, when requested to do so;
- publishing a notice describing the details of the procurement and successful bidder;
- maintaining documentation concerning the procurement for a period of 3 years;
- collecting and reporting relevant statistical information about its procurement, which Canada suggests be presented as annual reports.

3. Dispute Resolution and Enforcement Procedures

It is likely that the most onerous costs for municipalities from having to comply with CETA procurement rules will arise when claims are brought by unsuccessful bidders. Resolving such claims will engage a multi-staged dispute process that would be demanding of staff resources, may involve significant legal and compensation costs, and that could potentially derail the entire procurement process.

Stage 1: Disclosure of Information

Municipal procurement practices and decisions can be challenged under CETA by both the EU and unsuccessful bidders. At first instance, municipalities would be obligated to promptly provide the federal government with information explaining whether a particular procurement was carried out in compliance with CETA rules.

Article XVI:1 (*Provision of Information to Parties*) provides:

¹⁷ Article VI:4

On request of the other Party, a Party shall provide promptly any information necessary to determine whether a procurement was conducted fairly, impartially and in accordance with this Chapter, including information on the characteristics and relative advantages of the successful tender. (subject to certain exceptions where disclosure would eg. impede law enforcement or legitimate commercial interests)

Stage 2: Challenges by Unsuccessful Bidders

Unsuccessful suppliers are to be accorded the right to challenge the procurement before an independent administrative or judicial body and be given sufficient time to do so. Thus, under Article XVII (Domestic Review Procedures):

2. Each Party shall provide a timely, effective, transparent and non-discriminatory administrative or judicial review procedure through which a supplier may challenge:

(a) a breach of the Chapter; or

(b) where the supplier does not have a right to challenge directly a breach of the Chapter under the domestic law of a Party, a failure to comply with a Party's measures implementing this Chapter,

arising in the context of a covered procurement, in which the supplier has, or has had, an interest. The procedural rules for all challenges shall be in writing and made generally available.

3. Each supplier shall be allowed a sufficient period of time to prepare and submit a challenge, which in no case shall be less than 10 days from the time when the basis of the challenge became known or reasonably should have become known to the supplier.

Where a municipality establishes an informal process of review, an appeal to an independent adjudicator must be allowed.¹⁸

The Canadian International Trade Tribunal

In Canada such disputes are likely to be resolved by the Canadian International Trade Tribunal, and may engender significant legal costs and delay. The CITT currently has responsibility for inquiring into complaints by potential suppliers concerning procurement by the federal government that is covered by the NAFTA, the AIT and the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP).

There were 131 procurement disputes that proceeded before the CITT last year. The decisions are posted on line and reveal the complexity of such disputes. Many CITT procurement cases involved the participation of several legal teams, and it is not uncommon for such disputes to take months to adjudicate. Moreover, the right to seek judicial review of CITT decisions before

¹⁸ Article SVII:5.

the Federal Court of Appeal may also be an option for an unsuccessful bidder that fails before the Tribunal. Not only is the expense of such proceedings typically onerous, but an unsuccessful bidder may be able to tie up the procurement process for many months by making a claim.

Stage 3: Preserving the Rights of Unsuccessful Bidders

In addition to the delay and costs of adjudicating such claims, an unsuccessful bidder is entitled to have its rights preserved while any dispute is resolved, including, for example, by way of an order suspending the procurement process itself.

Article XVII: 7(a) requires each Party to establish procedures that provide for:

rapid interim measures to preserve the supplier's opportunity to participate in the procurement. Such interim measures may result in suspension of the procurement process. The procedures may provide that overriding adverse consequences for the interests concerned, including the public interest, may be taken into account when deciding whether such measures should be applied. Just cause for not acting shall be provided in writing; [emphasis added]

It is not clear whether the suspension of the procurement process will remain a permissive rather than mandatory feature of the regime, but it is obvious that such an eventuality has the potential to seriously derail the plans of both the municipality and the successful bidder.

Stage 4: Compensating Unsuccessful Bidders

Where the complaint of the unsuccessful bidder is borne out, the review body is to have the authority to require the municipality to compensate the unsuccessful bidder or remedy the breach. Article XVII: 7(b) provides:

where a review body has determined that there has been a breach or a failure as referred to in paragraph 1, corrective action or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be limited to either the costs for the preparation of the tender or the costs relating to the challenge, or both. [emphasis added]

In light of the fact that the contract would have already been awarded to another bidder, it is likely that compensation would be the usual remedy for non-compliance, unless the procurement process has been suspended pending the outcome of the claim. These costs too may be considerable, for the costs of preparing a bid for a significant project can be very substantial. Moreover, it is possible that compensation could be payable to more than one unsuccessful bidder where CETA procurement rules are breached.

It is finally worth noting that when formal and expensive legal remedies become available to participants in a process, the threat of litigation may influence the selection process to the prejudice of bidders less able or inclined to litigate if their bid is unsuccessful.

THE SPECIAL CASE OF WATER-RELATED PROCUREMENT

The federal government has made efforts to preserve its sovereign control over water when negotiating international trade agreements, and has been very deliberate about not committing water supply services under the services or procurement agreements of the WTO.¹⁹ Knowing these sensitivities, the EU has nevertheless made of point of requesting that Canada include drinking water services under the CETA procurement agreement. That request is made in the following terms:

All Annex 1 and Annex 2 entities [sub-national entities including municipalities] which exercise one or more of the activities referred to below and in respect of contracts awarded for the pursuit of any of those activities. And all other entities whose procurement policies are substantially controlled by, dependent on, or influenced by central, regional or local government, and which are engaged in commercial or industrial activities in one or more of the activities listed below.

Drinking water

All entities, as per the above definition, which provide or operate fixed networks intended to provide a service to the public in connection with the production, transport or distribution of drinking water, or supply drinking water to such networks, including:

- *EPCOR Edmonton*
- *Toronto Water and Emergency Services*
- *Municipal water and wastewater treatment entities.*

No doubt the fact that the world's largest water service companies, Veolia and Suez, both of France, and Thames Water of England, are based in EU explains why the EU would make such a problematic request given Canada's reluctance to make such commitments.

The objective of these large water conglomerates is to expand their Canadian markets by winning contracts to establish and/or operate water supply and waste water treatment facilities and services. Companies like Vivendi and RWE (which formerly owned Thames) have bid on several public-private partnership schemes to design, build, finance and operate water and waste water systems in Canada.

These companies have also been actively engaged in lobbying for stronger international services, investment and procurement rules to promote the privatization of water and wastewater services. From their perspective, international rules would ideally require municipalities and

¹⁹ See for example, Canada's explanatory notes to Appendix 1 of the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement which stipulates that: For the European Union, this Agreement shall not apply to contracts awarded by entities in Annexes 1 and 2 in connection with activities in the field of drinking water, energy, transport or telecommunications.

other entities to tender for such services rather than provide them through municipal or publicly owned water utilities.

The EU proposal to include water supply services does not go that far, but of course it would allow an EU-based transnational water company to bid on any privatization or P3 scheme that was tendered. In this scenario, and as we have seen in the case of the CRD wastewater treatment project, a municipality could not stipulate that the successful bidder use Canadian goods or services for carrying out the project, or impose conditions to the tender that would encourage local development in any other way.

Proposed CETA rules would allow a water conglomerate to get its foot in the door whenever a Canadian municipality or covered water utility tenders for any goods (eg. water treatment technology) or services (eg. for engineering, design, construction, or the operational services) relating to water supply systems. That contractual relationship could then provide a platform for the company to expand its interests in the water or waste water systems.

It is also important to understand these procurement rights in the context of proposed CETA investment rules. As noted, Canada is proposing that EU and Canadian investors be given the right to claim damages for any breach by the Party of the investor rights established by CETA. Similar rights have been written into NAFTA and many bi-lateral investment treaties – the latter typically negotiated with developing nations. Transnational water companies such as Vivendi (now Veolia) and Bechtel have invoked the dispute procedures of these treaties to claim damages when their investments in water privatization schemes have gone sour.²⁰ Even the threat of such litigation (claims are often in the \$10s of millions) can make it difficult for a municipality to extricate itself from a privatization scheme with a company that has the right to make such a claim even where there is good cause for severing the relationship.

In this way, international investment rules provide an important complement to those that facilitate foreign investment. Thus CETA procurement rules open the door for large water conglomerates to establish a stake in municipal water systems, and CETA investment rules effectively lock in those investments.

The most serious threat to public ownership and control of water arises from the risk of private entities being able to establish a proprietary claim to the water itself. Such claims have in fact already been made against Canada under NAFTA rules - in the Sunbelt²¹ case arising from a ban by British Columbia on bulk water exports and in the Abitibi case, arising from Newfoundland's decision to reclaim a water use permit and related hydro-power facilities when the company decided to close a paper mill powered by those resources.

²⁰ A summary of these and other investor-state claims can be found on the website of the World Bank Centre for the Settlement of International Investment Disputes (ICSID), at <http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID>.

²¹ The Sunbelt claim has been dormant for years, but illustrates the risks associated with allowing foreign investor the open-ended rights engendered by NAFTA investment rules.

Because P3 schemes commonly span decades, they establish an ongoing interest in the water that is necessary for the services being provided. Indeed, schemes to sell the effluent from waste water treatment plants have already been proposed. It is not implausible that international investment rules might be invoked to assert an interest in the underlying resource – water. While such a scenario may seem unlikely, the same was said about the Sunbelt and Abitibi claims as well.

EXCEPTIONS

While the scope and application of CETA rules would be unprecedented, the proposed Agreement does set out a limited number of exceptions. For present purposes the most important of these are exceptions are the following:

Article II:3

(a) the acquisition or rental of land, existing buildings or other immovable property or the rights thereon;

(b) non-contractual agreements or any form of assistance that a Party provides, including cooperative agreements, grants, loans, equity infusions, guarantees and fiscal incentives;

Article III:2

Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner that would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between Parties where the same conditions prevail or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent a Party from imposing or enforcing measures:

(a) necessary to protect public morals, order or safety;

(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health;

(c) necessary to protect intellectual property; or

(d) relating to goods or services of persons with disabilities, philanthropic institutions or prison labour.

Article IX:6

(Technical Specifications and Tender Documentation): For greater certainty, a Party, including its procuring entities, may, in accordance with this Article, prepare, adopt or apply technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment.

The language of Article III:2 is taken from Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which includes two exceptions that have been invoked, unsuccessfully, to defend environmental measures. The more important of these, which speaks to the conservation of natural resources (Article XX (g)), is not included under Article III and the omission is obviously deliberate. However, the interpretation of the term “necessary” has established such a high bar for environmental and conservation standards to meet that none have survived the challenge.

As for the right to apply technical specifications to promote the conservation of natural resources or protect the environment (Article IX:6), this exception would not allow for the types of conditionality attached to Ontario’s green energy program or allow the Capital Region of British Columbia to use procurement to spur environmental innovation by Canadian companies. In other words, while these environmental exceptions should be noted, they will have no material impact on moderating the prohibition of CETA procurement rules on any procurement condition, green or otherwise, that would encourage, either directly or indirectly, local development.

A CAUTIONARY TALE

In February, 2010, Canada entered into the Canada-U.S. Procurement Agreement (CUSPA)²² which was comprised of three elements, one of which included temporary Canadian procurement commitments for construction projects by many municipalities. In return, the federal government claimed the agreement would secure access to U.S. stimulus spending by exempting Canada from the “Buy American” provisions of the *Recovery Act*.

However, when the details of the deal were finally made public, it was apparent that Canada had gotten very little in exchange for opening its procurement markets to U.S. construction companies. Remarkably, Canada had agreed to an arrangement that obligated Canadian provinces and municipalities to open their procurement markets to U.S. bidders for construction services, but imposed no reciprocal obligation on U.S. states and municipalities.²³

In fact, extensive state and municipal procurement preferences for local companies, goods and services that are ubiquitous in the U.S. were unaltered under CUSPA.²⁴ This means that while a U.S. construction company is entitled to bid on certain Canadian municipal construction projects, Canadian companies have no similar right to bid on U.S. projects. There are also CUSPA asymmetries concerning the scope of goods covered and remedies available for non-compliance that also clearly favour the U.S.

²² Agreement Between the Government of Canada and the Government of the United States of America on Government Procurement, February 3, 2010.

²³ *Idem.*, Part B, Temporary Agreement on Enhanced Coverage, Article 6: Canada’s Sub-Central Coverage.

²⁴ Canada maintains an extensive list of US state and local procurement restrictions and preferences, see Government of Canada, U.S. State Procurement Preferences at <http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/sell2usgov-vendreaougouvusa/opportunities-opportunitites/opportunities-debouches.aspx?lang=eng>

The federal government's claim that it had secured access to U.S. stimulus spending also didn't stand up to scrutiny. According to an uncontroverted assessment carried out by the Canadian Centre on Policy Alternatives (the CCPA), even if taken at face value, Canadian companies gained access to less than 2% of the approximately \$US 275 billion of procurement funded under the *Recovery Act*.²⁵ But this access is subject to several qualifications and exclusions that greatly reduce the value of even this modest access to US procurement.

"Deal or No Deal"

The obvious question is why the Federal Government would have committed Canadian governments and municipalities to such a one-sided arrangement, and two possible explanations come to mind. The first is that Canadian trade officials are extremely poor negotiators. The other is that the political imperative to conclude a deal was such that the government felt compelled to accept an agreement on any terms, regardless of how disadvantageous the terms may be for Canada.

Unfortunately, CETA negotiations appear to reflect similar dynamics to those at play in the case of CUSPA. The Federal government once again has made a public political commitment to negotiating a ground-breaking free trade deal with a trading partner that did not initially see the rationale for a bi-lateral arrangement with Canada, at least until it understood how determined Canada was to conclude a deal. EC trade negotiators will be as hard-nosed as their U.S. counterparts, and quite ready to take advantage of the federal government's need for a 'successful' outcome to its trade initiative.

These dynamics strongly reinforce the need for municipalities to be vigilant in following the progress of CETA negotiations and to be precise about its collective bottom line. When FCM appeared before the Standing Committee on International Trade to discuss CUSPA, it declined to either endorse or reject that arrangement and reminded the Committee of the principles it had urged the Trade Minister to adopt in pursuing any trade initiative.

We believe it would be prudent to revisit those principles in light of the outcome of CUSPA negotiations, and for municipalities to seek a clear assurance from the Federal Government that it will not trade away the authority of local governments to use procurement to achieve economic, social, environmental, sustainability and other valid public policy goals.

Sincerely,

Steven Shrybman
SS:lr/cope 343

²⁵ Scott Sinclair, *Negotiating from Weakness, Canada-EU trade treaty threatens Canadian purchasing policies and public services*, April 2010. <http://www.policyalternatives.ca/publications/reports/negotiating-%E2%80%89weakness>

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