



## REPORT FOR ACTION WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

### Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall

**Date:** November 15, 2017

**To:** Executive Committee

**From:** Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services

**Wards:** All Wards

#### **REASON FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION**

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This report involves the security of property belonging to the City or one of its agencies or corporations.

#### **SUMMARY**

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This report proposes changes to the current "Enhanced" level of security at Toronto City Hall for approval by City Council. These proposals are based upon assessments from the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada, best practices, and benchmarking. The primary goals of these proposals are to maintain an accessible, safe, and secure Toronto City Hall while providing a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

#### **RECOMMENDATIONS**

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**The Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services recommends that:**

1. City Council approve the use of patron screening at Toronto City Hall as described in Confidential Attachment #1.
2. City Council approve the review and enhancement of the vehicle mitigation measures as described in Confidential Attachment #1.
3. City Council approve the installation of a physical measure to provide a delineation of public and reserved space at Toronto City Hall in Committee Rooms #1 and #2.
4. City Council approve the installation of a physical security measure in the Council Chamber as described in Confidential Attachment #1.
5. City Council authorize the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to enact adjustments to the "Enhanced" security level based upon changes to the Domestic Terrorism Threat Level or upon advice from law enforcement.

6. City Council direct that Confidential Attachments #1, 2, 3, and 4, remain confidential in their entirety, as they contain information that involves the security of property belonging to the City or one of its agencies or corporations.

## **FINANCIAL IMPACT**

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The recommendations in this report will result in an incremental annual Operating impact of \$0.774 million for additional security staffing and is included in the 2018 Operating Budget submission for the Facilities, Real Estate, Environment & Energy (FREEE) for Council consideration. Further details on the need for this funding are contained in Confidential Attachment 1.

The recommendations in this report will also require an additional \$0.500 million in one-time capital funding, included in FREEE's 2018 Capital Budget submission for Council consideration. Further details on this need for this funding are contained in Confidential Attachment 1 as well.

Any other costs associated with the recommendations within the report are accommodated for within FREEE's 2018 Operating Budget or 2018-2027 Capital Budget and Plan. Any incremental costs, outside of what has been already identified, that are the result of the recommendations in this report will be included in future year Budget submissions for Council consideration.

The Interim Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this report and agrees with the financial impact information.

## **DECISION HISTORY**

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At its meeting held on September 30 and October 1, 2009, City Council adopted item GM24.32, "Councillor Protection at City Properties" which highlighted security measures in place for the protection of Councillors, described additional measures that were being implemented, and made recommendations for further protections.

<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2009/gm/reports/2009-09-17-gm24-cr.htm#GM24.32>.

At its meeting of April 12 and 13, 2011, City Council adopted item Government GM2.12, "Councillor Protection at City Properties-Update" which provided an implementation update on the status of security measures as a result of the adoption of the report titled "Councillor Protection at City Properties" and recommend additional security measures.

<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2011.GM2.12>.

## COMMENTS

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Toronto City Hall is the seat of municipal government, corporate head office for Canada's largest city, and one of the most distinctive, symbolic, and iconic buildings in the City of Toronto.

As the forecourt to City Hall, Nathan Phillips Square is the premier open space where citizens can enjoy various key external and City sponsored events, hold demonstrations, or simply visit year round.

After the elevation of Canada's domestic terrorism threat level from Low to Medium on October 17, 2014, the Chief Corporate Officer authorized Corporate Security to move to an elevated (enhanced) level of security at key City facilities. Confidential Attachment 1 highlights the enhanced security measures that we enacted at Toronto City Hall after October 17, 2014.

Canada's Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) is an independent, expert federal body responsible for assessing terrorism threats to Canada and Canadian interests globally. Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels represent the likelihood of a violent act of terrorism occurring in Canada, based on information and intelligence. The definition of Medium is "intelligence indicates that an individual or group within Canada or abroad has the intent and capability to commit an act of Terrorism in Canada. ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur."

When the domestic terrorism level was raised, the duration of the raised threat level was unknown; therefore, the duration of corresponding security enhancements was unknown. As there is no indication that the level will again be lowered anytime in the near future, there is a need to consider security enhancements as more permanent in nature.

On May 29, 2017, the Toronto Police provided the Chief Corporate Officer with a "Toronto Police Service Vulnerability Assessment of Toronto City Hall", signed and approved by a number of senior Toronto Police Service staff including the Chief of Police. The report provides a vulnerability threat assessment on various types of threats, outlines the current security effectiveness measures for each of these threats, and makes recommendations to reduce or mitigate each threat through security enhancements, policies and training. The recommendations range in scope and size from equipment to procedural updates. Confidential Attachment 3 contains an overview of the "Toronto Police Service Vulnerability Assessment of Toronto City Hall".

A Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment for Toronto City Hall was also conducted by Public Safety Canada during the first week of August 2017 and provided to the City in October 2017. The report provides findings of the vulnerability assessment and provides security enhancements to consider based upon the vulnerabilities assessed. Confidential Attachment 4 contains an overview of the Public Safety Canada report.

Many of the Toronto Police recommendations and Public Safety Canada considerations are minor in nature and are currently being implemented (e.g. adding additional cameras, training, etc.). Some recommendations require Council approval due to new funding requests and changes to access.

### **Benchmarking**

Patron screening is done to various degrees at Provincial Legislatures, City Halls at large cities in the United States, City Halls for two large Canadian cities, Courts, and sport and entertainment venues such as the Air Canada Centre and Rogers Centre.

The Provincial Legislatures of Alberta, Ontario, Saskatchewan, and Quebec, amongst others, all use visitor control consisting of reduced entrances for members of the public staffed with law enforcement and visitor sign-in. The Legislatures also utilize other varied measures such as Police, metal detectors, bag searches, etc. The Provincial Legislature of Ontario has made a number of security enhancements including strict visitor control and the equipping of certain Special Constables with firearms.

In 2015, the City of Calgary implemented patron screening prior to entering the City Hall Council Chamber. In October 2017, the City of Edmonton also implemented this screening.

Visitor control including metal detectors and armed Police/Security Officers are used at City Halls for most large U.S. cities upon entering the City Hall.

Federal, Provincial, and Municipal courts utilize various degrees of patron screening, as well as, large sports and entertainment venues including the Rogers Centre and the Air Canada Centre.

### **Patron Screening**

Patron screening involves the use of walk through metal detectors (WTMD's), hand-held metal detectors (HHMD's), and physical baggage checks by persons, x-ray machines, or both.

A City Hall Patron Screening Policy and Procedures will be developed to provide appropriate regulations for security screening. This Policy and Procedures document will be based upon a number of best practices used at various government, court, sports, and entertainment facilities. Examples of these best practices include the "Patron Screening Best Practices Guide", dated March 2016 and the "Sports Venue Bag Search Procedures Guide", dated May 2012, both developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

A City Hall Patron Screening Policy and Procedures would provide regulations and guidance on various foreseeable issues such as: signage, instructions to conduct a proper patron screening, interacting with individuals being searched, identifying and responding to prohibited items, public awareness, consent, screening procedures for special needs patrons, special considerations, the use of amnesty boxes, training, etc. An Equity Lens would also be applied to these procedures and best efforts will be made to incorporate the equity considerations.

### **Vehicle Mitigation Measures**

Vehicle mitigation measures are an important safety measure to provide a physical separation between vehicles and persons. There are various existing vehicle mitigation measures in place surrounding Nathan Phillips Square.

### **Delineation of Public and Reserved Space in Committee Rooms #1 and #2**

For security reasons, a further physical delineation of space is recommended for Committee Rooms #1 and #2.

### **Modifying Glass Wall in Council Chamber**

For security reasons, a physical measure is recommended to enhance security in the Council Chamber.

### **Authority to Enact Adjustments to Enhanced Security**

As the recommended enhanced security measures are enacted, it is foreseeable that some adjustments may be required based upon the staff/public experience, changes in best practices, a change in the Canadian Domestic Terrorism Level, or upon advice from law enforcement.

It is proposed that City Council authorize the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services the authority to enact adjustments to the "Enhanced" security level.

## **Conclusion**

The primary goals of the recommendations are to maintain an accessible, safe, and secure City Hall. The safety of our visitors, employees, occupants, and elected officials is of prime importance. The City has a responsibility to ensure appropriate security measures are in place to provide a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

## **CONTACT**

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Dwaine Nichol, Director, Corporate Security, Internal Corporate Services  
Tel: (416) 397-7129; Email: [Dwaine.Nichol@toronto.ca](mailto:Dwaine.Nichol@toronto.ca)

## **SIGNATURE**

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Josie Scioli  
Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services

## **ATTACHMENTS**

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Confidential Attachment 1 - Recommended Enhanced Security Measures for Toronto City Hall  
Confidential Attachment 2 - Review of Current Threat Environment  
Confidential Attachment 3 - Summary of Toronto Police Service Vulnerability Assessment of Toronto City Hall  
Confidential Attachment 4 - Summary of Public Safety Canada Critical Infrastructure Assessment of Toronto City Hall