January 22, 2016

Mr. Peter Wallace
City Manager
City of Toronto
Toronto City Hall
11th Floor, East Tower
100 Queen Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 2N2

Mr. Bruce Macgregor
Chief Administrative Officer
Regional Municipality of York
17250 Yonge Street
Newmarket, ON L3Y 6Z1

Dear Messrs. Wallace and Macgregor:

At its meeting on Thursday, January 21, 2016 the TTC Board considered the attached report entitled "Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension – Schedule and Budget Reset".

The Board adopted the recommendations in the staff report, as follows:

"It is recommended that the Board approve the following recommendations and forward to the City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York together with a copy of this report:

1. Approve the recommendations as set out in the Confidential Attachment;

2. In accordance with the current funding commitments, City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York be requested to confirm funding of the increase in project costs of $400 million (exclusive of HST). The additional $400 million of funding equates to $240 million to the City of Toronto and $160 million to The Regional Municipality of York.

3. That the TYSSE budget as required to complete the project by December 31, 2017 be increased to $3.184 billion.

4. Authorize that the information provided in the Confidential Attachment is to remain confidential until such time as all claims and litigation are settled related to this project".
The Board also adopted the following motions:

i) That a copy of the Confidential Attachment be provided to the Councils of the City of Toronto and the Regional Municipality of York as "common-interest" privilege as they are responsible for the funding commitments and funding liabilities as contained within the Confidential Attachment.

ii) That staff be requested to provide monthly in-camera update reports on claims settlement.

The foregoing is submitted for your consideration with particular emphasis on the confidentiality requirements of this material, and the detrimental impacts of improper disclosure without the knowledge and approval of the TTC Board.

Sincerely,

Vincent Rodo  
Chief Financial &  
Administration Officer

1-11  
Attachments
STAFF REPORT
ACTION REQUIRED
With Confidential Attachment

Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension – Schedule and Budget Reset

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date:</th>
<th>January 21, 2016</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To:</td>
<td>TTC Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From:</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reason for Confidential Information:</td>
<td>This report contains advice that is subject to solicitor-client and litigation privilege, including communications necessary for that purpose.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Summary

The Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension (TYSSE) is a six-station, 8.6 km extension of the TTC’s Line 1 that will, for the first time, link another municipality to the TTC subway system, dramatically improving rapid transit in the Greater Toronto Area. The TYSSE is funded by the Government of Canada, Province of Ontario, City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York.

In March 2015, TTC staff brought a report to the TTC Board and Toronto City Council that outlined the need for a project reset to ensure completion of the subway line by December 2017. The report also explained the need for additional funding of $150 million for project management costs that included the services of Bechtel Canada Co. as project manager to meet that timeline, review claims and put rigour around a claims management process. The additional costs are borne by the City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York at 60 per cent and 40 per cent respectively.

Staff indicated in March that they would report back at the end of 2015 on additional project costs, including claims, that were unknown at the time. This report, and the Confidential Attachment, does that.

This report outlines costs to date, plus additional forecasted cost exposures (see Confidential Attachment). The Confidential Attachment discusses legal strategies and other legal exposures due to outstanding claims and litigation that remain in dispute. Until an agreement on those claims and associated costs is reached, the Confidential Attachment is “privileged” and must remain confidential to ensure the project’s negotiating and legal position is not compromised.
The Cost Reset has identified an amount of $400 million (excluding HST) as the additional required funding to cover the following costs:

- Known claims settlements;
- Identified changes in scope that have not been finalized with the contractors;
- Underestimated budget for remaining project scope;
- Co-ordination of the work;
- Risk mitigation strategies;
- Litigation management costs;
- Contingency; and
- Forecasted cost exposure for unresolved claims and litigation matters.

The TYSSE saw start-up delays, poor performance by some contractors, and scope and design changes, which were not factored into either the schedule or the project budget at the time. This report addresses those matters, as they are germane to the history of this complex project, which is now approximately 80 per cent complete. This report also details, however, the work done by the project team and various contractors in just a few short months to reset the project, negotiate and settle some claims, and strengthen and improve relationships.

**Recommendations**

It is recommended that the Board approve the following recommendations and forward to the City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York together with a copy of this report:

1. Approve the recommendations as set out in the Confidential Attachment;

2. In accordance with the current funding commitments, City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York be requested to confirm funding of the increase in project costs of $400 million (exclusive of HST). The additional $400 million of funding equates to $240 million to the City of Toronto and $160 million to The Regional Municipality of York;

3. That the TYSSE budget as required to complete the project by December 31, 2017 be increased to $3.184 billion.

4. Authorize that the information provided in the Confidential Attachment is to remain confidential until such time as all claims and litigation are settled related to this project.
Financial Impact

The current approved TYSSE budget is $2.784 billion. The total cost is split between the Federal Government, the Province of Ontario, the City of Toronto and York Region. In 2006, the Province provided funding of $670 million for TYSSE project costs, creating the “Move Ontario Trust” to hold and invest project funds. In 2007, the Province added additional funding of $200 million to the Trust, for a total principal amount of $870 million. Including interest income, total Provincial and Trust funding was estimated at $1.059 billion. In 2007, the Federal Government pledged up to $697 million towards eligible project costs, subsequently providing $75 million up-front, and $622 million by way of the Building Canada Fund Contribution Agreement.

The one-third municipal share is split between Toronto (59.96 per cent) and York Region (40.04 per cent). Under the current funding agreements, the municipalities are responsible for making up any cost overruns. In March 2015, the City of Toronto and The Regional Municipality of York Councils approved an increase to the project budget of $150 million to fund additional project costs for a project reset, including the retention of a third party project manager.

Table 1 outlines the proposed revised budget for the project resulting from the recommendations included in this report.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$ Millions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Original Budget</td>
<td>$2,634</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Budget increase approved March 2015</td>
<td>$150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total additional budget requested</td>
<td>$400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revised Budget</td>
<td>$3,184</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Accessibility Matters

All stations on the TYSSE have extensive facilities (such as elevators, escalators, tactile markings, etc.) that comply with the Accessibility for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (AODA). Furthermore, the service the TYSSE provides will improve access to jobs and opportunities for a large number of residents of Toronto and York Region and students at York University, and any delay to the start of service delays access to these opportunities.

Decision History

The Decision History for this matter is listed in Attachment 1.
Issue Background – TYSSE Project Reset

At its meeting of March 26, 2015, the TTC Board approved, in part, proceeding with the sole source contract to a third party in accordance with the recommended Option No. 1 based on a total known cost of $150 million with the goal of achieving the opening of the TYSSE by the end of 2017.

On April 10, 2015, the Board approved terms of a contract with the third party, Bechtel, and the contract was signed shortly afterward. Bechtel staff were on site and began working on the Project Reset in April 2015.

The TYSSE project team led by Bechtel has completed, since April 2015, its assessment of the Project Reset focused on achieving the following project goals:

- Improving the collaboration among the parties, both internally in the project team and externally with designers, contractors, and stakeholders for a more effective and efficient completion of the project.
- Developing a re-baselined schedule for completion of the project by December 31, 2017.
- Establishing a re-baselined cost forecast for completion of the project.
- Identifying a claims settlement strategy.

These goals were derived from the Project Reset, as originally conceived by an American Public Transit Association (APTA) Review in November 2014, described in more detail in the Bechtel Project Executive Summary of January 2015 (attached to March 2015 TTC Board report).

The TTC continues to function as the project manager with the addition of Bechtel staff to the project team. The role of the TYSSE Executive Task Force (ETF) has continued through this reset process, providing project oversight, budget recommendations and progress reporting. The TTC Board provides overall governance for the project under its policies and procedures.

Comments

Schedule Reset

The Project Reset effort resulted in a comprehensive integrated reset schedule for the delivery of the TYSSE Project. The schedule is based on the planning of all of the participants in the construction of the facilities and systems, in the testing and commissioning, and in the initial operations. All activities are logically linked so that the updates of progress across the project will reflect actual performance against time and provide a tool for management and decision making across the project team.
Once the reset schedule was established in August 2015, a risk assessment was produced using Primavera scheduling software. The analysis used a conservative approach to the schedule logic.

The reset schedule to deliver the project to revenue service by December 2017 was rolled out to the project contractors based on the schedule status as of the end of August 2015. The reset schedule has since been used as the tool to monitor project performance by the TYSSE project team and with the contractors. While substantial performance of each station contract is important, the critical path to open the subway is tied to completion of specific areas and equipment rooms to provide access for follow-on systems contractors, ultimately leading to component and system-wide testing and commissioning. Since the rollout of the integrated schedule in August 2015, the TYSSE critical path has been maintained.

**Cost Reset**

The Project Reset effort resulted in a comprehensive new cost forecast based on a bottom-up analysis of all project costs. The estimated final cost of each cost component: stations, tunnels and systems contracts and other project elements is the sum of the current contract value, the known changes, the identified trends and the received and expected claims.

A bottom-up estimate of final costs was developed starting with the cost and commitments as of April 1, 2015 and estimates of the “to-go” or remaining costs. The reset total was then compared to current budgeted amounts. All of the facilities and systems components were analyzed for base scope, changes, trends, claims, both actual and potential, using a cut-off date of end-March 2015. All of the supporting components were analyzed for comprehensiveness, allocation, and value.

The Project Reset cost forecast aligns with the re-baselined integrated schedule described above and will serve as the new baseline against which future changes will be assessed. A Trend Program is now in place to capture all potential cost change items for active management.

A component to the reset of the project is the issue of cost exposure to and mitigation of contractor claims and litigation matters. Due to ongoing legal related matters, additional information is provided in the Confidential Attachment.

The project team used risk and probability analysis software to determine the probability of a cost overrun on the project at this stage. Using that probability, the team then determined the appropriate level of contingency required to complete the project. The remaining or “to-go” costs on the project were assessed such that the to-go contingency value was not overstated. Capped scopes of work costs were excluded from contingency requirements.

It is important to note that the increase in the project budget is related to a variety of matters as noted above. The project team will vigorously defend any and all
unsubstantiated claims and that a rigorous claims management process has been established to vet all project specific claims.

The Cost Reset has identified an amount of $400 million (excluding HST) as the additional required funding to cover the costs for the following items:

- Known claims settlements;
- Identified changes in scope that have not been finalized with the contractors;
- Underestimated budget for remaining project scope;
- Risk mitigation strategies;
- Litigation management costs;
- Co-ordination of the work;
- Contingency; and
- Forecasted cost exposure for unresolved claims and litigation matters.

**Review and Findings of Schedule and Cost Reset**

A comprehensive schedule and cost analysis was conducted in the initial 120 days and submitted to the TTC’s Legal Counsel and the TTC’s CEO review. The TTC undertook a preliminary review of this analysis. The re-baselined schedule was accepted to implement and the re-baselined cost forecast was put forward for further review. Acting on the direction of the TTC’s Legal Counsel and the TTC’s CEO, TTC staff and City of Toronto and York Region staff then conducted a series of joint reviews of the cost forecast as follows:

- Identified filters to serve as the foundation of TTC, City of Toronto and York Region staff due diligence;
- Held a series of working sessions to conduct comprehensive reviews of the cost forecast through the Fall of 2015;
- Additional peer reviews were undertaken by TTC, City of Toronto and York Region staff during this period. The findings of staff were presented and discussed with ETF members; and
- The final results of these reviews was presented to ETF in December 2015, for discussion. ETF members agreed with the findings of the cost forecast, which now form the basis of this report.

**Project Progress to Date**

The project, to date, is approximately 80 per cent complete, with detailed tunnel, station and track work completion as set out below in Table 2. Systems installation has begun in a number of key areas as rooms are finished in stations and track installation is completed in tunnels.

Since April 2015, a number of key achievements have been realized:
• New schedule and milestones rolled out to all contractors.
• Marked improvement in processing requests for information from contractors.
• Resolution and payment for outstanding changes.
• Implementation of trends program to identify potential for new changes.
• Resolution of significant number of claims.

Table 2 – Progress by Major Component (end of December 2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>% Complete As of Dec 31 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sheppard West &amp; Southern Twin Tunnels</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finch West</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>York University *</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pioneer Village</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hwy 407 &amp; Northern Twin Tunnels</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vaughan Metropolitan Centre</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Track work</td>
<td>87</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Last contract awarded

The rollout of the project integrated schedule has established a common understanding of the critical path to deliver the TYSSE project to revenue service by December 2017. The program-wide schedule emphasis on the critical path relates to completion of critical equipment rooms for systems. Therefore, the project focus at each station is to maintain the critical path work through the room turnovers to support system installation, testing and commissioning. Since the roll out of the integrated schedule in August 2015, the TYSSE critical path has been maintained.

**TYSSE Project Historical Cost and Schedule Impacts**

To put the additional costs of the project in perspective, it is important to review, at a high level, a number of key factors that influenced the project since its inception at the Environmental Assessment stage in 2005.

Previous reports on the project’s progress identified a number of challenges to the project schedule and budget, the most recent being the report to the TTC’s Board in March 2015. The March 2015 report, in addition to a previous report in October 2012, provides a description of the challenges facing the project over its history. At the time of that report, the impact to the schedule and budget of the project had not been quantified. This report now addresses these impacts.
The key themes that have driven the cost and schedule impacts to the project from its inception in 2005 to current day can be summarized as follows:

1. Delay in release of funding;
2. Selection of Project delivery strategy;
3. Scope changes and design evolution prior to contract tender;
4. Design maturity at tender;
5. Contractor performance; and
6. Project management execution.

Attachment 3 – TYSSE Schedule – Proposed vs. Actual provides a graphic illustration of the schedule impact that the items noted above had on the TYSSE schedule.

In most cases, choices and impacts that fall under each of these themes resulted in either a cost or schedule impact or both to the project. Each of these elements is discussed briefly below. Some information on costs and impacts are included in the Confidential Attachment as they relate to ongoing legal related matters.

1. **Delay to Project Funding**

The initial schedule for the project was based on funding being available to establish the project team by January 2007 with design contracts being awarded within about nine months. The initial schedule showed an in-service date of mid-2015 (seven-eight years from start of design). By September 2006, provincial and municipal funding was approved in place (with conditions). However, despite an announcement of a federal contribution in March 2007, the federal funding was not secured until execution of the Building Canada Fund Contribution Agreement. A top up of $200 million was added by the Province in late 2007 in order to cover a shortfall in funding (and to ensure a fully funded project) as the federal funding was allocated based on the original, unescalated project budget and did not represent one-third of the then current budget. The Building Canada Fund Contribution Agreement was not signed until September 2008. The release of federal funding allowed for major station design contracts to be awarded. However, the delay in receiving the Federal funding resulted in a delay of 14 months from the initial availability of January 2007. This added schedule delay also resulted in additional costs.

2. **Selection of Project Delivery Strategy**

Early on in the project development, TTC staff undertook an in-depth analysis of project delivery factors, including a review of transit projects world-wide and enlisting the assistance of third party expertise in order to develop a project delivery strategy to meet the project timelines and budget.

In addition, under the terms of Federal Contribution Agreement, an “objective and independent” P3 screen and project delivery analysis was required for the project. For this purpose, the Move Ontario Trust and the ETF retained third party expertise from PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), which undertook a two-phased project delivery
analysis, with the participation of TTC, ETF, City of Toronto and York Region, and in the second phase, the ETF independent engineer and two subject matter experts.

In the fall of 2008 and January 2009, a series of risk workshops were undertaken to analyze and evaluate the project delivery options and identify the preferred strategy. The options were narrowed down to two key options: design-build, and design-bid-build. The results of the evaluation indicated that either option could be used to deliver the project. However, given the lack of experience at that time by either the TTC (or Infrastructure Ontario) in delivering underground rapid transit projects using a Private Public Partnership/Design-Build model, it was recommended and accepted that the preferred option was design-bid-build.

The design-bid-build strategy selected consisted of six major contracts involving four individual station contracts and two station-plus-tunnels contracts together with additional system contracts. The result of this contract strategy was the creation of an increased number of interfaces between the various contractors. The TTC adopted this strategy with these known risks.

3. Scope Changes and Design Evolution

The original project scope and associated budget were based upon the design concepts identified in the two environmental assessments prepared by Toronto/TTC and York Region in 2006. The initial project cost estimates were based on costs for station and tunnel design standards for the Sheppard Subway, specifically using TTC design standards for all facilities. A significant number of changes to the scope of the project resulted in added costs being absorbed by the project contingency, including:

- Design excellence: iconic architecture and design philosophy approved by the TTC Board (examples of the difference between Sheppard Subway designs, initial TYSSE World Class Architectural Concepts and TYSSE Approved designs is shown in Appendix 3). Architects with world-wide transit design expertise were sought and selected and initially delivered unconstrained designs. These designs required significant scaling back to bring them more in line with project budget and TTC standards.
- Significant geotechnical issues: station designs needed to include significant enhancements to counteract effects of high water table and uplift pressures.
- Third Party Changes: required by third parties to address new design standards (e.g. Toronto Green Standard), major stakeholder/property owner development requirements, and integration with other transit projects.
- Changes to Design Concept: numerous design concept revisions in the initial stages of design.
- Changes to Project Delivery: changes such as purchasing an additional tunnel boring machine.
- Changes to Project Design: changes such as increased tunnel diameter and shifting of tunnel alignment in two locations to accommodate significant design challenges.
4. **Design Maturity**

The design process for the stations and tunnels began in November 2008, after the award of the station design contracts in October 2008. The design schedule was established based on the contract strategy laid out in the project delivery strategy. This design schedule required that the first two contracts to be put out to tender would be the two stations and tunnels contracts. In order to meet the project timelines, with a project opening of mid-2015, the stations and tunnels contracts would need to be awarded by end of 2010.

The initial phase of design had several significant challenges, including changes to scope, as noted above, extensive re-work of early design concepts to reduce complexity and cost of designs, numerous iterations to designs to respond to changing stakeholder requirements. Integration with other transit projects, including a GO Rail station at Downsview Park, provision for Highway 407 Transitway, Finch West LRT, and Highway 7 Viva Transitway required numerous co-ordination efforts to design interfaces. These challenges resulted in delays to design progress varying from three-six months.

5. **Contractor Performance**

Performance issues amongst the major contractors have been reported to the TTC Board on numerous occasions over the past three years, in most detail in the October 2012 report. In summary, contractor performance issues that have had a significant impact on the overall progress of the project, and have previously been reported, include:

- Significant delays in contractor mobilization;
- Lack of familiarity of Ontario contracting environment and practises;
- Shortage of sub-trades and resources;
- Reluctance to accelerate or use premium time to recover schedule;
- Fatality at York University station site; and
- Harsh winter weather (two years).

6. **Project Management Execution**

The team was built on a successful model from the Sheppard Subway project. The TTC contracting and procurement practises were adapted from experience and recent practices including resources for:

- Design management.
- Construction management.
- Contract management/procurement.
- Controls – schedule and cost management.
- Risk Analysis.
- Third Party management.
- Systems design/management.
In mid 2014, an internal TYSSE project review concluded that a 2016 project completion date was not achievable and that, based on the progress at that time, a revised completion of late 2018 or first quarter 2019 was a more likely completion date. The TTC CEO instructed that a peer review of the project be undertaken by qualified personnel from the American Public Transit Association with a view to achieving a 2017 opening date. -The American Public Transit Association review concluded that this was possible, but made a recommendation that a “reset” of the project was required, including the management team, in order to achieve the 2017 opening date objective.

In March and April 2015, the Board agreed to supplement the current project management team with Bechtel, which had a direct impact on the costs of the project.

**Conclusion**

The action taken by the Board pursuant to the TTC CEO’s recommendation to bring in Bechtel to provide increased certainty of the 2017 completion date, and identify and quantify known costs and forecast cost exposures has achieved the desired results.

The project team is continuing to work to the December 2017 integrated schedule and pursue settlement negotiations of commercial matters. Reports to the Board will continue on a regular basis for those aspects of the project that require Board authority. Additional reporting on lessons learned will be provided to the Board within the second quarter of 2016.

**Contact**

A. Byford, Chief Executive Officer  
Telephone: 416-393-3890; Email: andy.byford@ttc.ca

**Attachment 1 – Decision History**

**Attachment 2 – Design Evolution Images**

**Attachment 3 - TYSSE Schedule – Proposed vs Actual**

**Attachment 4 – Confidential Attachment**
ATTACHMENT 1 – Decision History Chronology

At its meeting of August 29, 2001, the TTC Board received the RTEP report, which planned for an extension of the TTC Spadina Subway.

At its meeting of April 16, 17 and 18, 2002, City Council endorsed an extension of the Spadina Subway.

At its meeting of June 16, 2004, the TTC Board approved the terms of reference for the Spadina Subway Extension Environmental Assessment.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2004/Jun_16_2004/Other/Spadina_Subway_Exten.jsp

At its meeting of February 1, 2 and 3, 2005, City Council re-affirmed its position that the Spadina Subway Extension was its top priority for subway expansion.

At its meeting of September 25, 26 and 27, 2006, Council adopted the recommendations of Policy and Finance Committee Report No 7, Clause 35.

At its meeting of October 25, 2006, the TTC Board approved a resolution with respect to design excellence for TTC facilities.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2006/Dec_13_2006/Minutes/index.jsp

At its meeting of May 23, 24 and 25, 2007 (EX 8.5), Council directed that the capital contribution from the City not exceed its share (59.96 per cent) of the one-third funding that would be attributable to the municipal sector and that a request be made to the Provincial and Federal Governments to provide a full two-thirds funding of actual project capital costs.

At this meeting, Council also approved a project delivery structure that included the TTC as Project Manager, and the principles of an Operating Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between Toronto, TTC, and York Region.

In this report, Council approved a municipal cost sharing of 59.96 per cent City of Toronto/ 40.04 per cent The Regional Municipality of York (York Region), based on a recognition of municipal boundaries and responsibilities, and of shared system infrastructure, to the benefit of both parties.
This cost sharing arrangement is set out in a Capital Cost Allocation Memorandum of Understanding between the City and York Region.

At its meeting of September 12, 2007 (Report), the Board received a report outlining the impact of delaying the implementation of the project.

At its meeting of March 26, 2008 (Report 8(c)), the Board approved the Project Delivery Strategy.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2008/March_26_2008/Other/Toronto_York_Spadina.jsp

At its meeting of June 18, 2008 (Report 8(a)), the Board approved the principles as between the City, York Region and the TTC relating to operations and operational costs of the TYSSE project.

Finally, on June 23, 2008 (EX21.8), Council authorized senior City and TTC staff to negotiate on behalf of the City, a Building Canada Fund Contribution Agreement relating to the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension with the Federal Government of Canada and The Regional Municipality of York.

This agreement was signed in September 2008, by the then Mayor of the City of Toronto, and Chair of York Region, and included a project completion date of March 31, 2016.

At its meeting of January 21, 2009 (Supplementary Agenda, Report #13) the Board received a report outlining the use of a design-bid-build as the approved Project Delivery Strategy for TYSSE.

At its meeting of October 24, 2012 (Supplementary Agenda, Report #13), the Board approved the extension of the TYSSE project completion date from December 2015 to the fall of 2016.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2012/October_24/Supplementary_Reports/TYSSE_Schedule_Status.pdf

At its special meeting of December 6, 2013, the Board received a confidential update on the TYSSE Project.

At its meeting of March 26, 2014 (Report 1(a) with Confidential Attachment), the Board received confidential information relating to the TYSSE Project.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2014/March_26/Reports/TYSSE_Pioneer_Village_Steeles_West_Station_Contract_A31_1.pdf

At its meeting of January 21, 2015, the Board received a report outlining large litigation files relating to the TTC.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2015/January_21/Reports/Large_Litigation_Matters.pdf

At the TTC Board Meeting of March 26, 2015, the Board approved a series of recommendations, as amended, relating to a reset of the TYSSE Project and approved entering into a sole source contract with a third party project management firm.

On March 31, 2015, City Council approved the increase in the 2015 Capital Budget and 2016-2024 Capital Plan for the Toronto-York Spadina Subway Extension project by $150 million gross, and $90 million net, representing the City of Toronto’s share of costs, with the remaining $60 million reflecting The Regional Municipality of York’s share.
http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2015.CC5.1

At its meeting of March 26, 2015, York Region Council approved, in part, supporting the TTC CEO being authorized to take the steps set out in his report (March 26, 2015 Board Report 4.1) to minimize the impact of the delay to the completion of the Spadina subway extension and to minimize the additional budget impact. York Region Council further agreed to fund up to an additional $60 million subject to other funding be available from other levels of government.

At its meeting of April 10, 2015, the Board received a report from its solicitor with respect to the project management contract.
http://www.ttc.ca/About_the_TTC/Commission_reports_and_information/Commission_meetings/2015/April_10/Reports/TYSSE_Project_Management.pdf
**Bessarion Station**  
Sheppard Subway – Updated TTC Design

**York University Station**  
World Renowned Architectural Design

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**York University Station**  
Approved Design Enhanced Architecture
Yonge-Sheppard Bus Terminal
Sheppard Subway – Updated TTC Design

Finch West Station Bus Terminal
World Renowned Architectural Design

Finch West Station Bus Terminal
Approved Design Enhanced Architecture
Leslie Station
Sheppard Subway – Updated TTC Design

Downsview Park Station
World Renowned Architectural Design

Downsview Park Station
Approved Design Enhanced Architecture
STATION INTERIORS

Downsview Park Station – TYSSE

Leslie Station – Sheppard Subway
STATION INTERIORS

Downsview Park Station – TYSSE

Bessarion Station – Sheppard Subway
STATION INTERIORS

Highway 407 Station – TYSSE

Don Mills Station – Sheppard Subway
ATTACHMENT 3

TYSSE Schedule – Proposed vs Actual

ORIGINAL SCHEDULE

- Project Completion Extended to Dec 2017

ACTUAL SCHEDULE

- Design Evolution

KEY EVENTS

1. Federal Funding Agreement Signed
2. Project Delivery Strategy Approved
3. Extended Project Schedule to End of 2016
4. Extended Project Schedule to End of 2017

TYSSE – Schedule and Budget Reset