

Comments regarding A New Commemorative Framework for the City of Toronto's Public Spaces

Patrice Dutil, Ph.D

I want to register my opposition to the policy proposal as it is currently worded, to suggest amendments to the proposed City of Toronto Commemorative Framework, and to encourage the Executive Committee to think more strategically about how sensitive issues like place-naming need to be managed in the future. Toronto, a city that has sadly often proven very insensitive to its past, needs to bring a great deal more sophistication to this area.

Certainly, the City of Toronto needs to have a Commemorative Framework to guide its policies. Every great city in the world has one, and Toronto's practice needs significant reform to remove meaningless commemorations and to take advantage of opportunities to create "places of memory" that will have a community-and-city building potential.¹

The Commemorative Framework proposed by the City Manager is far too restrictive to the point where it can lead to errors in judgment and I urge City Council to seek amendments before it is passed.

Here are the amendments I propose:

1. ~~Be-Ensure commemorations are informed- driven~~ by historical research focused on evidence, and informed by traditional knowledge city traditions, and community insights, and best practices from around the world;
2. ~~Be-Proposals be~~ supported by ~~_communities through~~ meaningful community engagement;
3. Honour Indigenous ways of knowing and being;
4. Prioritize commemorations significant to ~~Indigenous Peoples, Black communities, and workers, women and~~ equity-deserving groups;
5. Connect to the history and cultures of Toronto, Ontario, ~~and/or~~ Canada ~~'s histories and cultures; and~~
6. Share knowledge and stories behind commemorations that will enhance a general sense of belonging to the community; and.
7. Share the financial cost of such undertakings clearly with the public as part of the review process by staff.

The amendments I propose are fairly self-explanatory. The new commemorative framework needs to highlight the evidence-based nature of city government as well as its sensitivity to community needs. After all, legal matters are referred to lawyers, structural matters are referred to engineers and public health issues are referred to physicians. The task of "remembering"

¹ A rough translation of the French concept of "Lieux de mémoire" or places/names that will meaningfully invoke the past.

similarly needs to be directed by staff who possess relevant expertise and who know how to seek it objectively in the broader community.

Remembering the historically significant indigenous origins of Canada is important (#3), but the views all equity-deserving groups should be considered, not just two (#4). The city is far more complex demographically and culturally than clause #4 pretends. Finally, the City's experience with the Dundas Street naming controversy has underlined the need for financial clarity. The staggering \$6M price tag has been widely viewed as underestimated.

The experience of the Dundas Street renaming over the past two years has brought to light a number of troubling realities that lead me to three proposals:

A. The Dundas Street Renaming initiative must be abandoned

B. The City should create a Toponymy Commission accountable to City Council

C. The City should create a permanent Secretariat to support such a Commission.

Discussion:

A. The Dundas Street Renaming initiative must be abandoned

For over two hundred years, most Torontonians would likely have imagined that the name had been given to honour some important family like the Crawfords, Thompsons, Jarvises, Christies, or Bloors. The better-travelled might have made the link to the Dundas Clan of Scotland, many of whom had immigrated to Canada and to the city. A select few might have wished that it was named for Captain George Dundas, a young University of Toronto student who had joined the Canadian army in 1915, survived gassing at Passchendaele in Sep. 1917 and was killed in Apr. 1918 at Amiens.

In other words, there was no issue with "Dundas". The street was never publicly associated or identified with Henry Dundas (no street signage has ever indicated "Henry Dundas", nor is the square at Yonge known as "Henry Dundas Square"), but the link was made nevertheless and suddenly "Dundas" became in issue.

City Staff agreed that the association had to be made and performed work that was rushed, and left much to be desired in its rationale to change the name of Dundas Street. It published countless errors of fact and grievously distorted the story of Henry Dundas. Not least, it adopted a process that completely side-tracked the broader community, choosing instead to consult only a few groups before it recommended the street name.

Moreover, the July 2021 report submitted by Staff was clearly written by individuals who had no expertise in interpreting the past. Instead, the process of drafting it was entirely focused on the meaning of the word "Dundas" to a very small number of discrete communities. No effort was made to consult with experts. It was a closed-door, secret process that has no legitimacy in modern governance.

Very few knew that Dundas Street commemorated someone named “Henry Dundas” until George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, a thousand miles west of Toronto.

The City Report had the virtue of being candid. It acknowledged that it was done “in the aftermath of the killing of George Floyd and the global protests that followed.” It declared that the very name of the street was “an act of oppression to continue to honour and recognize individuals who have contributed to the subjugation of Black and Indigenous peoples, and people of colour.” Outrageous already, the connections City Staff concocted became even more bizarre. Dundas was accused of trying to capture the revolutionary St. Domingue (Haiti) from the French (the report failed to mention that Napoleon crushed the revolt and reinstated slavery). But it then turned even stranger: Dundas was accused of having defeated the French forces in Egypt, “a victory that enabled England to enforce colonial control of India.”

This was a new twist: the British were wrong to defeat Napoléon as he sought total domination of Europe, parts of Africa and the Middle East? The report cherry-picked one geo-strategic effect of that defeat and missed the forest for the trees. “Dundas played a key part in the expansion of Britain’s presence and influence in India,” it says. Clearly the authors of the report were unaware of Dundas’s opposition to Britons buying *any land* in India. It’s a wonder they didn’t hold Dundas responsible for the outbreak of the First World War or the Spanish Flu.

In fact, Henry Dundas (1742-1811) was a giant figure in the wars that marked the last third of the 18th century and the history of Canada after the American War of Independence. In traditional British and Canadian historiography (English and French) those wars constituted a struggle to maintain British freedom and order from revolutionary threats, oppression, and mythology.

Born in Edinburgh, Dundas studied law at the city’s university and found himself powerfully attracted to the ideas of the Scottish Enlightenment. He was also immensely talented. He was named Solicitor General for Scotland almost straight out of university, but particularly distinguished himself in leading the defence of Joseph Knight, a young black man who had been enslaved in Jamaica and taken to Scotland. Knight tried to escape upon setting foot in Britain, but was unsuccessful. Dundas fought for Knight’s freedom and won the landmark case. He was a man of the world.

He combined pride in his Scottish heritage with a broad Enlightenment humanity. He had all the virtues and deficiencies of a progressive Whig and on occasion defended even the rights of Catholics (much to his personal peril — rioters attacked his house in Edinburgh while his mother was at home). He stood up for displaced Highlanders, as well as the enslaved. He took inspiration from Sir Guy Carleton’s *Quebec Act* of 1774 which showed that Great Britain could indeed learn to live with Catholics, at least in the context of its large majority-French colony. In fact, Henry Dundas was the man who ordered the government of Lower Canada (today’s Quebec) to *support* the pleas of *Canadien* politicians and ensure that laws introduced in the Legislative Assembly be written in French and that all bills be presented in translation. He was thus responsible for the first policy of bilingualism in this country.

Dundas was also a politician who worked hard to dominate Scottish affairs. He was elected to the House of Commons in 1774 as a protégé of Lord North and later as a leading figure in the administration of William Pitt. He served as Secretary of State for the Home Office (1791-4), Secretary of War (1794-1801), and First Lord of the Admiralty (1804-5). His reconstruction of the Royal Navy led to Britain's triumph in the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805 and shattered Napoleon's plans to invade England.

The City Staff Report on Dundas declared that “20 academic experts knowledgeable in the areas of public history, Black Canadian studies and public commemoration as a whole” were consulted. In fact, no qualified historians in either 18th century Britain or Upper Canada, of whom there are a number in Ontario, were involved. The team writing the report consulted the city's Anti-Black Racism Unit and the Indigenous Affairs Office and concluded that the question was ripe for public consideration. The City then retained QuakeLab, an independent consultancy on “equity-deserving communities” to further bolster its position. Four “discovery” sessions with 25 unnamed “community leaders” were then held. The City claims that business organizations were supportive of renaming the street. It is not clear if they were ever told of the actual cost and asked to suggest better ways to spend such monies, such as helping people who suffer from actual racial discrimination. Instead, according to the report, “the new context” (that is to say, the feverish, violent American summer of 2020) required quick action, leaving no room for such subtleties.

The seven-paragraph history (really, six paragraphs as the first offers no substance) presented in the City Staff report revealed the limits of the research that was undertaken. It claimed to be based on a review of “published peer-reviewed academic research prepared by professional historians on Henry Dundas to understand his legacy and how it may impact Black and Indigenous communities in Toronto,” but the only source that contends that Dundas “subjugated” indigenous people was *not* peer-reviewed.

The potted history does not give any overview of Dundas's career or the times in which he lived. Instead it focuses entirely on one disposition of his at one moment in time, based on select and biased readings, presented without context, and egregiously illogical. First, the text:

In 1792, independent Member of Parliament William Wilberforce brought a bill before the British House of Commons to immediately abolish the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. This proposal followed growing support for abolition among the British public, with a then-record 500 petitions being submitted to the House in support of Wilberforce's bill. During the parliamentary debate, Dundas proposed an amendment qualifying support for the bill by adding the word "gradually", so that it read that the slave trade "ought gradually to be abolished". In his speech to parliament, Dundas explained that while he had "long entertained the same opinion ... as to the abolition of the slave trade", he "must consider how far it may be proper for [him] to give [his] assent" to the bill. He went on to describe how "this trade must ultimately be abolished, but by moderate

measures which shall not invade the property of individuals, nor shock too suddenly the prejudices of our West India Islands".

There are several problems with this text. In fact, Wilberforce first proposed a motion in the House to abolish slavery in 1791, when it was roundly defeated. When he reintroduced it in 1792, Dundas, who was in the legislature this time, introduced a petition from Edinburgh citizens and pronounced himself against slavery.

Dundas then gave his first speech in the House of Commons on abolition, in which he denounced *both* the slave trade and slavery and warned his colleagues that public opinion was changing and that certain men's business interests in the slave trade were in jeopardy. It was then that he suggested an overture amendment to win over recalcitrant members and added the word "gradual" to the resolution. This gambit was designed to get *more* support for abolition. Dundas then laid out a plan that would abolish slavery and its trade within seven years. Dundas's amendment helped secure the support of a majority of MPs, provided a rationale and a prescription

The resolution was supported by the House of Commons but was then defeated in the House of Lords. There were other successful votes in 1794 and 1799 in favour of a motion to ban slave-trading to foreign territories, and both met the same fate. This showed how impossible it was to move at all on abolition. The Lords were immovable, and so was King George III.

The resolution of 1792 showed Dundas's remarkable courage in a hostile political environment. He was always in favour of Wilberforce's position on abolition in principle, but he knew that Scottish merchants were disproportionately profiting from the slave trade and that it would take time to persuade them that there was a more enlightened and perhaps profitable way to run their business interests without slaves.

Dundas managed to convince most of the recalcitrant Scottish MPs to abstain, and those who did vote mostly voted to support the Wilberforce-Dundas resolution. The point is that Dundas consistently supported an unpopular position and should thus be regarded as something of a hero of the anti-slavery movement.

At exactly the same time, Dundas, in his role as Home Secretary, appointed a celebrated soldier of the Revolutionary War, John Graves Simcoe, who was a friend to both Dundas and Wilberforce, to the position of Lieutenant Governor of Upper Canada. It was not an accident that Simcoe's first priority was to abolish slavery and the slave trade in Upper Canada, making it the first territory of the British Empire, and thus in the world, to pass such legislation. He approved the *Act to Limit Slavery in Upper Canada* in Jul. 1793,² partly in retaliation at the U.S. Congress's *Fugitive Slave Act* of Feb. 1793.

² "1793 Act to Limit Slavery in Upper Canada," *Canadian Encyclopedia*
<https://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.ca/en/article/1793-act-to-limit-slavery-in-upper-canada>

Of course, Simcoe encountered some resistance, but, supported by William Osgoode, the first Chief Justice—also a Dundas appointee—and others, he pressed on and won his case. Reflecting the spirit of his friend Dundas, Simcoe pointedly welcomed black freedom-seekers to Upper Canada, confirming a refugee tradition that reached from the Black Loyalists of the Revolutionary War to the Underground Railroad of the 19th century.

It was as a result of Dundas's intervention that the House of Commons pronounced itself against slavery, knowing full well that King George III and the Lords would not play along. This is not a trivial point. When today's opponents of Henry Dundas attribute to him the defeat of abolition, they forget that most of the political establishment was against it.

Moreover, the incident revealed a difference between Wilberforce and Dundas. The latter consistently argued in favour of ending slavery: for Dundas, it was the only place to start. Wilberforce did not share that view. His focus was on ending the slave *trade* rather than the end of slavery itself. That is because Wilberforce believed that ending the trade would cause planters to improve conditions for slaves in order to “keep up the numbers” and that in turn improving conditions would eventually bring slavery to an end. It was a naive view that later proven to be mistaken in the years after passage of the 1807 Anti-Slave Trade Bill. It would take a long time for Wilberforce to come around. Only in 1823, twelve years after Henry Dundas had died, did Wilberforce help found the Society for the Mitigation and *Gradual* Abolition of Slavery Throughout the British Dominions (my emphasis), taking a page from Dundas's approach to the problem.

The fact that the 1792 motion had absolutely no hope of passing has been acknowledged by the most severe critics of Henry Dundas. Even Dr. Stephen Mullen, the historian most relied upon by the City of Toronto staff, has admitted that the “1792 bill had no prospect of passing the Lords.” The notion only survives in the heart of the City of Toronto's staff.

This was the second History paragraph provided by the city staff:

In moving this amendment, Dundas set out a middle-ground proposal that voiced moderate support for abolition, while also acknowledging the arguments of opponents of the bill, who saw the continuation of the slave trade as essential to the economy of the British West Indies. Dundas' intentions for doing so have been subject to debate. Biographer Michael Fry, for example, has interpreted the amendment as a compromise solution that allowed the bill to pass in the House of Commons, laying the groundwork for eventual abolition. On the other hand, peer-reviewed academic research offers different interpretations of his actions. Scottish historian Dr. Glen Doris suggests that Dundas' amendment was motivated by "fear of radical change". Dr. Iain Whyte described how Dundas' amendment "effectively delayed abolition for nearly two decades".

Wading skittishly into the historical debate, the City of Toronto report knew which side it favoured: It is the views of Dr. Doris and Dr. Whyte that supported the City report's thesis. They

ignored a whole range of scholars who had demonstrated that such an interpretation of Dundas was wrongheaded and anti-historical.

Why are other experts in the field not being considered? The work of Sir Tom Devine, widely regarded as authoritative, is not included. Why not Christer Petley's work on the remarkable independence of slaveholders in the British Caribbean at the time? Or Oxford professor Brian Young's exploration on Dundas's progressivism in the context of the 18th century? What about University of St. Andrews Professor Guy Rowlands, who argued that the war environment around the turn of the century made it impossible to end slavery? The fact that such a law was eventually enacted in 1807 revealed the goodwill that built around the movement. No acknowledgment is made of how an economic case was built in favour of abolition. The work of the Henry Dundas Committee for Public Education on Historic Scotland, which includes facsimile of key documents, is nowhere to be found.

In a recent article in *Scottish Affairs*, Dr. Angela McCarthy highlighted the fact that the peer-reviewed literature has long considered that Dundas supported the Wilberforce resolution out of goodwill. She demonstrated vividly that there is simply no logic in concluding that Dundas delayed anything.

To return to the City's report's third paragraph:

Dundas' actions following the 1792 parliamentary debate show a clear opposition [sic] to abolition. Wilberforce continued to present an abolition bill every year until 1799 – but as Glen Doris argues, Dundas "worked hard to defeat subsequent bills". He points to a communication between Dundas and Wilberforce in 1794 in which Dundas stated that he had "used all the influence he possessed to prevent the abolition question being raised at any rate while the nation was at war," in reference to Britain's wars with France (1793-1815). The work of historian Roger Buckley shows that from 1795 until the abolition of the slave trade in 1807, the British government sought to enhance its army's military capability by purchasing approximately 13,400 slaves to serve in the West India Regiments.

This highly distorting passage willfully ignores the constant communication Wilberforce maintained with Dundas — it was not just a single memo. Dundas is mentioned 40 times in Wilberforce's 1793-1800 diaries, prompting the Wilberforce Diaries Project to recognize them as evidence of ongoing dialogue. The passage also suppresses the fact that Wilberforce opposed the abolition of slavery for more than twenty years — even after Britain abolished the trade in slaves in 1807.

The text continues with a fourth paragraph:

As Secretary of War, Dundas was a key architect behind this policy, which made the British Government the largest individual purchaser of slaves during this period. In a paper titled "Henry Dundas: a 'Great Delayer' of the Abolition of the Transatlantic Slave

Trade," Dr. Stephen Mullen expands on this work, arguing that Dundas' opposition to abolition after 1792 was grounded in his interest in preserving both the economy of the British West Indies as well as British military capabilities, describing how Dundas "designed a gradual abolition to suit the needs of enslavers and the British state". In a recent interview with the Scottish Herald, Dr. Mullen concludes that scholarship by historians of slavery and abolition is "unequivocal that Henry Dundas played an instrumental role in delaying abolition for vested interests after 1792".

This paragraph essentially repeats the previous one, holding Stephen Mullen's view as entirely authoritative when it emphatically is not. Mentioning the tendentious title of Mullen's work in the main body of the text, as opposed to putting it in a footnote, reveals the staff report's bias. It goes on in a fifth paragraph:

Whatever the motivation behind his amendment may have been, the consequences of Dundas' actions are clear. Whether he is viewed cynically or as a pragmatist, his actions and those of the British government he served contributed to the perpetuation of the enslavement of human beings. Though Dundas' amendment was adopted and a date for abolition was proposed for 1796, the bill was never enacted by the House of Lords. It would be 1807 before the [Abolition of the] Slave Trade Act was finally passed. During this time, more than half a million Africans were enslaved and trafficked across the Atlantic, many to British colonies.

Here again, no actual evidence is brought forward, and so the paragraph essentially repeats the same selective argument, except that now the charge is augmented to include 500,000 slaves. Henry Dundas is thus set up as a straw-man to carry the blame for the entire British Empire on his shoulders, all based on his role in the only vote *in favour* of ending the slave trade. It defies common sense.

As numerous scholars have pointed out, it was Dundas' predecessor as Home Secretary, William Grenville, the 1st Baron Grenville, who authorized the Governor of Jamaica to *purchase* on public account the slaves needed to staff the British garrison on the island. Grenville did not enslave people, but he did rent their services. This practice remains historically and ethically murky, but what is clear is that purchase in the late 18th century did not mean "to buy" but instead to "hold" on contract for a period of service. His intention may well have been to *release* the slaves after the emergency was resolved. Dundas became Secretary of State for War in 1793 and showed his mettle when General Sir John Vaughan asked him repeatedly to authorize the purchase of slaves for black regiments in the British Army. Dundas declined his requests. Vaughan proceeded against Dundas's orders and in 1795 Dundas ordered a halt to this recruitment. A few weeks later, Dundas was forced to reverse his order and authorized the purchase of some slaves. Dundas wrote to Vaughan again, and this time authorized the purchase of slaves. Dundas noted that it was "the king's confidential servants," the cabinet, that made this decision.

The reality was that ending slavery in the Caribbean in the 1790s was impossible. Scholars have long known that politicians in London were acutely aware of dissent in the colonies (America being the most prominent) and certainly did not want to see other parts of the empire lopped off. More recently, historians have documented the high degree of conflict between local legislators and the government's representatives. In war, they urgently needed to keep those alliances solid, and there was no way slavery or the slave trade could be abolished without the support of the colonial populations. It was a matter of holding off on that demand until emergencies subsided. That window of opportunity did open in 1807.

Not to be overlooked in the background is the serious geopolitical challenge that Britain faced. A slave revolt in St-Domingue (today's Haiti) had reduced the country to cinders. Britain, at war with France, needed stability in the area in order to fund and supply its military efforts. To suddenly upend slavery there would have impaired that stability and depleted Britain's treasury and ability to fight. Yes, defeating the Europe-wide bloodbath launched by the French Revolution mattered more than ending the slave trade. At least, this was the feeling in the British political establishment.

The Staff Report goes on with a sixth paragraph:

Consideration must also be given to Dundas' role in the continued subjugation [sic] of Indigenous peoples in Canada in his capacity as Home Secretary. The Home Secretary held oversight over colonial affairs, and as such was a powerful figure who upheld imperial rule. Drawing on maps produced in the 1780s and 1790s, Professor Thomas Pearce has traced how the origins of the western portion of Dundas Street are traced [sic] back to an Indigenous trail pre-colonialism. The naming of this street, which assumes the path of a traditional Indigenous route, after a colonizer, erases Indigenous presence from the landscape, further calling into question the appropriateness of commemorating it with the Dundas name.

It is completely inaccurate! If anything, Henry Dundas treasured the alliance struck with indigenous people as a bulwark against any northern expansion of the American Republic. Simcoe formalized the boundaries of the Six Nations Mohawk people almost as soon as he arrived, resolving a conflict that had endured for years. Dundas instructed the Governor at Quebec, Sir Guy Carleton, the 1st Baron Dorchester, that the Crown wished "to show every consistent mark of attention and regard to the Indian Nations" and that any diplomatic interventions with the Americans would strive to protect the interests of the "Indian Nations" such as "...securing to them the peaceable and quiet possession of the Lands which they have hitherto occupied as their hunting Grounds, and such others as may enable them to procure a comfortable subsistence for themselves and their families." That wording, unlike the City's report, *accurately* reflects Dundas's approach.

It is worth pointing out that Simcoe gave easily recognizable names to the streets of York (as Toronto was named in those days) in order to cement the allegiance of the newly-arrived loyalists to the Upper Canada regime.

Governor Simcoe's designation of a street that would in time allow for the building of modern residences and businesses may well have been traced upon an older trail (the claim is unproven, but not improbable) but that in itself would have been a compliment to the indigenous trailblazers. If the exact name of the old trail can be established, there would likely be no objection to adding it to the signposts. That would add charm and depth to an already-rich history behind the street-name. It is worth remembering that the city's founders were not opposed to indigenous influences —they actually changed the northern English name of "York" back to a distinctive old Mohawk moniker in 1834. Torontonians today would no doubt share in the spirit of combining an old heritage with another old heritage without erasing the history of the City.

Toronto should also look at what is happening around it. In January this year, the City Council of Mississauga, the sixth largest city of Canada (pop. 750,000) where less than half the population speaks English at home, has voted unanimously against renaming its three kilometre stretch of Dundas Street, refusing to foot the bill of almost \$2 million. Mississauga wisely concluded that the "interpretations of history" and in particular the "motives and accomplishments of historical figures — are open to controversy and misinterpretation, especially when viewed through a modern lens." There are no indications yet that the old town of Dundas, Ontario (which is now part of Hamilton Ontario) or the United Counties of Stormont-Dundas and Glengarry in eastern Ontario, will change their name. The town of Belleville, Ontario, has no plans to change the name of its Dundas Street, and neither will London, Burlington, or Oakville.

That leaves Toronto with three real policy alternatives. The first is to maintain "Dundas" Street as it was, essentially an anonymous common label familiar to the people living here for two centuries. The second, the better one, would be to rename it "Henry Dundas Street" and take great pride in his accomplishments and his lifelong efforts to defend and help indigenous people and slaves. The third, of course, would be to pay the high costs of a massive name change campaign, even if it's founded on fake history.

B. The City should create a Toponymy Commission accountable to City Council

The city needs to guard against the egregious bias displayed by City staff by creating an oversight committee. Such a commission should be composed of a mixture of City Council members and members of the public who are expert (or somewhat expert) in understanding Toronto's past. The City of Toronto's Preservation Board is a good model.

Such a commission could systematically review issues as they arose well as identify duplications in street names which could create many opportunities to commemorate. At the same time, it

would lead the search for under-memorialized but important people and events that should be on public display.

To give one example, Elizabeth Street, which stands just north of City Hall, duplicates a similar name in Etobicoke. Why not consider renaming it in honour of Mr. Kew Dock Yip, the first Chinese Canadian Lawyer who had his office on that street from 1945 to 1984. He was a trailblazer who fought for the repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1947, yet he is unknown to Torontonians.

C. The City should create a modest permanent Secretariat to support such a Commission.

The Dundas Street fiasco showed there is no expertise in the city administration on how to manage and research re-naming issues. In fact, where most big cities in the world are supported by a professional secretariat, the City of Toronto seems content to second talent from various departments without criteria or meaningful screening for suitable candidates.

A secretariat such as this should be headed by a person with deep and extensive experience in evaluating historical evidence. Ideally, this person should have a Ph.D. in Canadian history and capable of leading a small team of researchers and community outreach experts.

In sum, Toronto has a long history of neglecting its past, and it should put an end to this practice. It should also seek ways to unite citizens in remembering, not divide them as it has on the Dundas Street affair. Not least, it should guard against dispensing scarce funds for the wrong reasons. New, professional processes should go a long way in helping the City reach its goals.