The City’s Longstanding Partnership with the Building Trades:
Breaking it is not Worth the Added Costs and Risks

Report By John O’Grady

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Submitted by:
Central Ontario Building Trades
2088 Weston Rd.
Toronto, ON M9N 1X4

Phone: (416) 449-5115
Fax: (416) 449-5124
E-mail: info@cobtrades.com
Web Site: www.cobtrades.com
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Key Points

A Longstanding Partnership

- The City’s partnership with the Building Trades Unions and their Contractors goes back to 1978. The City has benefited from:
  - a reliable supply of well-trained construction workers,
  - a pool of first-rate contractors,
  - an enviable health and safety record on City projects,
  - partnerships that advance the City’s equity goals, and
  - a growing pool of apprentices that will ensure a continuing supply of skilled workers.

Safety on City Projects

- The health and safety performance of Building Trades Unions and their employers is significantly better than the non-union sector. A 2015 study by the Institute for Work and Health\(^1\) found that:
  - Lost-time injury rates are 23% lower in unionized firms,
  - Musculoskeletal injury rates are 17% lower in unionized firms, and
  - Critical injury rates are 29% lower in unionized firms.\(^2\)

- A subsequent study by the Institute for Work and Health concluded that “unionized construction firms have stronger hazard identification and control practices in the work site and more OHS [occupational health and safety] training”.\(^3\)

- Contrast the Building Trades record with that of the CLAC employer - O’Connor Electric – which was convicted on June 12th of serious violations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act after three workers suffered burns from an arc flash while working on an energized electrical system. The Court


The study was commissioned by the Ontario Construction Secretariat (OCS). The OCS agreed that the results could be published regardless of the outcome of the analysis.

\(^2\) Critical injuries are defined in the study as injuries that jeopardize life, cause blindness, or injuries that result in amputations, major burns, fracture of large bones, and loss of consciousness.

found that O’Connor Electric had failed to establish and implement written measures and procedures to ensure that workers are adequately protected from electrical shock and burn and also, contrary to the safety regulations, had instructed its employees to work on an energized system.  

- Ending the City’s partnership with the Building Trades Unions and their employers means a significantly increased risk of critical injuries or fatalities on City projects.

**Greater Investments in Apprenticeships**

- 81% of unionized construction contractors sponsor apprentices compared to only 54% of non-union contractors.

- Ending the City’s partnership with the Building Trades Unions and their employers inevitably means fewer apprenticeships.

**Support for Equity Programs**

- The City has enjoyed strong support from the Building Trades Unions and their employers in advancing our shared equity goals. Programs run by or supported by the Building Trades Unions and their employers include:
  - **Hammer Heads** for disadvantaged youth,
  - **Helmets to Hard Hats** for veterans,
  - **Renos for Heroes** which carries out home improvement work for disabled veterans,
  - Community Benefit Programs, like **Construction Connections**, and
  - **Habitat for Humanity** which constructs homes for low-income Torontonians.

- Working with the City to achieve equity goals is integral to the long-standing partnership that the Building Trades and their employers have had with the City. City Council has launched a number of initiatives to advance equity goals. These include: equity and gender-focused budgeting, the Toronto Poverty Reduction Strategy, the Action Plan to Confront Anti-Black Racism, the Toronto Strong Neighborhoods Strategy, the Community Grants Policy, the Seniors Strategy, the Newcomers Strategy, the Youth Equity Strategy, the Housing Opportunities Toronto 2010-2020 Action Plan and

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5 Ontario Construction Secretariat, 2018 Contractor Survey. The survey was conducted by the Logit Group via telephone with 500 ICI contractors from across Ontario in January-February 2018. The margin of error for a sample of 500 is +/-4.38%, 19 times out of 20. Seventy percent of the contractors surveyed were trade contractors and 26% were general contractors. The regional breakdown was as follows: Central Ontario 25%; GTA 31%; Eastern Ontario 17%; Southwestern Ontario 15%; Northern Ontario 11%.
the Welcome Policy. The Building Trades Unions and their employers reiterate our readiness to continue supporting the City in any way we can to ensure the success of these initiatives.

- Our record differs markedly from that of Merit Ontario, which is the largest non-union employer organization in the construction industry. Not a single equity program or initiative is mentioned on the website of Merit Ontario. Visit the website of the Central Ontario Building Trades (COBT) and you will see how the COBT highlights its sponsorship of the Hammer Heads program. That program brings apprenticeship opportunities to disadvantaged youth, many of whom are referred to the COBT by the City's social assistance department. The COBT has launched 462 of these youth into apprenticeship programs.

- The City already has in place a process to assess budget issues through a gender and equity lens. The City should apply the same gender and equity lens to the 'construction employer' issue.

- The Building Trades Unions and their employers are partners with the City in advancing its equity goals. Those equity goals will be put at risk or severely set back if the City unilaterally ends its longstanding partnership with the Building Trades Unions and their employers.

The Claim of Significant Cost Savings is not Plausible:

- The studies published by the Cardus organization manipulate statistics and use wholly irrelevant examples (like corrupt practices in Quebec) to support their advocacy of Toronto becoming a "non-construction employer". In the main body of this report, we show why the Cardus claims are misleading.

- Perhaps the most damning conclusion on the Cardus claims is made by Stephen Bauld, a procurement expert, who formerly co-authored a study for Cardus. In his Daily Commercial News column, Bauld stated: "Shortchanging Ontario's Cities [the Cardus study] is not based on impartial research and would never pass a peer review if submitted to a respected industry journal. The study cherry-picks examples and cites theoretical "academic estimates."

- Compare York Region with the City of Toronto. York Region is not a 'construction employer'. It has no partnerships with the Building Trades or their employers. Does anyone seriously believe that by crossing Steeles Avenue, construction costs magically fall by the 15-40% claimed by the Cardus organization? As is shown in detail in the report of the Ontario Construction Secretariat and in this report, the claim of significant cost savings is not plausible, especially when one takes into account issues such as safety performance, investments in apprenticeship, reliability of the skilled labour pool and support for equity goals.

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6 http://www.meritontario.com/

- The City should take the necessary legal steps to maintain its longstanding partnership with the building trades.
The City’s Longstanding Partnership with the Building Trades: 
Breaking it is not Worth the Added Costs and Risks

Report by John O’Grady

• This report makes the case for the City of Toronto continuing its longstanding partnership with the building trades.

• For many years, the City of Toronto has been a partner with nine of the building trades unions: carpenters, electricians, plumbers, painters, glaziers, bricklayers, sheet metal workers, asbestos workers, and ironworkers. The earliest partnership dates from 1978. The foundation of these partnerships is the City’s commitment to the provincial collective agreements of these trades. These agreements apply to the construction of non-residential buildings. (The "Ontario Labour Relations Act" refers to this as the industrial-commercial-institutional sector – or "ICI" sector).

• Recent amendments to the "Ontario Labour Relations Act" would allow the City to terminate its partnership with the building trades by unilaterally releasing itself from these nine provincial agreements. Under the recent amendment to the Act, this will happen automatically unless the City advises the Ontario Labour Relations Board that it wishes to continue to be a party to the nine provincial agreements.

• Through its partnerships with the building trades, the City has:
  • avoided skills shortages,
  • enjoyed high standards of safety on City projects, and
  • minimized the need for on-site inspection or audits to police the City’s safety and employment standards policies.

The City has also benefited from the building trades’ strong support for youth apprenticeships and their participation in equity and social programs, including:
  • Hammer Heads,
  • Helmets to Hard Hats,
  • Renos for Heroes, and
  • Community Benefit Programs such as Construction Connections.

The City’s partnership with the building trades works. The City should continue that partnership.
Better Health and Safety on City Projects

- In ICI construction, the health and safety performance of building trades workers and their employers is significantly better than the non-union sector. This is documented by a 2015 study by the Institute for Work and Health (IWH). The IWH study was published in a reputable, peer-reviewed journal. The study found that:
  
  1. Lost-time injury rates are 23% lower in unionized firms,
  2. Musculoskeletal injury rates are 17% lower in unionized firms,
  3. Critical injury rates are 29% lower in unionized firms.

- The building trades unions and their employers invest significantly in health and safety training. The building trades unions also recruit and train health and safety representatives to support safe working practices on the job. It is not surprising, therefore, that another study by the IWH found that "unionized construction firms have stronger hazard identification and control practices in the work site and more OHS [occupational health and safety] training".

- The conclusion is inescapable: the building trades’ investments in health and safety training pay off in the form of significantly lower lost-time injuries and especially in substantially fewer critical injuries. If the City chooses to end its partnership with the building trades, it is implicitly accepting that, in the absence of additional policies and interventions, there is a significant risk that there will be an increase in the number of injuries, including critical injuries, on its projects.

- In the City of Toronto, we have a vivid example of the human cost of taking on additional risk of work-related injuries. On Christmas Eve in 2009, four workers employed by Metron Construction plunged to their death when their defective swing stage failed. The defective swing stage had been the subject of a previous Ministry of Labour compliance order. The workers were supposed to take training on the use of the equipment. However, Metron simply purchased the training kits, gave the

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8 Amick, Benjamin C. III PhD; Hogg-Johnson, Sheilah PhD; Latour-Villamil, Desiree MS; Saunders, Ron PhD., “Protecting Construction Worker Health and Safety in Ontario, Canada: Identifying a Union Safety Effect”, *Journal of Occupational and Environmental Medicine*: December 2015 - Volume 57 - Issue 12 - p 1337–1342. Available at: https://journals.lww.com/joem/fulltext/2015/12000/Protecting_Construction_Worker_Health_and_Safety.14.aspx\#pdf-link The study was commissioned by the Ontario Construction Secretariat (OCS). The OCS agreed that the results could be published regardless of the outcome of the analysis.

9 The estimates include both the positive union effect on safety performance and other positive effects that may arise from the fact that union contractors tend, on average, to be larger than non-union contractors. The latter is known as the ‘firm size’ effect.

10 Critical injuries are defined in the study as injuries that jeopardize life, cause blindness, or injuries that result in amputations, major burns, fracture of large bones, and loss of consciousness.

workers their certificates and told them to show the certificates to an inspector if one showed up. The workers’ supervisor (who was subsequently jailed) provided no instruction and did not deal with the defective equipment. The workers fell to their deaths with their training certificates in their pockets. Why would the City increase the risk of repeat of the Christmas Eve tragedy?

Greater Investments in Apprenticeships

- A 2018 survey undertaken for the Ontario Construction Secretariat found that, in non-residential building construction, 81% of unionized construction contractors sponsored or employed apprentices compared to only 54% of non-union contractors.\textsuperscript{12} Three-quarters (75%) of apprentices in the unionized construction industry complete their training compared to only 58% outside the unionized sector.\textsuperscript{13} Every building trade in Toronto operates a training centre to support its apprentices and to upgrade the skills of its members. Many of these training centres deliver pre-apprentice training and support equity programs that create pathways to construction jobs. Ending the City’s partnership with the building trades inevitably means fewer apprenticeships. Is this an outcome that the City wants?

Support for Equity Programs:

- The City of Toronto is a leader in recognizing the important role of equity programs in supporting pathways to construction careers for young workers from First Nations, Metis and Inuit people, low-income families, racialized minorities, immigrants and women. The City has enjoyed strong support from the building trades unions in meeting these goals. Programs such as:
  
  - \textit{Hammer Heads} for disadvantaged youth, \textit{Helmets to Hard Hats} for veterans,
  - \textit{Renos for Heroes} which does home improvement work for disabled veterans,
  - Community Benefit Programs, like \textit{Construction Connections}, and
  - \textit{Habitat for Humanity} which constructs homes for low-income Torontonians

all require or are stronger because of the active support of building trades unions for these initiatives. \textit{All of these initiatives will be weakened or at risk if the City unilaterally ends its partnerships with the building trades.}

- Merit Ontario is the largest of the non-union employer organizations in the construction industry. It is worth noting that \textit{Merit Ontario is not involved in any equity programs}. Nor does the CLAC union

\textsuperscript{12} Ontario Construction Secretariat, \textit{2018 Contractor Survey}. The survey was conducted by the Logit Group via telephone with 500 ICI contractors from across Ontario in January-February 2018. The margin of error for a sample of 500 is +/-4.38%, 19 times out of 20. Seventy percent of the contractors surveyed were trade contractors and 26% were general contractors. The regional breakdown was as follows: Central Ontario 25%; GTA 31%; Eastern Ontario 17%; Southwestern Ontario 15%; Northern Ontario 11%.

have any programs that are comparable to either Hammer Heads, Renos for Heroes or Helmets to Hard Hats. It is patently unreasonable to expect a unionized contractor to bear the cost of supporting equity programs when they are forced to compete with non-union contractors who do not invest in any of these programs.

**Prompt Access to Skilled Labour:**
- Toronto is experiencing a boom in ICI and high-rise construction. There is a shortage of skilled labour. This shortage can cause delays in completing projects and drive up costs. The building trades unions have a well-developed system for drawing in skilled labour from regions and provinces where the pace of construction has slowed. The City's partnership with the building trades is an insurance policy against skills shortages and their damaging consequences.

**Supporting Compliance with Tax Obligations and Labour Standards:**
- A common tactic of contractors seeking to gain an unfair competitive advantage is to style their workers as 'independent operators' (i.e., sub-contractors) rather than as employees. This tactic removes workers from the payroll thereby enabling the contractor to avoid the cost of EI, CPP and WSIB contributions as well as requirements for overtime pay, vacation pay and statutory holiday pay. When all of these are taken into account, a contractor that uses off-payroll workers can save around 16.5% on its labour costs.\(^{14}\) This is little more than gaining an unfair competitive edge on the backs of workers. In the unionized sector of non-residential construction, this type of evasion is not possible. Collective agreements establish wages and benefits and all contractors pay their required EI, CPP and WSIB contributions. The City's Fair Wage Policy only protects against the 'independent operator' loophole if the City actively audits contractors to determine whether off-payroll workers should be reclassified as employees. Such audits are costly and time-consuming.

- Since 2013, it has been mandatory for 'independent operators' in the construction industry to register with the WSIB. This is intended to foster compliance. However, a comparison of WSIB data with the Labour Force Survey shows that around 80% of 'independent operators' are not complying.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Employer Contributions</th>
<th>%</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EI</td>
<td>2.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPP</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSIB (average for construction)</td>
<td>4.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vacation (Statutory Minimum: 2 weeks)</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Holidays (Statutory Minimum: 10 Days)</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>19.8%</td>
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For a worker earning $25.00/hr:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$</th>
<th>%</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Basic Pay</td>
<td>25.00</td>
<td>83.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Payroll Costs (19.8%)</td>
<td>4.95</td>
<td>16.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Labour Cost</td>
<td>29.95</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
with the mandatory registration requirement.\textsuperscript{15} If the City expands its use of non-union contractors, it should assume that there will be an increased need to audit off-payroll workers.

**The Claim of Significant Costs Savings is not Plausible:**

*Cardus Institute’s 15\% Savings Claim*

- The Cardus Institute has circulated a report claiming that municipalities can achieve cost savings of 15\% by ending their partnerships with the building trades. This claim is not credible:

  First: labour costs represent around 34.1\% of constructions costs.\textsuperscript{16} To achieve a 15\% cost reduction would require cutting labour costs by around 50\%. Cardus is implicitly assuming that Fair Wage Policies will also be scrapped to achieve savings on this scale.

  Second: in support of the 15\% cost reduction claim, Cardus uses examples that bear little connection to Toronto. For example, they restrictive bidding practices in Montreal that were illegal and which were investigated by the Charbonneau Commission. They also cite higher costs on a B.C. project even though most of the 7\% higher costs were attributable to equity programs which presumably Cardus would also scrap. Cardus also cites 21 studies that it claims support their cost-saving contention. The majority (12) of these studies are American and therefore not even remotely comparable to Ontario in terms of minimum labour standards. Two of the cited studies do not even deal with construction work. Five studies are simply critiques of Fair Wage Policies which presumably are also

\textsuperscript{15} These data are from a study by Prism Economics and Analysis commissioned by the Ontario Construction Secretariat: *The Underground Economy in Ontario’s Construction Industry: Estimates of the Revenue Losses to Governments*, May 2019


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Expense Category</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Materials, Energy &amp; Transportation</td>
<td>26.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinery &amp; Equipment</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financing, Leasing &amp; Rental</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineering, Architecture &amp; Other Specialized Design</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professional Services</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Office &amp; Other</td>
<td>2.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Input Costs, Excluding Labour</td>
<td>48.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Payroll Costs (Wages and Employer Contributions)     | 34.1\%           |
| Gross mixed income\textsuperscript{18}               | 7.8\%            |
| Gross operating surplus                              | 3.8\%            |
opposed by Cardus. And finally, two studies analyze the union effect on wages without any discussion of actual construction costs.

Third: the City's own study estimated that, in light of the City's Fair Wage Policy, the upper estimate of potential cost savings from ending the partnership with the building trades would be 1.7%. Moreover, this assumed (doubtfully) that all of those savings, if they materialized, would be passed on to the City.

European Commission Study (Lukas Vogel)\textsuperscript{17}

- The Vogel study for the European Commission examines the impact of implementing the EU's legislation on introducing transparency in procurement processes and removing some tendering restrictions, chiefly those that favoured or required local suppliers. These changes applied to only about 20% of the public procurement market, predominantly the market for goods and professional services. Vogel cites other studies which estimate that implementing the EU's legislation in these segments of the procurement market led to price declines of 2%-10 percent. \textit{It would be exceedingly unwise to transpose this cost estimate to an analysis of the impact of the City becoming a non-construction employer:}

First: the percentage change in costs depends on the starting point. Prior to the EU transparency and competition legislation, the affected public sector procurement markets in the EU were highly restricted. In some jurisdictions the lack of transparency may have fostered corrupt practices. Policies that favoured or even required local suppliers not surprisingly raised costs, especially in smaller jurisdictions where the bid pool was small. These starting conditions bear no resemblance to the City of Toronto. Rigorous transparency and above-board competition rules already operate in the City. As well, the potential bidding pool in Toronto is almost always large given the size of the City and the absence of local supplier requirements. In other words, the starting point in the City of Toronto is radically different from the starting point in the EU. \textit{It would be a serious error to expect similar cost savings when the starting points are so different.}

Second: the labour standards and social policy environment in the EU is often much different from Ontario and the City of Toronto. For example, in many EU countries, the labour relations system is based on a 'decree model' that establishes wage and benefit norms on a sector basis, irrespective of whether workers are unionized or not. As well, many benefits that are employer-based in Canada are state-provided in EU countries. \textit{To assume that cost savings estimated in the Vogel study would be mirrored by the City of Toronto is to ignore significant differences in the labour standards and social policy environment.}

\textsuperscript{17} Lukas Vogel, \textit{Macroeconomic Effects of Cost Savings in Public Procurement}, Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission (2009)
The Dijkema/Gunderson study applies what is known as the Bertrand bid model to municipal construction. The Bertrand bid model predicts that, in a competitive market, bids will cluster and that the degree of distance between the winning bid and the losing bids indicates the degree of competition in the market.

At first blush, the Bertrand bid model would appear to apply to construction tendering. However, the Bertrand model requires a number of important assumptions that often do not apply to construction markets. First, all suppliers are assumed to have equal capacity. This is simply not the case in the construction industry and it is why many public authorities pre-qualify bidders. Second, all bidders are assumed to face equal marginal costs for labour, equipment and for materials. Again, this is not the case. Large contractors enjoy favourable discounts on materials that can offset higher costs for labour. Third, all bidders are assumed to have equal alternative opportunities for their resources. Again, this is not true in construction. For various reasons, some contractors are working full tilt, while other contractors are desperate for work to maintain cash-flow. And fourth, all bidders are assumed to have equal reputations for reliability and quality. In the construction industry, this is clearly an unfounded assumption. There is also an implicit assumption in the Bertrand model that the product or service being supplied is not complex. This is often not true in construction projects. Quite simply, the Bertrand model on which the Dijkema/Gunderson study rests is not a good description of the construction industry. It is therefore important to note that other scholarly studies show that loosening the strict assumptions in the Bertrand model (as realism would require) alter the expected outcomes of a price-setting process.

While construction bids often tend to cluster, it is not uncommon for there to be outliers. High outlier bids occur because some contractors submit bids solely for the purpose of remaining on invitation lists, continuing to be eligible bidders or to signal to other bidders that they would be open to a sub-contract. They do not expect their high bids to succeed. Low outlier bids often reflect a need to secure work for cash-flow purposes or special circumstances such as workers and equipment that is in close proximity to the project (thereby largely eliminating 'mobilization costs'). Some contractors also bid low because their interpretation of the specifications suggests that there will be significant opportunities for change orders where are often highly profitable.

It is also important to note that the Dijkema/Gunderson study focused on smaller municipalities where small bidding pools are the norm. This is emphatically not the case in Toronto where there is already a large pool of bidders.

Doubtful Savings vs Real and Predictable Costs:

The cost savings on ICI construction that it is claimed will arise by the City of Toronto becoming a non-construction employer are:

18 Brian Dijkema and Morley Gunderson, “Restrictive Tendering”, Cardus Institute, January 2017

a) minor, at best, (1.7% based on an earlier City report);

b) conjectural, because they are based on doubtful comparisons (Cardus), radically dissimilar circumstances (Vogel) or inappropriate and highly unrealistic economic models (Dijkema/Gunderson); and

c) uncertain because all of these cost saving claims assume that 100% of cost savings, if they materialize, will be passed on to the City.

- While the cost savings may be minor, conjectural and uncertain this is not the case with the associated costs of the City becoming a non-construction employer. To ensure compliance with the Fair Wage Policy, safeguard high standards of safety on City projects, ensure adherence to equity programs, and uphold compliance with labour standards and tax obligations, the City will need to augment its contractor screening activities and increase its on-site inspection and audit activities.

- In contrast with the cost savings that will be minor, conjectural and uncertain, the costs of this additional careening, inspection and auditing will be real.

### There is Only One Way to Sustainably Lower Construction Costs

- Increased productivity is the primary means of achieving sustainably lower construction costs without sacrificing workplace safety, apprenticeship investment and compliance with tax and reporting obligations. The keys to increased productivity are:
  - more investment in health and safety management systems,
  - more investment in skills upgrading,
  - more investment in apprenticeship,
  - more investment in mechanization and digital technologies,
  - and more investment in project management.

- Higher productivity is the only sustainable and fair way to lower costs. There are no short-cuts. Rather than buying into false promises of supposedly risk-free cost-savings, the City’s procurement strategy should focus on the factors that truly reduce construction costs. As the City’s longstanding partners, the building trades are happy to work with the City on ways to achieve higher productivity.

### The City should maintain its Longstanding Partnership with the Building Trades

- I recommend that the City take the necessary legal steps to maintain it longstanding partnership with the building trades. The case to end that partnership is speculative, based on tortured evidence and will increase both risks and the City’s administrative costs. The case to maintain the partnership with the building trades is strong.
John O'Grady

Education

MA, University of Toronto
BA, University of Toronto

Career Summary

2000 – Present  Founding Partner, Prism Economics and Analysis
1991-2000  Consulting Practice (private/full-time)
1992  Visiting Senior Researcher, Economic Council of Canada
1987-1990  Legislative and Research Director, Ontario Federation of Labour
1982-1987  Project Planner (Asia), Canadian Labour Congress
1978-1982  Assistant to President, Ontario Public Service Employees Union
1974-1978  Research Officer, Ontario Public Service Employees Union
1973-1974  Associate Secretary (Administration), Council of Ontario Universities

Professional Experience

Consulting

Clients have included:

- Canadian Apprenticeship Forum,
- Canadian Council of Technicians and Technologists,
- Canadian Labour Force Development Board,
- Cultural Human Resources Council,
- Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre,
- Canadian Technology Human Resources Board,
- Contact Centre Canada,
- Construction Sector Council,
- Economic Council of Canada,
- Electricity Sector Council,
- Engineers Canada,
- Federal-Provincial Advisory Council on Immigration
- Howe Research Institute,
- Human Resources and Skills Development Canada,
- Industrial Restructuring Commissioner (Ontario),
- Industry Canada,
- Information and Communications Technology Council,
- International Institute of Labour Studies (ILO - Geneva),
- Ontario Construction Secretariat,
- Ontario Ministry of Treasury and Economics,
- Ontario Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities,
- Ontario Ministry of Labour,
Ontario Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration,
Ontario Ministry of Tourism and Recreation,
Ontario Premier’s Council,
Royal Architectural Institute of Canada,
Sectoral Skills Council of the Electrical and Electronics Industry,
Workplace Health and Safety Agency
Workplace Safety and Insurance Board

Teaching Assignments

- Ryerson University: Labour-Management Relations
- York University (adjunct professor): Special Topics in Labour Market and Industrial Relations Policy

Funded Study Tours

- Fulbright Programme in the United States to study trade and competitiveness
- Swedish Work Environment Fund and Swedish Information Agency - study of labour market policies and institution

Publications

- “Removing the Obstacles to Negotiated Adjustment,” in Werner Sengenberger and Duncan Campbell, eds., *Creating Economic Opportunities: The Role of Labour Standards in Industrial Restructuring*, International Institute for Labour Studies (ILO) (Geneva, 1994)
- *Arbitration and Its Ills*, School of Policy Studies, Queen’s University (1994)
- *Job Control Unionism vs. the New Human Resource Management Model*, Queen’s University Industrial Relations Centre (1995)
- “Integrating Sustainable Development into Workplace Governance,” in *Sustainable Development: Getting There from Here*, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy and Canadian Labour Congress (1992)
- *Direct and Indirect Evidence of Changes in Work Organization*, Queen’s University Industrial Relations Centre
- *Work Organization, Labour Relations and Human Resource Management: The Negotiated Adjustment Option*, Queen’s University Industrial Relations Centre
Presentations, etc.

- Canadian Industrial Relations Association
- Industrial Relations Research Association (US)
- Economic Policy Institute (Washington, D.C.)
- Canadian Bar Association (pension law section)
- Canadian Association of Business Economists
- Canadian Pension Conference/Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities/Canadian Institute of Actuaries
- Canadian Association of Administrators of Labour Law
- Economic Council of Canada
- Institute for International Economics (Washington, D.C.)
- Canadian Institute of Management
- Centre for International Studies (University of Toronto)
- Institute of Policy Studies (Queen’s University)
- Canadian Labour Market and Productivity Centre
- Fraser Institute
- Lexium Inc. Pension Conference
- Conference Board in Canada
- Ontario Premier’s Council
- Ontario Labour-Management Forum (Ministry of Labour)
- Institute for Work and Health

Memberships, Etc.

- Institute for Work and Health – formerly, member of Board of Directors and Chair,
- Toronto Business Development Centre – formerly member of Board and President,
- ORTECH Corp. - formerly member of Board of Directors and Vice-Chair
- North-South Institute - formerly Treasurer and member of Board of Directors
- Canadian Training Network (York University) - formerly member of advisory committee
- HEALNet (Centre of Excellence funded through Medical Sciences Research Council) - formerly Chairperson of research advisory committee
- Centre for Study of Living Standards - formerly member of Research Advisory Committee