



## REPORT FOR ACTION WITH CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT

### Review of Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall

**Date:** December 18, 2019

**To:** General Government and Licensing Committee

**From:** Executive Director, Corporate Real Estate Management

**Wards:** All

#### REASON FOR CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION

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The attachment to this report pertains to the security of property belonging to the City of Toronto.

#### SUMMARY

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This report recommends changes to the current "Enhanced" level of security at Toronto City Hall for approval by City Council. These recommendations are based upon assessments from the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada, best practices, benchmarking, and experience from the current set-up. The primary goals of these recommendations are to maintain an accessible, safe, and secure Toronto City Hall while providing a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

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The Executive Director, Corporate Real Estate Management recommends that:

1. City Council approve the use of patron screening for all non-City access card holders, using walk-through metal detectors, on the main floor of Toronto City Hall.
2. City Council approve the installation of a physical security measure to provide a delineation of public and secure space on the main floor of Toronto City Hall at the location of the walk-through metal detectors.
3. City Council approve the installation of security turnstiles on the main floor of Toronto City Hall requiring City access card holders to utilize their access cards in order to bypass patron screening.
4. City Council direct that portions of Confidential Attachment 1 be released at the discretion of the Executive Director, Corporate Real Estate Management, following the implementation of City Council's decision, and that the balance of Confidential Attachment 1 remain confidential, as it pertains to the security of property belonging to the City of Toronto.

## FINANCIAL IMPACT

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The optical turnstiles and installation of physical security measures is estimated to cost \$0.350 million. Funding is available within the 2019 Council Approved Facilities, Real Estate, Environment and Energy Capital Budget and 2020-2028 Capital Plan and will be absorbed in the 2020 Capital Budget for Corporate Real Estate Management.

The Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer has reviewed this report and agrees with the financial impact information.

## DECISION HISTORY

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At its meeting held on September 30 and October 1, 2009, City Council adopted item GM24.32, "Councillor Protection at City Properties" which highlighted security measures in place for the protection of Councillors, described additional measures that were being implemented, and made recommendations for further protections.

<http://www.toronto.ca/legdocs/mmis/2009/gm/reports/2009-09-17-gm24-cr.htm#GM24.32>.

At its meeting of April 12 and 13, 2011, City Council adopted item Government GM2.12, "Councillor Protection at City Properties - Update" which provided an implementation update on the status of security measures as a result of the adoption of the report titled "Councillor Protection at City Properties" and recommended additional security measures.

<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2011.GM2.12>.

At its meeting of December 5, 6, 7 and 8, 2017, City Council adopted item EX 29.10, "Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall" which directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to review options for enhanced security at City Hall including security changes for the Council Chamber and Committee Rooms, and to survey members of the public and City employees on patron screening at City Hall.

<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2017.EX29.10>

At its meeting of June 26, 27, 28 and 29, 2018, City Council adopted item EX35.3, "Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall" which approved a number of recommendations to enhance the physical security of City Hall, the Committee Rooms, and the Council Chamber. One of the adopted recommendations directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to report back to City Council through the applicable Standing Committee on any recommended changes or enhancements to the main floor patron baggage security screening and Council Chamber patron screening prior to the end of 2019.

<http://app.toronto.ca/tmmis/viewAgendaItemHistory.do?item=2018.EX35.3>

## COMMENTS

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Toronto City Hall is the seat of municipal government, corporate head office for Canada's largest city, and one of the most distinctive, symbolic, and iconic buildings in the City of Toronto. Unfortunately, these attributes may also make Toronto City Hall a target for serious threats. The City has a responsibility to ensure appropriate measures are in place to provide a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats. These proposed security enhancements will help maintain an accessible, safe, and secure City Hall for staff and the public while providing a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

### **Canada's Domestic Terrorism Threat Level**

Canada's Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre is an independent, expert federal body responsible for assessing terrorism threats to Canada and Canadian interests globally. Canada's National Terrorism Threat Levels represent the likelihood of a violent act of terrorism occurring in Canada, based on information and intelligence. On October 17, 2014, Canada's threat level was elevated from "Low" to "Medium". The definition of Medium is "intelligence indicates that an individual or group within Canada or abroad has the intent and capability to commit an act of Terrorism in Canada. The Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre assesses that a violent act of terrorism could occur." Since the elevation of this threat level there has been a number of realized terrorist related incidents, violent attacks appropriating terrorist methods, and disrupted terrorist plots in Canada, including in Toronto.

The threat levels serve as a tool for government officials, including those in law enforcement, to identify risks and vulnerabilities from threats and, in turn, determine appropriate responses to prevent or mitigate a violent act of terrorism.

Canada's domestic terrorism threat level was again recently reviewed by the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police distributed an official "Update for the National Terrorism Threat Level for Canada" on December 5, 2019. This update confirmed the domestic terrorism threat level will remain at Medium.

### **Terrorism Threat Environment in Canada**

According to the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre, the greatest terrorism threat to Canada remains domestic extremists who have been inspired or incited online by violent ideologies propagated by extremist groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (also known as DAESH) or al-Qaida. Other forms of terrorism also continue to pose a threat to the security of Canada. ITAC continues to judge that individuals associated with DAESH, AQ or other extremist milieus, such as right-wing extremism, maintain the intent and some capability to conduct violent acts in Canada.

Online propaganda distributed by terrorist groups and their supporters continues to inspire and incite lone-actors and small groups to carry out attacks where they live, using whatever means they have available, such as a bladed weapon, firearm, improvised explosive device, or a vehicle. Recent attacks using these methods demonstrate that relatively simple techniques, requiring minimal planning, have the potential to create significant impacts. Some additional examples include lone-actor attacks using a bladed weapon, single firearm, or a vehicle.

## **Grievance Based Threats**

Grievance based threats are also a security concern for Toronto City Hall. Grievance based adversaries can range from disgruntled constituents and groups, disgruntled customers, hate groups, opposition movements, etc. These grievances may be based upon real or perceived decisions, policies, or comments made by City Council, elected officials, or City staff. Grievances may be based upon real or perceived actions taken on local, domestic, and/or international issues.

## **Determination of Measures to Mitigate Threats**

After the elevation of Canada's domestic terrorism threat level from "Low" to "Medium" on October 17, 2014, City Hall has been operating at an elevated (Enhanced) level of security. While operating at the enhanced level of security, information was sought through assessments, benchmarking, and best practices to determine recommended enhancements for providing a reasonable level of protection from foreseeable threats.

### **Assessments**

In 2017, the City received two assessments providing recommendations to further enhance security at Toronto City Hall. One of these assessments was the "Toronto Police Service Vulnerability Assessment of Toronto City Hall" signed and approved by the Chief of Police. This assessment detailed that the most severe threats to City Hall are from an improved explosive device and/or an active attacker. The main recommendation of the assessment was the implementation of security screening for all visitors requiring the use of walk-through metal detectors / hand wands (patron screening) with all members of the public accessing the building through one main set of doors.

The second assessment received was the "Critical Infrastructure Vulnerability Assessment for Toronto City Hall" conducted by Public Safety Canada. The report provides findings of a vulnerability assessment and provides security enhancements to consider based upon the vulnerabilities assessed. One of the main recommendations included the use of metal detectors (patron screening) upon entrance to City Hall.

### **Benchmarking**

Patron screening is done to various degrees at provincial legislatures, city halls at large cities in the United States, city halls for two large Canadian cities, courts, and sport and entertainment venues such as the Scotiabank Arena and Rogers Centre. As it pertains to benchmarking, the only major Canadian change in the last year in regards to patron screening was the announcement in July 2019 that Queen's Park would be

implementing patron screening via walk through metal detectors before entering the building and a new Visitor Screening Centre would be built with a 2020 implementation date.

## **Previous Reports**

The staff recommendation of walk through metal detectors at the front entrance to City Hall was previously recommended to City Council in December of 2017, upon receipt of the assessments from the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada. At this meeting, some security enhancements were approved; however, the recommendation of patron screening on the main floor of the building was not approved.

At this meeting, City Council directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to survey members of the public and City employees on patron screening at City Hall and to report back to City Council. Subsequently, a number of surveys and engagement sessions were conducted in order to survey members of the public, including online polling by a third-party market research firm, in-person intercept surveys conducted at City Hall by a third-party market research firm, an online public survey on the City's website, an online survey for City staff on the City's intranet site, and facilitated community conversations (engagement sessions) with the African Canadian Black community; Muslim, Middle-Eastern, South-Asian communities; and Indigenous Peoples community.

At its meeting in June 2018, City Council adopted the staff report "Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall" which approved a number of recommendations to enhance the physical security of City Hall, the Committee Rooms, and the Council Chamber. One of the adopted recommendations directed the Deputy City Manager, Internal Corporate Services, to report back to City Council through the applicable Standing Committee on any recommended changes or enhancements to the main floor patron baggage security screening and Council Chamber patron screening prior to the end of 2019.

## **Current Patron Screening and Baggage Security Screening Measures**

Currently, baggage security screening is conducted for all non-City access card holders during all operating hours. During regular business hours, baggage security screening is conducted beside the East and West Council elevators and at the Hagerman exterior door. Portable stanchions are used to define the screening area with a Corporate Security guard stationed at the pedestrian gap to provide the screening. This security baggage screening requires all members of the public to stop and speak with a security guard who provides information / directions to assist the visitor. The security guard then also inspects anything being carried by the member of the public (bags, coats, etc.) to ensure they do not contain prohibited items.

This baggage security screening has been occurring since August 2018. To date over 126,000 bags have been screened and a number of prohibited items have been removed. The majority of these prohibited items have been bladed items (knife, box cutter, etc).

Patron screening, involving the use of walk through metal detectors, hand-held metal detector wands, and physical baggage checks, is conducted for all individuals without a City access card prior to entry to the Council Chamber for City Council meetings. This screening currently occurs inside the Council Chamber bridges that are located between the east and west towers and the Council Chamber. This location allows for the checking of attendees for prohibited items prior to entrance to the actual Council Chamber.

This patron screening has been occurring since December 2018. To date over 2000 visitors have been screened and few prohibited items have been removed. The majority of these prohibited items have been bladed.

There have been relatively very few complaints with either the baggage security screening or the Council Chamber patron screening from members of the public.

### **Recommended Screening**

The staff recommendation of walk through metal detectors at the front entrance to City Hall was previously recommended to City Council in December of 2017, upon receipt of the assessments from the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada. At this meeting, some security enhancements were approved; however, the recommendation of patron screening was not approved.

The approved, and since implemented, recommendations of the main floor patron baggage security screening and the Council Chamber patron screening strived to seek a balance between a reasonable level of security and an acceptable level of security measures that would be approved by City Council.

The original recommendations of walk through metal detectors on the main floor are being again recommended for a number of reasons, including:

- 1) Detection Capabilities. It is clear that a walk through metal detector is far superior in the detection of weapons than only baggage security screening.
- 2) Experience to Date on the Effectiveness of Baggage Screening.
- 3) To Provide Further Ground Floor Coverage.
- 4) To Obtain Earlier Detection. Earlier detection allows for a faster response to an emergency event including early lockdown of the building.

### **Recommended Configuration**

Appropriate implementation of patron screening near the main doors of City Hall would require physical security enhancements in the forms of semi-permanent glass partitions and optical turnstiles.

The proposed configuration would have the patron screening located on the West side of the ground floor "Toronto at Your Service" Information Desk and the optical turnstiles for City access card holders on the East side between the Information Desk and Security Desk. The "Toronto at Your Service" staff would be integrated with the patron screening area to provide information and directional services to visitors. This set-up would still therefore allow for the first contact for visitors during business hours to be "Toronto at Your Service" staff, as opposed to security guards.

It is recommended that optical turnstiles be installed on the "employee-side" of the patron screening configuration. An optical turnstile is a physical security device designed to control access to a secure area through card access. An example of an optical turnstile can be found at TTC stations with the turnstile opening upon presentation of a valid Presto card. Installation of this measure would require City access card holders to utilize their access card for immediate access. To exit the turnstiles no security assistance is required, the turnstile automatically opens.

It is further recommended that semi-permanent glass partitions, integrated with the optical turnstiles, be erected to provide a physical delineation between public and secured space.

The design of the semi-permanent glass partitions and optical turnstiles would be appropriately conducted in conjunction with Heritage Preservation Services (heritage) and Toronto Fire Services (Fire Code compliance). A rendering of a possible design is provided in Attachments 1 and 2 of this Report.

As patron screening would now be done on the main floor, the walk through metal detectors would be removed from the Council Chamber and re-used on the main floor, thereby enhancing the secure space from only the Council Chamber to the full building and requiring only one screening check.

The current baggage security screening area would also be removed and the security guards dedicated to the East, West, and Hagerman baggage security screening areas would be redeployed to the new patron screening areas.

With this recommended set-up, public access to City Hall would be from the PATH entrance and front door entrances only. The Hagerman door and West Permit Alley doors would become card access-only doors.

### **Threat Detection Technology**

A number of recent technologies are currently being offered that are designed to improve weapons threat detection while minimizing interruption to the flow of foot traffic. These systems look similar to a walk through metal detector but can accommodate multiple persons at a time, with a much higher throughput, and do not require the emptying of pockets of metal objects.

Corporate Security staff will continue to monitor the developments in this technology and its appropriateness for critical City facilities such as City Hall and will report to City Council at a future time if their use would be recommended to replace the walk through metal detectors.

## **Alternative Recommendations**

Alternative recommendations are being provided should City Council require other recommendations to consider in the event that City Council were not to approve the original recommendation of patron screening on the main floor of City Hall. The financial impact of any of these recommendations would not exceed the financial impact of the original recommendation. Additional information on the vulnerabilities of each of these recommendations is contained in Confidential Attachment 1.

### **A) Replacement of Current Baggage Screening with Patron Screening (WTMD)**

Following this recommendation, the patron screening set-up recommended for the main floor at the "Toronto At Your Service" Information Desk would instead be installed at the current baggage security screening locations at the entrances to the East and West towers. In this configuration, for the East tower, optical turnstiles and accompanying semi-permanent glass partitions would be installed on each side of the East Council Chamber elevator. On one side, where there currently exists belted stanchions, this area would be used for City access card holders only. On the other side, where the baggage security screening table currently sits, would be public access with a walk through metal detector. This whole configuration would be repeated at the West tower. With this set-up the Hagerman door would be on card access only.

### **B) Relocation of the Baggage Security Screening to the Information Desk Area**

Following this recommendation, the current baggage security screening would be relocated adjacent to the Information Desk at two locations: 1) on the East side of the Information Desk where the after-business hours baggage check is currently completed and 2) at the entrance to Permit Alley.

### **C) Enhancements of Current Baggage Screening Locations**

Following this recommendation, the current belted stanchions at the current baggage security screening locations would be replaced with optical turnstiles and semi-permanent glass partitions but without the walk through metal detectors. In this configuration, for the East tower, optical turnstiles and accompanying semi-permanent glass partitions would be installed on each side of the East Council Chamber elevator. On one side, where there currently exists belted stanchions, this area would be used for City access card holders only. On the other side, where the baggage security screening table currently sits, would be the security screening table followed by an optical turnstile. This configuration would be repeated at the West tower. With this set-up, the Hagerman door would be on card access only as public access from this door is significantly less than at the East and West baggage screening areas.

### **D) Minor Modifications to the Existing Set-Up for Baggage and Patron Screening**

Following this recommendation, no physical changes would occur for the existing baggage security screening areas. As it pertains to the Council Chamber and the patron screening configuration, a minor change would be recommended for the installation of a semi-permanent partition for the Council Chamber East Tower elevator lobby to replace the current, temporary belted stanchion barrier. The belted stanchion barrier was erected in order to secure one of the washrooms within the secure space so members



of the public who have already been screened could access a washroom without having to be re-screened.

## **Conclusion**

The safety of all those who work, visit, or do business at City facilities is a top priority of the City of Toronto.

These proposed security enhancements will help maintain an accessible, safe, and secure City Hall for staff and the public. These enhancements will also provide the majority all building occupants with the same level of security currently employed in the Council Chamber, thus providing uniform security protections for all persons.

The recommended security measures for City Hall are an enhancement from current measures, but still are in line with security measures at provincial legislatures, city halls at large cities in the United States, courts, and sport and entertainment venues such as the Scotiabank Arena and Rogers Centre. These recommended security measures also remain consistent with the professional advice provided by the Toronto Police Service and Public Safety Canada. Further, these recommendations emphasize the results of the experience, and challenges, with the current measures.

## **CONTACT**

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## **SIGNATURE**

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## **ATTACHMENTS**

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Confidential Attachment 1 - Review of Enhanced Security Measures at Toronto City Hall  
Attachment 1 - Rendering of Possible Design of Main Floor Screening Areas (West View)  
Attachment 2 - Rendering of Possible Design of Main Floor Screening Areas (East View)