

### Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall

**Date:** June 12, 2018

**To:** Executive Committee

**From:** Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services

**Wards:** All Wards

#### REASON FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

---

This report involves the security of property belonging to the City or one of its agencies or corporations.

#### SUMMARY

---

This report recommends changes to the current "Enhanced" level of security at Toronto City Hall for approval by City Council. These recommendations are based upon assessments from the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada, best practices, benchmarking, and feedback from community conversations. The primary goals of these recommendations are to maintain an accessible, safe, and secure Toronto City Hall while providing a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

---

**The Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, recommends that:**

1. City Council approve the use of patron baggage security screening, through physical checks of baggage, on the East and West sides of the main floor in the Rotunda, and at the Hagerman entrance of Toronto City Hall.
2. City Council approve the use of patron screening, using walk-through metal detectors, for the Council Chamber at Toronto City Hall.
3. City Council approve the installation of a physical measure to provide a delineation of public and reserved space at Toronto City Hall in Committee Rooms 1 and 2.
4. City Council approve the installation of a physical security measure to replace the ropes in the Council Chamber.
5. City Council direct that Confidential Attachment #1 remains confidential in its entirety, as it contains information that involves the security of property belonging to the City or one of its agencies or corporations.

6. City Council direct the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to report back to City Council, through the applicable Standing Committee, on any recommended changes or enhancements to recommendations 1 and 2 prior to the end of 2019.

## **FINANCIAL IMPACT**

---

Patron baggage security screening and patron screening requires 4 additional security staff and additional security hours at a cost of \$0.365 million. Implementation effective July 1, 2018 will cost \$0.162 million in 2018. This cost will be absorbed in FREEE's 2018 Approved Operating Budget on a one-time basis thereby resulting in a full year annualized impact for 2019.

The walk-through metal detectors and installation of physical security measures will cost \$0.085 million and will be absorbed in FREEE's 2018 Approved Capital Budget.

The delineation of public and reserved space in the Committee Rooms will have no incremental financial implications.

The Interim Chief Financial Officer has reviewed this report and agrees with the financial impact information.

## **DECISION HISTORY**

---

At its meeting held on September 30 and October 1, 2009, City Council adopted item GM24.32, "Councillor Protection at City Properties" which highlighted security measures in place for the protection of Councillors, described additional measures that were being implemented, and made recommendations for further protections.

<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2009/gm/reports/2009-09-17-gm24-cr.htm#GM24.32>.

At its meeting of April 12 and 13, 2011, City Council adopted item Government GM2.12, "Councillor Protection at City Properties-Update" which provided an implementation update on the status of security measures as a result of the adoption of the report titled "Councillor Protection at City Properties" and recommend additional security measures.

<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2011.GM2.12>.

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council considered item EX 29.10, "Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall" and adopted the following:

1. City Council approve the review and enhancement of the vehicle mitigation measures as described in Confidential Attachment 1 to the report (November 15, 2017) from the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services and City Council direct the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to report to City Council by March 2018.

2. City Council direct the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to review options for enhanced physical delineation, including ropes, in Committee Rooms 1 and 2, and to report back to City Council before any installation occurs by March 2018.

3. City Council direct the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to review options for enhanced physical delineation in the Council Chamber and to report back to City Council before any installation occurs.
4. City Council direct the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to survey members of the public and City employees on patron screening at City Hall and to report back to City Council by March 2018.
5. City Council authorize the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to enact adjustments to the "Enhanced" security level based upon changes to the Domestic Terrorism Threat Level or upon advice from law enforcement.
6. City Council direct that the remaining portions of Confidential Attachments 1, 2, 3, and 4 to the report (November 15, 2017) from the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services not already publicly released remain confidential as they contain information that involves the security of property belonging to the City or one of its agencies or corporations.  
<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2017.EX29.10>

## COMMENTS

---

Toronto City Hall is the seat of municipal government, corporate head office for Canada's largest city, and one of the most distinctive, symbolic, and iconic buildings in the City of Toronto. Unfortunately, these attributes may also make Toronto City Hall a target for serious threats and some key measures required to mitigate these threats are not currently present. The City has a responsibility to ensure appropriate measures are in place to provide a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats. These proposed security enhancements will help maintain an accessible, safe, and secure City Hall for staff and the public.

### Canada's Domestic Terrorism Threat Level

Canada's Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) is an independent, expert federal body responsible for assessing terrorism threats to Canada and Canadian interests globally. Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels represent the likelihood of a violent act of terrorism occurring in Canada, based on information and intelligence. On October 17, 2014, Canada's threat level was elevated from "Low" to "Medium". The definition of Medium is "intelligence indicates that an individual or group within Canada or abroad has the intent and capability to commit an act of Terrorism in Canada. ITAC assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur."

The threat levels serve as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism.

Canada's domestic terrorism threat level was again recently reviewed by ITAC and the RCMP distributed an official "Update for the National Terrorism Threat Level for Canada" on March 28, 2018. This update confirms the domestic terrorism threat level will remain at Medium.

### **Terrorism Threat Environment in Canada**

Currently, the greatest terrorism threat to Canada is posed by domestic extremists who have been inspired or incited online by Islamist terrorist groups. Online propaganda distributed by terrorist groups and their supporters continues to inspire and incite lone-actors and small groups to carry out attacks where they live, using whatever means they have available, such as small arms, vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs), hostile vehicle attacks, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). Recent attacks using these methods demonstrate that relatively simple techniques, requiring minimal planning, have the potential to create significant impacts. Some additional examples include lone-actor attacks using a bladed weapon, single firearm, or a vehicle.

There have been a number of incidents of recent propaganda issued by terrorist organizations, with references to Canada and threats against Canada. This propaganda has named Canada as a target for terrorist attacks and it named deceased Canadian domestic terrorists as attackers worthy of emulation by others.

Transnational terrorist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (DAESH), al-Qaeda (AQ), and their affiliates continue to call for attacks against targets that carry symbolic significance including unsecured or lightly secured: emblematic buildings, special events, and government facilities. High profile public events, landmarks, commemorative ceremonies and festivities, government officials, and crowds at public events may present appealing targets for terrorist groups / individuals.

ITAC assesses that there continues to be a number of individuals who advocate violence and aspire to carry out terrorist attacks in Canada, specifically against uniformed personnel and government interests. ITAC assesses that government officials and crowds at public events represent attractive targets for terrorists.

### **Grievance Based Threats**

Grievance based threats are also a security concern for Toronto City Hall. Grievance based adversaries can range from disgruntled constituents and groups, disgruntled customers, hate groups, opposition movements, etc. These grievances may be based upon real or perceived decisions, policies, or comments made by City Council, elected officials, or City staff. Grievances may be based upon real or perceived actions taken on local, domestic, and/or international issues.

## Examples of Violent or Terrorist Related Incidents 2014 to 2017 - Canada

The reasoning for attacks can vary from terrorism inspired beliefs to grievance based beliefs. These attackers and attack methods have been orchestrated or attempted on Canadian soil and cannot be dismissed as only a problem in other nations.

<i>Date</i>	<i>Location</i>	<i>Attack Details</i>	<i>Weapon</i>
Sept. 2017	Edmonton, Canada	A lone male attacker intentionally hit a Police Officer with a vehicle, exited the vehicle, and stabbed the Officer. Lone attacker then used rental van and struck 4 pedestrians.	Vehicle and Knife
June 2017	Toronto, Ontario	A lone female allegedly attacked several people with a golf club at a Canadian Tire store and pulled a large knife out from her clothes.	Hand Held / Knife
Jan. 2017	Quebec City, Quebec	A lone male attacker opened fire at a Mosque.	Firearm
Aug. 2016	Strathroy, Ontario	A lone male attacker allegedly intended to conduct a bomb attack against a large urban centre during commuter rush hour.	IED
March 2016	Toronto, Ontario	A lone male attacker carried out a knife attack in a Canadian Forces Recruitment Centre in a Federal government building in Toronto.	Knife
Oct. 2014	Ottawa, Ontario	A lone male attacker conducted an attack at the Canadian National War Memorial and Parliament Hill.	Firearm
Oct. 2014	Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Québec	A lone male attacker intentionally rammed military personnel in a Shopping Centre parking lot.	Vehicle

## Determination of Measures to Mitigate Threats

After the elevation of Canada's domestic terrorism threat level from "Low" to "Medium" on October 17, 2014, City Hall has been operating at an elevated (enhanced) level of security. While operating at the enhanced level of security, information was sought through assessments, benchmarking, and best practices to determine what changes may be required to appropriately mitigate applicable threats.

## **Assessments**

The City received two assessments providing recommendations to further enhance security at Toronto City Hall. One of these assessments was the "Toronto Police Service Vulnerability Assessment of Toronto City Hall" signed and approved by the Chief of Police. This assessment detailed that the most severe threats to City Hall are an improved explosive device (IED) and/or an active attacker. The main recommendation of the assessment is the implementation of security screening for all visitors requiring the use of walk-through metal detectors / hand wands (patron screening), building access restricted to one door, and turning all exterior doors into exit-only doors.

The second assessment received was the "Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment for Toronto City Hall" conducted by Public Safety Canada. The report provides findings of the vulnerability assessment and provides security enhancements to consider based upon the vulnerabilities assessed. One of the main recommendations included the use of metal detectors (patron screening) at the facility entrance.

## **Benchmarking**

Patron screening is done to various degrees at provincial legislatures, city halls at large cities in the United States, city halls for two large Canadian cities, courts, and sport and entertainment venues such as the Air Canada Centre / Scotiabank Arena and Rogers Centre. Both the City of Calgary and the City of Edmonton have implemented patron screening, using walk-through metal detectors prior to entering the City Hall Council Chamber, which was implemented after the domestic terrorism threat level was raised to "Medium".

## **Patron Screening Surveys**

Patron screening involves the use of walk through metal detectors (WTMDs), hand-held metal detectors (HHMDs), and physical baggage checks by persons, x-ray machines, or both.

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to survey members of the public and City employees on patron screening at City Hall and to report back to City Council.

A number of surveys and engagement sessions were conducted in order to survey members of the public, including online polling with 1000 respondents (in lieu of telephone) by a third-party market research firm, in-person intercept surveys conducted at City Hall by a third-party market research firm, an online public survey on the City's website, an online survey for City staff on the City's intranet site, and facilitated community conversations (engagement sessions) with the African Canadian Black community; Muslim, Middle-Eastern, South-Asian communities, and Indigenous Peoples community.

A brief summary of the polling, surveys, and facilitated community conversations is included below. A more detailed breakdown is included in Attachment 2, Summary of Survey Results. Reports on the online poll & intercept survey, community conversations with the African Canadian Black, Muslim, Middle-Eastern, and South-Asian communities, and engagement session with the Indigenous Peoples community is included in Attachment 3, 4, and 5.

### **Survey Questions**

The Strategic Communications and the Equity, Diversity and Human Rights divisions provided strategic advice to assist in obtaining the applicable polling company and professional consulting firms to hold the community conversations. Questions for the various polls were completed by the contracted polling firm and minor changes to questions were made based upon feedback from Strategic Communications and the Equity, Diversity and Human Rights divisions.

### **Survey Results**

#### **Online Polling**

The online polling was conducted by The Strategic Counsel, a professional market research firm. The objective of their polling was to evaluate the level of public support for security screening at Toronto City Hall.

The online panel of 1000 respondents is considered by The Strategic Counsel to be a robust sample size for the city of Toronto and is considered to be representative of the larger city population. With 1,000 respondents, its margin of error is low – it is estimated to be accurate within 3.46 percentage points, 95 times out of 100. The average time to complete the survey was eight minutes.

According to The Strategic Counsel polling results, overall there is support amongst respondents for security screening at Toronto City Hall.

- Eight-in-ten (79%) of City of Toronto residents (based on the online survey) support security screening at the public entrances into City Hall.
- This level of support increases to 83% once the option of using metal detectors for security screening similar to those used at major sporting facilities is introduced.
- Among city of Toronto residents who oppose the use of metal detectors for security screening, causing delays is the most cited reason.

While Corporate Security and the Equity, Diversity and Human Rights divisions emphasized the importance of diversity and representation while planning the public survey, it should be noted that the demographics of the respondents for the online survey are not fully, statistically reflective of Toronto's racial diversity. Approximately 40% of the respondents (residents based on the online survey) identified as "visible minority / racialized" while in actuality 53% of Toronto's population identifies as visible minorities.

## **In-Person Intercept Surveys**

The in-person intercept surveys were also conducted by The Strategic Counsel. An intercept survey is a research method used to gather on-site feedback from a specific population. During the intercept survey, the interviewer approached persons entering City Hall. To diversify the respondents and not capture people who were specifically coming to City Hall for the same purpose on the same day, the 100 interviews were carried out over three separate days. It was determined through later analysis that intercept respondents tend to visit City Hall more frequently than online respondents, with half reporting they visit City Hall once a month or more frequently.

According to The Strategic Counsel's intercept survey results, there is support from respondents for security screening at Toronto City Hall. Two-thirds (67%) of the in-person respondents support the use of metal detectors to screen all visitors entering City Hall and 66% of the in-person respondents support the use of security screening. According to the intercept survey results, 34% of respondents identified as visible minority or Indigenous.

Results from both the online polling and intercept surveys indicated that a majority of respondents surveyed did not feel that information regarding independent security assessments impacted their original views on security.

## **Public Online Survey on City's Website**

The City hosted an online survey for the general public on the City of Toronto website from March 19 to April 10, 2018. The questions in the survey closely followed the online polling questions used by The Strategic Counsel.

The online survey however did not have the same scientific controls as the online polling conducted by The Strategic Counsel. For example, the survey did not have the functionality to restrict multiple responses from the same IP address nor restrict responses from members of the public who do not reside in the City of Toronto, amongst others.

The online survey on the City's website had a total of 1602 responses; however, this number may include multiple responses from the same respondents. Of those responses, 18.7% support screening at the public entrances to City Hall and 19% support metal detectors.

## **Online Staff Survey on City's Intranet**

The City hosted an online survey for City staff on the City's intranet. The survey asked general questions to all staff and additional questions to staff who indicated City Hall was their primary work location. The online survey for City staff however did not have the same scientific controls as the online polling conducted by The Strategic Counsel. The online survey hosted on the City's intranet did not have the functionality to restrict multiple responses from the same IP address nor responses from employees who do not work primarily at City Hall.

The online staff poll had a total of 599 respondents, with 286 respondents indicating their permanent work location was City Hall. Of these 286 responses, 53% supported the use of metal detectors to screen visitors.

## **Facilitated Community Conversations**

One of the core elements of conducting an equity impact analysis is to identify communities that may be impacted by the initiative. The installation of metal detectors raised concerns of racial profiling and over policing. These are issues that people from many different communities experience; however, it is often directed at Indigenous peoples, Muslims, south Asian, Middle Eastern, and black people. The Equity, Diversity and Human Rights division recommended focus groups with the communities most vulnerable to any potential negative impacts through a third party facilitator.

Focus group facilitator services were procured for Corporate Security with the assistance of the Equity, Diversity and Human Rights division. Facilitator services were procured to design, organize, host, lead, and report on focus group sessions. A Consultant, David Lewis-Peart, was procured to facilitate community conversations (engagement sessions) with the Black, South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, and Muslim communities. A separate consultant, McLean Consulting Group, an indigenous owned and operated company, was procured to engage with the Indigenous Peoples community.

### **Black, South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, and Muslim Communities**

For the Black, South-Asian, Middle-Eastern, and Muslim communities, the Consultant recommended targeted focus groups for the a) general community and b) outreach and engagement of community leaders, organisers, and subject matter experts (SMEs). According to the Consultant's report: "The community engagement sessions were organised within areas of the city that have significant populations of African, Caribbean, Black, Middle-Eastern, South-Asian, and Muslim individuals. The three agencies partners were Delta Family Resource Services, Thorncliff Neighborhood Office, and the Toronto Centre for Community Learning and Development". In the SME sessions, there were representatives from 13 different organizations and community groups, and two levels of government - both municipal and provincial. The community engagement sessions had a range of participants from various ethnic backgrounds and lived experiences, with consideration given to gender and age. There were a significant number of elder participants in the African, Caribbean, and Black (ACB) focused consultation, and a balanced inclusion of men and women in the community sessions in the Middle Eastern, South-Asian and Muslim communities."

As detailed in the "Consultant Summary and Recommendations", "there is an overwhelming agreement among all the individuals who were invited to be a part of the engagement process, that the security of City Hall, staff, elected officials and patrons is of course of the highest priority. There were clear differences of thought on the use of patron screening measures. A number of individuals expressed their approval, albeit with clear stipulations about improved training regarding racial and religious bias. There was also a strong sense - by a fairly significant amount of community - of a need for cautiousness around the use and potential misuse of these technologies and measures by security personnel."

## **Indigenous Community**

For the Indigenous community, twenty-seven individuals participated. While some of the participants came as part of the community, most of the participants were also employees of twelve different Indigenous agencies. The Consultant ensured that "...the voices of both youth and women were heard so that the feedback passed through an equity lens of not only the racialized group but also the sub-groups".

As detailed in the summary of the report from McLean Consulting Group, the focus group was largely unaware of issues at City Hall pertaining to threats or violence. As it pertained to patron screening using metal detectors, the focus group was split on support with women and youth having the most concerns. Half of the focus group would support patron screening if raised concerns were dealt with. Some of these concerns and recommendations include: cultural competency training for staff, a privacy room for dealing with traditional items, options for a female to perform searches for females, and the ability for a person being searched to call for a supervisor.

## **Recommended Screening**

City Council considered item EX 29.10, "Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall", at its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017. One of the recommendations in this December report was for City Council to approve the use of patron screening at Toronto City Hall. The recommended patron screening was to occur just inside the main doors of City Hall for all members of the public and City staff without a valid access card.

This report recommends a different type of patron screening that reflects benchmarking from other Canadian cities, results and comments from the public polling, and strives to seek a balance between a reasonable level of security and public accessibility.

Currently, visitors to City Council undergo a baggage check by Security Guards for prohibited items, including weapons, upon entrance to the Council Chamber for City Council meetings. It is recommended that this level of screening be moved to the main entrance areas of City Hall and the security baggage screening (baggage check) currently being conducted in the Council Chamber be replaced with patron screening with walk-through metal detectors.

## **Patron Baggage Security Screening**

To enhance security for City Hall during all operating hours, it is recommended that patron baggage security screening, similar to that currently being conducted for City Council meetings, be conducted in two areas: 1) inside the main entrance lobby of the building and 2) at the Hagerman exterior door.

The first recommended location for this security baggage screening would be on the East and West sides of the main floor. The exact placement of the screening would be changed to adapt to different operating hours, as well as, events occurring in the Rotunda.

Portable stations would be used to define the enhanced area with a Corporate security guard stationed at the pedestrian gap to provide the screening.

The second location for security baggage screening would be located at the Hagerman doors.

This security baggage screening would require all members of the public to stop and speak with a security guard who would provide information / directions to assist the visitor. The security guard would also check anything being carried by the member of the public (bags, coats, etc.) to ensure prohibited items were not being brought into City Hall.

City of Toronto access card holders would not be subject to the security baggage screening and would bypass the screening by wearing their issued access / ID card.

To implement the new baggage screening it is estimated that a total of four, new, full-time Corporate security guards will be required to perform the screening with an operating impact of \$313,260.

If approved, policies and procedures will be developed to provide regulations and guidance on various foreseeable issues. An equity lens would also be applied to these procedures and best efforts will be made to incorporate the equity considerations.

### **Council Chamber Patron Screening**

Patron screening would involve the use of walk through metal detectors, hand-held metal detector wands, and physical baggage checks. Patron screening would occur for all members of the public and City staff without access cards. Security guards would not have the authority to exclude an individual from screening.

The recommended location for the patron screening would be located inside the Council Chamber bridges that are located between the east and west towers and the Council Chamber. This location would permit the checking of attendees for weapons prior to entrance to the actual Council Chamber. With this set-up, members of the public would use the east and west tower elevators to access the Chamber rather than the smaller Council elevators.

If approved, policies and procedures will be developed to provide appropriate regulations for security screening and will be based upon a number of best practices used at various government, court, sports, and entertainment facilities. Examples of these best practices include the "Patron Screening Best Practices Guide" and the "Sports Venue Bag Search Procedures Guide", both developed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

The policy and procedures would provide regulations and guidance on various foreseeable issues such as: signage, instructions to conduct a proper patron screening, interacting with individuals being searched, identifying and responding to prohibited items, public awareness, consent, screening procedures for special needs patrons, special considerations, the use of amnesty boxes, training, etc. An equity lens would also be applied to these procedures and best efforts will be made to incorporate the equity considerations.

It is important to note that two Canadian cities, Calgary and Edmonton, already successfully use patron screening prior to entrance to their Council Chambers.

### **Delineation of Public and Reserved Space in Committee Rooms 1 and 2**

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to review options for enhanced physical delineation, including ropes, in Committee Rooms 1 and 2, and to report back to City Council before any installation occurs by March 2018.

It is recommended that the physical delineation for Committee Rooms 1 and 2 be completed through the use of retractable barrier belts. These belts would only be extended in the case of meetings that have significant public attendance or meetings where there exists the reasonable expectation of disruption.

These retractable barrier belts would be installed in conjunction with the planned Accessibilities for Ontarians with Disabilities Act (AODA) review occurring during the Council break in the summer of 2018.

### **Modifying Glass Wall in Council Chamber**

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services to review options for enhanced physical delineation in the Council Chamber and to report back to City Council before any installation occurs.

Due to the Council seating configuration, Councillors have their backs to the visitors in the Chamber. Surrounding the outer row of Councillors is a glass wall that delineates the Councillors seating area from the public areas. There are also some areas surrounding the outer row of the Councillors seating that are equipped with decorative ropes that provide a visual delineation of space.

It is recommended that the current decorative ropes be replaced by continuing the glass wall and the installation of swinging half-doors. Further delineation is recommended by increasing the height of the existing glass wall by 30 centimeters if patron screening is not implemented.

These enhancements would be installed in conjunction with the planned AODA review and would be implemented during the Council break in the summer of 2018.

## **Vehicle Mitigation Measures**

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council approved the review and enhancement of the vehicle mitigation measures as described in Confidential Attachment 1 to the report (November 15, 2017) from the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, and City Council directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to report to City Council by March 2018.

A contract has been awarded to a consultant, specializing in hostile vehicle mitigation measures, to perform an assessment, design, and tender of vehicle mitigation measures for Union Station. This consultant provided a preliminary review of the current vehicle mitigation measures deployed at Nathan Phillips Square and made recommendations.

As part of the security plan for large events, large vehicles from various City divisions and the TTC are used to provide hard road closures around Nathan Phillips Square or to restrict access to Nathan Phillips Square. This is anticipated to continue until additional temporary measures are enacted.

Work is currently underway to determine a range of acceptable, temporary vehicle mitigation measures that appear as additional street furniture such as bike racks, seating, planters, etc. These temporary measures will be deployed in areas as needed to provide further enhanced vehicle mitigation.

Work is also currently underway for a Request for Proposal to be issued for assessment, design, and tender of vehicle mitigation measures for Nathan Phillips Square. Once a design is chosen, the capital cost of the implementation of long-term vehicle mitigation measures will form part of a future FREEE Capital Budget request.

## **Conclusion**

The safety of all those who work, visit, or do business at City facilities is the top priority of the City of Toronto.

These proposed security enhancements will help maintain an accessible, safe, and secure City Hall for staff and the public.

The recommended security measures for City Hall are an enhancement from current measures, but still are in line with enhancements to Council Chambers in other Canadian cities, and are more accessible than security measures at provincial legislatures, city halls at large cities in the United States, courts, and sport and entertainment venues such as the Air Canada Centre / Scotiabank Arena and Rogers Centre.

The City has a responsibility to ensure appropriate security measures are in place to provide a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats. The recommended security measures for City Hall strive to seek a balance between protection measures from foreseeable threats while still maintaining an applicable level of public access to a municipal City Hall.

## **CONTACT**

---

Dwaine Nichol, Director, Corporate Security, Internal Corporate Services  
Tel: (416) 397-7129; Email: [Dwaine.Nichol@toronto.ca](mailto:Dwaine.Nichol@toronto.ca)

## **SIGNATURE**

---

Josie Scioli  
Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services

## **ATTACHMENTS**

---

Confidential Attachment 1 - Recommended Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall  
Attachment 2 - Summary of Survey Results  
Attachment 3 - The Strategic Counsel Report  
Attachment 4 - Community and SME Engagements Report  
Attachment 5 - Indigenous Peoples Community Report