

# DECISION AND ORDER

**Decision Issue Date** Monday, December 10, 2018

PROCEEDING COMMENCED UNDER Section 45(12), subsection 45(1) of the Planning Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.13, as amended (the Act)

Appellant(s): SLAVICA VUCKOSKA

Applicant: IAN ROBERTSON DESIGN

Property Address/Description: 145 ROYALAVON CRES

Committee of Adjustment Case File: 18 186735 WET 05 MV (A0527/18EYK)

TLAB Case File Number: 18 211094 S45 05 TLAB

**Motion Hearing date:** Monday, November 19, 2018

DECISION DELIVERED BY G. BURTON

## APPEARANCES

## INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

This is a Decision on a Motion to Dismiss an Appeal without holding a hearing, as permitted by the Planning Act. The Motion was made by the owners of 145 Royalavon Crescent in the Kipling/Dundas section of Toronto. They had been successful in obtaining approval from the Committee of Adjustment (COA) on August 2, 2018 for four variances for the construction of a new dwelling.

This decision was appealed by Ms. Slavica Vuckoska, owner of 155 Royalavon Crescent, five properties to the north of the subject. The grounds cited in her Notice of Appeal are set out below under Evidence.

The Hearing of the appeal is set for January 17, 2019.

Because of certain factors, including the timing of construction (a 6- to 10- month delay would occur) and the cost of rental accommodation following their required move out of the present dwelling, the owners brought by their counsel Ms. Stewart a Motion to Dismiss the appeal without holding a hearing. This Motion was filed on Nov. 1, 2018. The TLAB is permitted to take this action, if warranted, under subsection 45(17) et seq.

of the Act (see below, Jurisdiction). The grounds for the requested dismissal were cited as:

- “The reasons set out in the Notice of Appeal (Form 1) do not disclose any apparent land use planning ground upon which the TLAB could allow all or part of the appeal;
- b. The appeal is frivolous, vexatious, and commenced in bad faith;
- c. The appeal is made only for the purpose of delay.”

In the Motion hearing on Nov. 19, the following grounds were added: only one of the variances was opposed; the appellant is too far removed to be affected; and there is no planning merit to the appeal.

The Appellant Ms. Vuckoska filed a Response to this Motion on November 13, 2018. She included many issues in this Response:

- The height is exceptional and “will not fit into the neighborhood uniformity and style”;
- The owners’ intent is to create additional living space in the attic;
- Her approved new dwelling with a height of 9.75 m is not yet built, and so no other of 9.75 m exists on the street as claimed; and
- This height would be an undesirable precedent for future applications.

## **MATTERS IN ISSUE**

The issues in the Motion hearing were whether the facts of this appeal fall within the language of the Act cited below, which allows for dismissal without a hearing in certain situations.

## **JURISDICTION**

Subsections 45(17), (17.1) and (17.2) of the Act state (some text not applicable in this matter has been deleted):

(17) Despite the *Statutory Powers Procedure Act* and subsection (16), the Tribunal may dismiss all or part of an appeal without holding a hearing, on its own initiative or on the motion of any party, if,

(a) it is of the opinion that,

(i) the reasons set out in the notice of appeal do not disclose any apparent land use planning ground upon which the Tribunal could allow all or part of the appeal,

(ii) the appeal is not made in good faith or is frivolous or vexatious,

(iii) the appeal is made only for the purpose of delay, or...

(b) the appellant has not provided written reasons for the appeal;.....

(17.1) Before dismissing all or part of an appeal, the Tribunal shall notify the appellant and give the appellant the opportunity to make representation on the proposed dismissal .....

(17.2) The Tribunal may dismiss all or part of an appeal after holding a hearing or without holding a hearing on the motion under subsection (17), as it considers appropriate.

## **EVIDENCE**

The variances granted by the COA are:

### **1. Section 900.3.10.(37)(C), By-law 569-2013**

The maximum permitted gross floor area, including an attached or detached garage, is 150 m<sup>2</sup> plus 25% of the lot area (307.9 m<sup>2</sup>), provided that the maximum floor space index does not otherwise exceed 0.5 (307.9 m<sup>2</sup>).

The new dwelling, including the attached garage, will have a gross floor area equal to 150 m<sup>2</sup> plus 28% of the lot area (325.62 m<sup>2</sup>) and will have a floor space index of 0.51 (325.62 m<sup>2</sup>).

(Ms. Stewart explained that this would be only an additional 18 sq. m. above the By-law, on two floors, leaving 9 sq. m. on each).

### **2. Section 10.20.40.10.(1)(A), By-law 569-2013 and Section 320-42.1.B.(1)**

The maximum permitted height is 9.5 m.

The new dwelling will have a height of 10.11 m.

(This is the only variance appealed. It is only at the highest portion of the roof peak-discussed below).

### **3. Section 10.5.100.1.(1)(C), By-law 569-2013**

The maximum permitted driveway width is 5.84 m.

The proposed driveway will have a width of 6 m

(The Transportation Department had no objections).

### **4. Section 10.5.50.10.(1)(C)**

A minimum of 60% of the front yard shall be maintained as landscaping (95.19 m<sup>2</sup>).

A total of 59.5% of the front yard will be maintained as landscaping (94.3 m<sup>2</sup>).

(The variance is for less than a square metre of landscaping).

There were conditions imposed by the COA that will be discussed later.

In her appeal, Ms. Vuckoska objected only to the height variance granted. These were her reasons for concluding that the variance is not minor:

- “1. It is for 610 cm higher than the maximum allowed.
2. there is no any other development that is permitted to be higher than 9.75 m on the same street.
3. the roof height is not crucial for his project to be realized.
4. if this height of 10.11 m is allowed for 145 Royalavon Cres then the City will consequently approve all other projects in the area for that height.

5. The owner indicated that the Planning and development department from City of Toronto supported the height, which is very unusual, exceptional and unacceptable.”

The owners’ expert planning witness, Mr. David A. McKay, had filed on Nov. 14, 2018 his Expert Witness Statement. He did not attend the hearing, but had provided the planning evidence in support of the height variance, the only issue raised by Ms. Vuckoska in her appeal. The Dismissal without a Hearing question must be determined first, but in order to do this, the planning validity of the objection must be assessed.

The height of 10.11 m (the By-law limit is 9.5 m) would be only at the central peak, as both Mr. McKay and Mr. Ian Robertson (the architectural designer who did attend the hearing) stated. The roof massing is broken up in the design, with a permitted style that is steeply pitched with gables and dormers. It slopes away on all sides from the central point, so it is well-articulated and the height is less perceptible. There is no increase required for the main wall height. Mr. Robertson expressed it in this way (Ex. 3, para 3):

“Equally as important, from a practical perspective, my clients wanted to avoid the challenges associated with a flat roof, or a roof with significant flat proportions such as a Mansard roof. These types of rooflines can create maintenance problems associated with drainage, snow storage, leaves, etc. A sloped roofline like that proposed is less prone to those maintenance issues.”

Thus there would be a sensitive and compatible height increase that is arguably negligible. The height was in fact lowered slightly prior to the COA hearing, to accommodate the expressed concerns of the Planning Staff. Staff were then satisfied with the 10.11 m requested (Ex. 5). In studying the height issue, they had been able to go back further than the 10 years of decisions usually provided to applicants. Height limitations in general are meant to ensure a consistent pattern of development, so that new structures are compatible with the existing, as the Official Plan (OP) policies require.

Evidence on the variances in a Motion to Dismiss is accepted only for the purpose of making findings on whether there is a triable issue to go to a hearing. If one is not found, there is no consideration of the merits required. In this case, as stated at the hearing of the Motion, I am satisfied that, as in subsection 17(a)(i) of the Act, the reasons set out in the notice of appeal do not disclose any apparent land use planning ground upon which the Tribunal could allow all or part of the appeal.

Ms. Stewart gave some of the background concerning Ms. Vuckoska’s own approval of variances by the COA. She had made application for a similar two storey detached at 155 Royalavon. It would have somewhat greater massing, and was approved at 9.75 m height, and for a greater main wall height. Ms. Stewart alleged a degree of bad faith in launching the appeal: Ms. Vuckoska’s own request for a greater height variance had been denied, and she is a real estate agent who had this property on the market previously. She had also been involved in a TLAB hearing in the past, with an expert witness, and so should be familiar with the duties of an appellant.

Ms. Stewart noted that the issue of possible intent to create living space in the attic was first raised in the Response to the Notice of Motion. This was not identified in her appeal letter. Ms. Stewart claimed that this was further evidence of improper intention.

As mentioned, the purpose of this Motion to Dismiss is not to make findings on the merits of the proposal, but on the legitimacy and authenticity of the appeal. She argued against the reasons given in the Notice of Appeal. Citing the measurement of 610 cm above the Bylaw limit of 9.5 m. is resorting to evaluating a variance as a degree of magnitude only, a test denied in the case law. It must also include the evaluation on quantitative grounds, that is, whether it causes adverse planning effects. There are no adverse effects here, given the very small height increase for the roof peak, deployed very effectively in the massing of the dwelling.

Ms. Stewart argued that a decision to dismiss the appeal without a hearing here would be important, in order to give a message to appellants that appeals should be substantiated with cogent planning evidence. It is otherwise too easy to launch an appeal and cause delay and cost to a successful COA applicant. She summarized that the TLAB has the ability to look beyond the issues raised to determine if the action, words and conduct in all the circumstances sustain the legitimacy of the appeal.

In outlining her opposition to the Motion for Dismissal, Ms. Vuckoska testified that she is a Compliance Inspector with the OPS (I presume that this would give her an enhanced ability to read plans and so on – this was not made clear). She has owned her property at 155 for two years, and her present intent is to remain, not to sell. She stated that the subject project itself is a reasonable one. She had attended the COA hearing to object only to the height variance, even though she had not received notice of the meeting. She had attempted to resolve this objection with the owner's representative prior to the COA hearing. The representative had no interest in resolving her concern, she stated, and proceeded with the original variance (note: which the Planning Staff had approved, and the COA granted at their hearing). Ms. Vuckoska expressed it that the owners were unwilling to "correct" the plans to resolve her height issue, and had made no alterations to the first or second storey plans, but only to the height.

She argued on the Motion that the requested variance of 10.11 m for the roof height is "not crucial for the project to be realized." There is no greater height than 9.75 m on the same street. This would create a precedent for future increases, altering the feel of the neighbourhood. She would define the neighbourhood as this street alone. She feels that the City would have to alter the By-law height limitation if this were approved. The owners' lack of willingness to lower the height has led her to believe that there was an intent, she now posits, to add living space within the roof structure. She argued that the requested reduction of one additional foot would not interfere with their roof plan, would better meet the By-law limit, and would not permit living space to be created under the roof. She disagreed with Mr. Robertson's statement that trusses permitting space there could not be remade within a reasonable time. She did not appeal in order to delay or cause extra cost to the owners, but merely to exercise her right to object.

## ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, REASONS

The TLAB carefully considered the evidence and submissions presented on this motion, including the Notice of Appeal and the statements provided by the parties. I have also subsequently reviewed the cases submitted by the moving parties, the Woods.

I agree with Ms. Stewart that the test of the appropriate neighbourhood used by Ms. Vuckoska is incorrect. The main reason for her appeal appeared to be that there is no higher height than 10.11 m “on the same street”. Here, where both the City Planning staff and Mr. McKay extended the appropriate neighbourhood for evaluating this variance to several blocks in either direction, limiting it to the present block of Royalavon is not appropriate. She presented no planning evidence to prove her statement. Nor did she present actual height measurements for the dwellings for which she provided pictures. I agree with Mr. McKay’s evidence that the proposed increase over the permitted will facilitate an attractive and proportionate roof design, with no adverse impact of a planning nature. While this addresses the merits and thus the statutory tests, it is more importantly a factor in finding no valid land use planning concern in the appeal upon which the appeal could be granted.

Ms. Vuckoska did not supply any evidence beyond her own opinion and apprehension that the height was excessive or caused evidence of impact, let alone is sufficient to allow an appeal. As Ms. Stewart argued, if it is “not significant” to lower the roof height as Ms. Vuckoska claimed, it is equally not significant NOT to make the change. She had shown no flexibility in her demand that the requested height be lowered from 10.11 m to 9.75 m. The additional height is not a meaningful increase over heights either on the street or in the neighbourhood. Most significantly, there has been no planning evidence to prove that a legitimate, triable issue exists as between professional advisors. Two of these did address and support the height variance. Other than the slight increase in number, which I discount as unimportant, I had no evidence that there would be any adverse effect of a planning nature with the requested height variance that would warrant a Hearing on the merits.

I also find that comparing her own dwelling, not yet built, to the proposed is based on an incorrect understanding of what constitutes a “neighbourhood” for application of the subsection 45(1) tests. Variances that have been approved by the COA or the TLAB already form part of the neighbourhood context, whether built or not. Therefore it is not correct to say that because there is no higher height than the 9.5 m permitted on the street now, this variance should not be approved. Her own approved dwelling would be 9.75 m in height, and this is now part of the existing and planned physical character of the neighbourhood for purposes of the statutory test. Nor was there any professional opinion evidence that establishes that this variance would lead to further variances, as she claimed. Each application must be assessed on its own merits. Here it can be seen from the “Royalavon Overlay” filed by the designer for the owners that the massing of the proposed dwelling at 145 would be even less that that proposed for Ms. Vuckoska’s new dwelling at 155 (see also Ex. 3, final page). Planning staff did not support her planned 9.85 m height, and the COA approved only 9.75 m. for her proposed dwelling height.

I do not draw any adverse conclusion from the alleged lack of good faith in bringing the appeal. There was no evidence of “sour grapes” that she did not receive a higher height variance than the owners here. The fact that her property was for sale at one stage also goes to this issue, but it is not necessary to determine whether this was a factor in her appeal. However, her property is indeed at a fair distance in planning terms from the subject – she is not an immediate neighbour. This is why she was outside the required area for notice of the COA hearing and did not receive a notice. She also admitted that she is not directly physically affected by the proposal, but could be “psychologically” affected by lack of continued enjoyment of the neighbourhood. In my view this is insufficient as a valid and legitimate planning ground for the appeal.

Another issue Ms. Vuckoska raised in her Response to Motion is also not a valid land use planning ground for an appeal. It is not possible to state that an owner “needs” a variance – this is not a test. In addition, one cannot impute future intentions – i.e., to build a room in the attic – without proof of this allegation. She tendered new hand drawings in support of her claim that this was possible. This claim is irrelevant, especially where evidence was provided to prove that the contingency is wildly improbable. Mr. Robertson stated in his affidavit (Ex. 3, para 5 et seq.) that the owners had already ordered the trusses required for the roof, and that it would be very expensive to produce them by hand, as suggested by Ms. Vuckoska. In addition, there could be no viable living space produced within the roof area, both from a space and a Building Code perspective (an access point, egress, and light penetration would be required.)

If the appeal is dismissed without a hearing, this eliminates an appellant’s statutory right to a hearing on the merits. Therefore the exercise of this jurisdiction must be closely considered to ensure that appeal is not prematurely dismissed. The Act contains similar wording for appeals of official plan amendments, zoning by-laws, minor variances and consents.

There is an approximately 20-year history of court and Board decisions on the dismissal power, and they are mainly consistent. Ms. Stewart submitted some of these cases outlining the principles for a dismissal without a hearing, as the Act permits. In *Sheldrake and Springwater (Township)*, 2015 CanLII 66916 (ON LPAT), the then-OMB panel summarized the principles in decisions concerning the dismissal power:

“[13] Alex Currie Motors Ltd. submit that the Sheldrakes have failed to raise any land use planning grounds upon which the appeal could be granted; failed to raise any new or substantive planning grounds which would warrant a hearing or could affect the outcome of a hearing; and have failed to meet the onus on them in regards to this motion to dismiss. [They]... submit that the Board, as upheld by the court, has consistently found that an appellant must do more than “simply raise apprehensions” in an appeal letter, and must present serious issues that can sustain an appeal in the face of a motion to dismiss.”

And further: “[15].....As is well established by prior Board decisions, the onus is on the appellants to show that there are relevant grounds to sustain an appeal. When faced

with a motion to dismiss, the appellant has a responsibility to provide to the Board and the other party the scope of its concerns and an indication of the presence of a legitimate planning issue that could be adjudicated in a hearing.

[16] This is best enunciated in the decision by the court in *Zellers Ltd. v. Royal Cobourg Centres Ltd.* [2001], O.J. No. 3792; 42 O.M.B.R. 193 (Div. Ct.) that upheld the Board decision to dismiss an appeal without a hearing. In this matter, the court stated:

Through a motion to dismiss, members of the OMB, people who have the background and expertise in planning matters, are given the power to ensure that steps open to participants in the planning process are employed for legitimate purposes. Decisions to participate in this process and particularly to launch an appeal are serious and must be pursued diligently. **The legislation and related jurisprudence make it clear that it is not sufficient that appellants raise land use issues in the Notice of Appeal. Such issues have to be worthy of adjudication and the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the appellants to demonstrate through their conduct in pursuing the appeal, including their gathering of evidence to make their case, that the issues raised in their Notice of Appeal justifies a hearing.**” (emphasis added.)

Ms. Stewart submitted that the fact situation here is similar, as Ms. Vuckoska did not challenge Mr. McKay’s evidence in any valid way nor did she present any evidence of her own beyond a mere apprehension. She expressed a concern about the height variance, and later expanded on this in her Response to the Motion by speculating about what the owners might do with the variance. However, I agree that this but did not meet the onus of presenting cogent planning evidence challenging the COA determination. **This is critical, because the decisions conclude that once a motion to dismiss is made, the onus of proof shifts to the appellant to prove by planning evidence that the appeal has merit.**

The *Sheldrake* decision also contains the following:

“[20] As provided by Vice-Chair Campbell in *Guelph (City) Official Plan Amendment No. 30 (Re)* [2006] O.M.B.D. No. 924; , “Parties like the Appellants are well within their rights in participating in this process. However, for the appellants to have sustained their right-of-appeal in this matter, they had to do more than simply raise issues couched in land use planning terminology”. Simply put, the Sheldrakes have a responsibility to demonstrate that there are legitimate planning grounds that underlie their appeal, and have a responsibility to respond as well to a motion to dismiss to show that they intend to obtain evidence to sustain their appeal.

I have considered the rationale and conclusion set out by the OMB in the foundational case of *Toronto(City) v. East Beach Community Association*, 1996 CarswellOnt 5740, [1996] O.M.B.D. No. 1890, 42 O.M.B.R. 505, and I agree with it:

“11. It is our conclusion that although in many instances, planning language is deployed and, in others, planning issues have been raised, the substance of these concerns individually and collectively are (*sic*) not such that the tests are met.”



Ms. Vuckoska did not present any planning justification for her appeal. Her intention in appealing is not entirely clear, but appears to be unrelated to land use planning grounds. None of the relevant City staff objected to the variances requested. Five interested persons received notice of the TLAB hearing, including the Islington Ratepayers – and none appeared or commented. On the issue of the other variances (which does not need to be determined) I note only that the GFA, driveway and front yard setback variances are so minor as to be almost negligible.

## **DECISION AND ORDER**

For the above reasons, the Motion is allowed and the Decision and Order issued August 2, 2018 for the subject property is confirmed. For further clarity, these are the variances authorized:

### **1. Section 900.3.10.(37)(C), By-law 569-2013**

The maximum permitted gross floor area, including an attached or detached garage, is 150 m<sup>2</sup> plus 25% of the lot area (307.9 m<sup>2</sup>), provided that the maximum floor space index does not otherwise exceed 0.5 (307.9 m<sup>2</sup>).

The new dwelling, including the attached garage, will have a gross floor area equal to 150 m<sup>2</sup> plus 28% of the lot area (325.62 m<sup>2</sup>) and will have a floor space index of 0.51 (325.62 m<sup>2</sup>).

### **2. Section 10.20.40.10.(1)(A), By-law 569-2013 and Section 320-42.1.B.(1)**

The maximum permitted height is 9.5 m.

The new dwelling will have a height of 10.11 m.

### **3. Section 10.5.100.1.(1)(C), By-law 569-2013**

The maximum permitted driveway width is 5.84 m.

The proposed driveway will have a width of 6 m

### **4. Section 10.5.50.10.(1)(C)**

A minimum of 60% of the front yard shall be maintained as landscaping (95.19 m<sup>2</sup>).

A total of 59.5% of the front yard will be maintained as landscaping (94.3 m<sup>2</sup>).

These variances are subject to the following conditions, as in the COA decision:

**It is noted that the parties agreed to include an extra Condition, Number 4, in addition to the Conditions imposed by the Committee. If this is not authorized following this decision on the Motion, it is at least acknowledged by them.**

1. Submission of a complete application for a permit to injure or destroy a City-owned tree(s). A *Contractor's Agreement to Perform Work on City-owned Trees* will be required prior to the removal/injure of the subject tree(s). Form located at [www.toronto.ca/trees/pdfs/contractor\\_services\\_agreement\\_information.pdf](http://www.toronto.ca/trees/pdfs/contractor_services_agreement_information.pdf).

Submission of a tree protection guarantee security deposit to guarantee the protection of City-owned trees according to the *Tree Protection Policy and Specifications for Construction Near Trees* or as otherwise approved by Urban Forestry. Accepted

methods of payment include debit or card, certified cheque or money order payable to the *Treasurer of the City of Toronto*, or Letter of Credit.

2. Submission of a complete application for permit to injure or destroy privately owned trees.

3. The proposal shall be constructed substantially in accordance with the revised **elevation plans attached hereto as Attachment 1** and submitted and held on file by the Committee of Adjustment office and date stamped as received on July 30, 2018, to the satisfaction of the Director, Community Planning, Etobicoke York District. Any other variances that may appear on these plans but are not listed in the written decision are NOT authorized.

4. The space above the second floor and under the roof shall not be used for additional floor space.

**ATTACHMENT 1 - REVISED PLANS - Elevations**

X 

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G. Burton

Panel Chair, Toronto Local Appeal Body

Toronto Local Appeal Body

# EXHIBIT #

Case File Number: 18 211094 S45 05 TLAB

Property Address: 145 Royalavon Cres


Date Marked: November 19, 2018

# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.

ROYALAVON CRESCENT  
(FORMERLY MONTGOMERY ROAD BY REGISTERED PLAN 2312)

PIN 07537 - 0147

CENTRE LINE OF ASPHALT PAVEMENT



LOT 117  
PIN 07537-0057

LOT 118  
PIN 07537-0056

LOT 119  
PIN 07537-0055

LOT 109  
PIN 07537-0053

LOT 108  
PIN 07537-0054

REGISTERED

ZONING			
SITE DATA	BY-LAW 569-2013	BY-LAW V131	PROPOSED
ZONE	RD (15.0; s555 (0.45)(x37))	R2	R2
LOT FRONTAGE	15.0 M	7.5 M	15.24 M
LOT AREA	555.0 M <sup>2</sup>	510.0 M <sup>2</sup>	633.44 M <sup>2</sup>
FRONT YARD SETBACK	AVG OF NEIGHBOURS (9.35M)	AVG OF NEIGHBOURS (8.80 M (PORCH))	10.15 M (HOUSE)
SIDE YARD SETBACK	1.20 M	1.20 M	1.26 M
REAR YARD SETBACK	1.20 M	1.20 M	1.84 M
AGGREGATE TOTAL OF SIDE YARD = 20% OF FRONTAGE (3.05M)			3.10 M
REAR YARD SETBACK	10.39 M	10.39 M	15.59 M (HOUSE) 12.88 M (DECK)
AREA OF GROUND FLOOR WITHIN 4M OF FRONT WALL	10.0 M <sup>2</sup>	N/A	N/A
MAIN FLOOR AREA	150M <sup>2</sup> + 25% OF LOT AREA MAX. 0.50	60.0 M <sup>2</sup>	325.62 M <sup>2</sup> (0.514) (INCL. GARAGE)
GROSS FLOOR AREA (FSI)	17.0 M	N/A	14.64 M
BUILDING LENGTH	19.0 M	N/A	15.62 M
BUILDING DEPTH	1.0 M	N/A	N/A
1 STOREY EXTENSION	2.50 M	N/A	2.74 M
MAX. DECK PROJECTION			
LOT COVERAGE	33% (209.03 M <sup>2</sup> )	33% (209.03 M <sup>2</sup> )	26.89% (170.38M <sup>2</sup> )
NOT INCL. PORCH			
LOT COVERAGE	33% (209.03 M <sup>2</sup> )	33% (209.03 M <sup>2</sup> )	27.53% (174.38M <sup>2</sup> )
NCL. PORCH			
FIN. GND FLOOR TO FIN. GRADE	1.20 M	N/A	0.43 M
FIN. FLOOR TO ROOF PEAK			10.26 M
FIN. FLOOR TO U/S OF SOFFIT			6.15 M
BLDG HEIGHT TO PEAK	9.50 M	11.0 M	10.11 M
BLDG HEIGHT TO SOFFIT	7.0 M	N/A	6.58 M
PARKING SPACE WIDTH	3.20 M	3.20 M	5.84 M
DRIVEWAY WIDTH	6.0 M	6.0 M	6.60 M
EAVE PROJECTION			0.40 M
FRONT YARD AREA			158.65 M <sup>2</sup>
DRIVEWAY AREA			64.26 M <sup>2</sup>
WALKWAY & STAIR AREA			4.04 M <sup>2</sup>
FRONT YARD LANDSCAPING	60% (95.19 M <sup>2</sup> )		158.65-63.55-94.39M <sup>2</sup> (59.5%)
FRONT YARD SOFT LANDSCAPING	60% (47.60 M <sup>2</sup> )		94.39-4.04-90.35 (114%)


**REVISED**  
9:53 am, Jul 30, 2018

Client:	RINA & DAVID WOOD
Lot:	LOT 118
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO
Sheet Title:	SITE PLAN
Drawn by:	BM
Date:	06/28/18
Project No:	18-21
Page:	1 OF 1
Scale:	1:200

20 RIVERMEDE ROAD, UNIT 101, VAUGHAN, ONTARIO, L4K 3N3  
PHONE: (416) 863-0111; FAX: 1 (866) 602-1163; WWW.IANROBERTSONDESIGN.CA

IANROBERTSONDESIGN


# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.



**FINISHED BASEMENT PLAN**  
 FINISHED FLOOR AREA = 986 sq. ft.

Client:	RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot:	LOT 118	
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title:	BASEMENT PLAN	
Drawn By:	BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
Project No.:	18-21	Page: 1 OF 7
Scale:	1/8" = 1'0"	


# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.



<b>GROUND FLOOR PLAN</b>	
GROUND FLOOR AREA	= 1424 sq. ft.
OPEN TO BELOW	= 0 sq. ft.
COVERAGE	= 1834 sq. ft.
COVERAGE (W / PORCHES)	= 2048 sq. ft.
<b>TOTAL AREA</b>	<b>4078 sq. ft.</b>

Client: RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot: LOT 118	
Address: 145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title: GROUND FLOOR PLAN	
Drawn By: BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
Project No: 18-21	Page: 2 OF 7
Scale: 1/8" = 1'0"	


# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.



**SECOND FLOOR**  
 FINISHED FLOOR AREA = 1674 sq. ft.  
 OPEN AREA = 3 sq. ft.

Client:	RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot:	LOT 118	
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title:	SECOND FLOOR PLAN	
Drawn By:	BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
Project No.:	18-21	Page: 3 OF 7
Scale:	1/8" = 1'0"	

# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.




FRONT ELEVATION

Client:	RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot:	LOT 118	
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title:	FRONT ELEVATION	
Drawn By:	BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
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Scale:	1/8" = 1'0"	






# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.



Client:	RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot:	LOT 118	
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title:	RIGHT SIDE ELEVATION	
Drawn By:	BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
Project No.:	18-21	Page: 6 OF 7
Scale:	1/8" = 1'0"	

# LOT 118 - 145 ROYALAVON CRES.



Client:	RINA AND DAVID WOOD	
Lot:	LOT 118	
Address:	145 ROYALAVON CRES. CITY OF TORONTO	
Sheet Title:	REAR ELEVATION	
Drawn By:	BM	Date: JUNE 28/18
Project No.:	18-21	Page: 7 OF 7
Scale:	1/8" = 1'0"	