March 30, 1998
To:Emergency and Protective Services Committee
From:Alan F. Speed, Fire Chief, Toronto Fire Services
Ron Kelusky, Acting General Manager, Toronto Ambulance Services
Subject:Fire/Ambulance Services Consolidation Options
Purpose:
To present to Toronto Council a qualitative assessment of the major options available with respect to the possible
integration of components of Toronto=s Fire and Ambulance Services.
Funding Sources, Financial Implications and Impact Statement:
There are no immediate financial implications on the present operating or capital budgets of either of the two services.
However, the current consolidation initiatives taking place between the fire and ambulance services are expected to yield
longer term financial savings and service delivery efficiencies.
The initiatives which are planned and which have already been undertaken in this area are precedential for the corporation,
and for emergency services in Ontario. A very successful historical working relationship between fire and ambulance
services in Toronto is being enhanced, while unique service delivery characteristics are being maintained. In the end, it is
the public who will benefit from these efforts.
Recommendations:
It is recommended that:
(1)this report be received for information; and
(2)it is the respectful opinion of both the Chief of the Toronto Fire Services and the Acting General Manger of the
Toronto Ambulance Services that Model One - Strategic Partnership - described herein continue to be adopted as the
consolidation model of choice in any discussions or planning about integration of fire and ambulance services.
Council Reference/Background/History:
At the first meeting of the City of Toronto=s Emergency and Protective Services Committee held January 13, 1998, a
decision was made to establish working sub-committees so that contact could be established with particular services - for
the purposes of dealing with specific service issues -on a more frequent basis than the regularly scheduled monthly
meetings of the E&PS Committee.
At the Fire and Ambulance Sub-Committee meeting held on January 30, 1998, a request was made of the Chief of the
Toronto Fire Services and the Acting General Manager of the Toronto Ambulance Services to prepare a joint report
outlining the potential options for greater integration - including possible full amalgamation - of the two emergency
services.
The Experience of Other Jurisdictions:
A timely comparison for the possibility of full amalgamation exists in the City of Edmonton (note that because of the
differences in health care systems, comparisons with jurisdictions in the United States are not equitable). In 1993, the City
of Edmonton directed that its fire service undergo amalgamation with its ambulance service, based on dual, cross-trained
emergency providers (i.e. firefighters performing ambulance work, and vice versa). Prior to that point, both services were
run separately.
After four years of operation, a number of problems were identified. These included training problems, >cultural=
problems, labour relations problems, workload problems, accountability problems, and management discord. In 1997, an
independent review was commissioned and concluded that the amalgamation should never have taken place. Further, it
identified that fire and ambulance services are too different to be conducive to amalgamation.
Today the Edmonton fire and ambulance services operate as two distinct disciplines, but under the same administrative
umbrella. This is very similar to the model that the Toronto Fire and Ambulance Services are striving to achieve within the
Works and Emergency Services cluster.
Comments and/or Discussion and/or Justification:
The Toronto Fire and the Toronto Ambulance Services have a decades long history of providing top quality and efficient
emergency service to the residents of the City of Toronto. Both services have developed and grown as uniquely separate
entities, mirroring the operating and organizational practices of almost all other fire and ambulance services in Canada. At
the same time, both services have established agreements of cooperation with respect to certain aspects of their respective
service delivery. >Tiered response= - where fire service resources are responded (along with the police service) to
potentially life-threatening medical calls - is the most prominent example of this degree of cooperation. Through >tiered
response= those citizens of Toronto suffering from serious illness or injury receive the benefit of the closest, medically
capable resource available, be it police, fire or ambulance.
But while both organizations are classed as >emergency services=, beyond that shared title both are very different. While
their service delivery may intersect on specific calls, their operating mandates - and the organizational structures which
have been constructed around them - remain very distinct. To date, this approach, and its differences, has served the public
exceptionally well.
Service Overview - Operating Mandate - Toronto Fire:
The Toronto Fire Services are responsible for maintaining life and safety through comprehensive fire protection and fire
prevention programs. The overall objective of the fire department is to provide the community with the optimum level of
protection from fire and other related public safety hazards.
Because fire fighters are usually the first responders to most types of emergencies, the Toronto Fire Services have evolved
into a total rescue service that involves many diverse functions: fire suppression and rescue (auto extrication, water and ice,
machinery, high angle, confined space, trench, and heavy urban search and rescue), pre-hospital emergency medical
services, hazardous materials control, response to terrorist incidents, emergency planning, preparedness and response.
Toronto Fire fulfills its legislative responsibilities under the authority given by the Fire Protection and Prevention Act of
Ontario.
Service Overview - Operating Mandate - Toronto Ambulance:
The Toronto Ambulance Service is responsible for the provision of emergency care and transportation to those individuals
who experience sudden injury or illness. It=s primary focus is medical. In actual fact, ambulance service in Ontario is, in
the first instance, viewed as simply an extension of the health care system, as comprehensive out-of-hospital health care.
Toronto Ambulance also provides non-emergency care and transportation, as directed by provincial legislation.
Its service activities are exclusively geared to the response to, and treatment of, all out-of-hospital medical and trauma
calls. It also maintains and deploys disaster resources to any large scale incident in the City and, as may be needed, to
elsewhere in the Greater Toronto Area. It provides specialized medical support to other agencies, as required (e.g. to the
Emergency Task Force of the Toronto Police).
Toronto Ambulance fulfills its legislative responsibilities through the Ambulance Act of Ontario and its regulations, as
well as through the Mental Health Act, the Health Insurance Act and the Health Facilities Act. Medical oversight exists
through the College of Physicians and Surgeons, by way of designated >base hospital= medical control.
Service Similarities:
As indicated, both the fire and ambulance services are >emergency services=. Often times, the public perception is that
they are quite similar in their service delivery, since both will appear and work together at the same type of emergency call.
At such calls, the responders of each service work as a team, undertaking clearly defined roles and responsibilities, roles
which complement one another.
Apart from those operational situations, the similarities of the two services are found in their administrative and
organizational functions. For example, both operate communications centres (and both are linked to the 911 system), both
maintain and service some of their fleet vehicles, both provide training programs, both maintain equipment and supply
inventories, and both require financial and human resource support services.
Service Differences:
Beyond the public perceptions described above, the differences between the fire and ambulance services are pronounced,
and are not just limited to the differences in their operating mandates and activities, or to the differences in the legislation
which governs them. On a basic level, paramedics are not trained to fight fires, just as firefighters are not trained to initiate
intravenous therapy.
Each organization=s service priorities have shaped the systems and infrastructure which sustain them. From the inside out,
and at almost all levels, this accounts for the differences.
For example, Toronto=s Fire Services utilizes a >station-based= deployment model. This involves the strategic
geographical placement of 80 fire stations throughout the city. Fire apparatus situated in these locations are then able to
achieve optimal response times, by being geographically and strategically located in order to meet the established standard.
The location of fire stations, then, is critical to fire service response time performance.
Toronto Ambulance, on the other hand, relies less on >station-based= deployment than it does on >mobile= deployment.
Stations, in most cases, are simply the start and finish points for ambulance crews in the course of their shifts. Response
time performance is strongly linked to having a fleet that is fluid. This also contributes to greater system efficiency in as
much as many more ambulances and many more stations would be necessary if Toronto Ambulance were to count on a
station-based model for achieving response time standards.
The >mobile= deployment utilized by Toronto Ambulance also reflects the >multi-point= and medically seamless nature
of its service delivery. When an ambulance responds to a call, it may have to transport a patient to a hospital which is
outside the community in which the call took place (e.g. a patient picked up in North York may well be transported to a
hospital downtown). When that ambulance is clear, it may be reassigned to transport another patient to a hospital in
Scarborough.
It is very common for ambulances to move freely across the whole of the city. Their response parameters are determined
much more by patient need and hospital resources than they are by the location of stations.
On the reverse, it would be very impractical and not at all cost effective to apply the same >mobile= approach to fire
vehicles. Fire service is generally considered a >two-point= service in that a fire vehicle will respond to a call and, when
the call is complete, return to its home station. Being station-based is much more critical to maintaining response time
efficiency.
Service Consolidation Options:
Toronto Fire and Toronto Ambulance have carefully evaluated two options for consolidating service delivery. They are
presented below as models.
Model One - Strategic Partnership:
In this model, Toronto=s Fire and Ambulance Services will continue on a course that has already been mapped out since
the beginning of the formation of the new City of Toronto. Both services are actively exploring opportunities for
administrative alliances which will result in greater efficiencies and cost savings.
The Strategic Partnership Model recognizes and respects the distinctiveness of each organization=s operating functions. At
the front-line level, therefore, there will be no noticeable effect on service. In the areas of administration and support
services, however, changes are being and will be effected.
The most substantive of these is already well underway. The Toronto Fire Service is locating its headquarters at the
existing headquarters facility of Toronto Ambulance, and has already established some of its main staff offices there.
Other viable opportunities for cost and support service sharing may possibly involve:
- shared communications systems/facilities
shared vehicle maintenance facilities and resources
shared equipment and supply facilities and, where possible, common bulk purchases
shared station use
common IT purchases and applications, where appropriate
administrative services (e.g. financial, human resource)
joint medical training (e.g. cardiac defibrillators)
shared mapping systems
joint bidding for external revenue opportunities
A comparison of the significant advantages/disadvantages of the Strategic Partnership Model is as follows:
Advantages |
Disadvantages |
- Realize cost-savings through the elimination of
duplication of facilities and functions
Enhancement of the coordination of effective and
efficient delivery of emergency services
Recognition of differences in core businesses,
employee culture and history
Realize cost-savings through economies of scale
Demonstrate the potential for other corporate service
delivery partnerships
More closely integrated service goals
|
- Limited number of support services are necessarily
duplicated if the two services remain
|
Advantages |
Disadvantages |
- Closer working relationship in common emergency
service matters (e.g. tiered response notification
protocols)
Makes effective use of surplus Ambulance
Headquarters space
Allows for a smoother fire service amalgamation
process
Both services main resources strategically located in
one multi-access location
Current Fire Facility Study can proceed based on
meeting the priority needs of the fire service
|
|
Model Two - Full Amalgamation:
This model would see the fire and ambulance services becoming one single service. Within the new structure, decisions
would have to be made with respect to how fire vs. medical services would be provided, and as to who would provide
them.
Options might include placing paramedics on fire vehicles, or placing an ambulance in each of the current eighty fire
stations.
In the first scenario, both a fire apparatus and a fire service ambulance would respond to all emergency medical calls
currently received by the Ambulance Service. This amounts to approximately 200,000 calls involving road response, an
increase over the present fire service medical response volume of approximately 50,000 calls. Where required, the
firefighter/paramedics would accompany the patient to hospital in the ambulance, requiring their fire vehicle to be placed
out of service or to operate with two fewer staff members. For minor cases, the ambulance=s basic life support crew might
transport unaccompanied.
Note that this option would require a significant increase in vehicle and staff resources - with attendant increase in cost -
and a transport system with a guaranteed response time. In cases where a fire service ambulance transported a patient, there
would have to be appropriate station or area coverage backfill. The amount of backfill would be increased whenever the
ambulance was engaged in cross-community transports, to a hospital outside of the area in which the call originated (e.g.
from Etobicoke to Scarborough) - in those situations the ambulance might be away from its home base for extended periods
of time.
Straight response to and from a medical call would normally see a fire vehicle and crew committed for 20 to 30 minutes.
On calls where part of the crew was committed to transport, this time would lengthen to at least an hour or more (based on
present ambulance service call completion times).
In the event paramedics were assigned to pumpers, they, too, would have to be backfilled whenever they accompanied a
patient during ambulance transport to a hospital. Again, in cases of distant transport destinations, the time - and therefore
the cost - associated with backfill would be significant. If a decision was made to limit the amount of backfill, then
ultimately fire service response times might begin to increase above current standards, as more and more vehicle resources
were pulled for backfill duty from stations further away.
In the second scenario, fire trucks would cease responding to medical emergencies unless extrication, technical rescue or
forcible entry was likely to be needed. Each of eighty fire stations would be equipped with an Advanced Life Support
ambulance and two paramedics who would respond to all medical emergencies in the station=s area. As outlined above,
sufficient ambulance backfill resources would be required to ensure that the station=s area remained adequately covered. In
effect, many more than eighty ambulances would be necessary in order to guarantee sufficient backfill so that response time
performance could be maintained. The number of additional vehicle resources would, in part, be determined by the number
of times an ambulance engaged in cross-community transports. Again, an increase in costs would be a very real factor in
this service delivery model.
In either of these or other scenarios, issues of training, possible cross-training, medical control, deployment, performance
standards, communications procedures, etc. would all have to be addressed. Also the equalization of salary differences and
the harmonization of collective agreements and legislation would be a major consideration.
A comparison of the significant advantages/disadvantages of the >Full Amalgamation= model is as follows:
Advantages |
Disadvantages |
- Initial response times for the arrival of full paramedics
at life-threatening calls might be reduced, although the
greatly increased demand might deplete resources
enough to offset any gains. The number of ambulances
might be reduced slightly compared to today as the
ambulance response time requirements might be
relaxed, given that paramedics are already with the
patient by way of a fire vehicle
Some reductions in management structure
Reduced wear and tear on fire apparatus
Joint programs for Administrative operations, ie.
purchasing, service and supply could be implemented.
The Ambulance commissioner position would be a
Deputy Chiefs= position in the Fire Service, at nominal
savings
The quality of both services would be maintained,
while allowing many administrative efficiencies to
occur
|
- Medical responses by fire apparatuses would nearly
quadruple to 200,000 responses per year. In this
model, fire vehicle availability would be seriously
reduced, due both to the increase in responses, and
to increased time-out-of-service per call once full
incident responsibility is moved to the fire crew.
Response time for fires and other emergencies could
be seriously impaired
To provide a minimum of two paramedics at each
call, each of the 80 first line apparatus crews in the
city would have to include two medics on each of
four shifts, for a minimum of 640 FTEs, plus staff to
cover for vacation, illness and injury. This is a
substantial increase over the number of paramedics
required to deliver service via ambulances alone
(and will actually involve cost increases)
|
|
- Transition costs to achieve wage parity will be high.
Communications centre staff would be included in
this
There would be transition costs and transfer of
liabilities in the areas of WCB/LTD, pensions, sick
time, etc.
Through current legislation, non-emergency
transfers would still have to be serviced. There could
be no immediate disposal of this part of ambulance
business. Authority for directing transfers rests with
a physician in a hospital, and not with a given
municipality
Cross-training existing fire fighters as Level II or
Level III advanced life support paramedics is highly
problematic and would be very expensive. At
present, the Ambulance Act and medical policy
require successful completion of a one-year full-time
community college training program prior to
entering the profession, followed by a minimum of
two years of full-time on-ambulance experience, and
then another six months of advanced life support
training
Neither ambulance or fire personnel may have the
desire, or the ability, to be cross-trained
If, in the alternative, current ambulance paramedics
were to replace fire fighters on fire vehicles, either
major increases in establishment or substantial
layoffs from the current fire fighter staff would be
required. Even if all existing Toronto Ambulance
Level II and III paramedics were transferred to fire
vehicles, additional staff would still be required in a
labour market lacking a pool of already-qualified
persons. The costs associated with training existing
paramedics as fire fighters, or vice versa, would then
have to be added, as would the cost of the complex
medical equipment to be carried on each responding
fire truck
Many fire stations would require major rebuilding to
add an ambulance bay. In some cases, expansion
would be impossible due to site limitations
|
|
- Rigidly staffed systems such as
Aone-ambulance-per-fire station-per-shift@ are
contrary to the best practices of the emergency
medical industry. Such an approach was explicitly
discouraged in the 1996 Ernst and Young
independent audit of Toronto Ambulance
The absence of fire apparatus first response places
complete reliance on the ambulance fleet for
coverage. Since 25-40% of the emergency fleet will
be committed at any one time, response times may
suffer as the closest available ambulance may not be
available, even though the closest fire apparatus is
As a single service, the operations of both divisions
would continue to require substantially the same
staffing both in management and in unionized
positions
Both agencies have distinct corporate cultures with
deep historical roots
Labour relations histories and practices are widely
divergent. Collective agreements would have to be
harmonized
Joint management of ambulance operations imposes
a new layer of bureaucracy on the system and
distances both fire and ambulance operations further
from public oversight
Most economies of scale have already been
maximized due to the very large size of both existing
services
The role of a firefighter and ambulance paramedic
are quite dissimilar and they attract different types of
individuals with distinct skills and aptitudes
A common fire/ambulance service budget may lead
to difficulties in times of budget reduction. The
maintenance of one service=s budget may be at the
expense of the other=s, which may organizationally
result in conflicting perceptions of priority
|
In addition to the above, there are some very legitimate reasons why full amalgamation should not be pursued at this point.
They include:
Consultant Perspective:
In 1996, the (then) Metro Toronto Corporation hired the consulting firm of Ernst & Young - at a cost of $500,000 - to
conduct a review of Toronto Ambulance in order to determine how well it was measuring up to industry standards and best
practices. When evaluating alternative delivery options, it concluded that the Toronto Ambulance service should remain
operationally separate from fire service.
It also provided Toronto Ambulance with a number or recommendations which will result in service improvements,
through an implementation plan expected to carry through to the year 2001.
>Who Does What= Sub-Panel on Emergency Services:
The >Who Does What= panel, in its review of service delivery in the GTA, examined a full range of opportunities for the
integration, in whole or in part, of emergency services. It recommended in November, 1996, that full integration at the
front-line service delivery level was not a viable option at that time. It noted that Aeach service has a separate legislative
framework, statutory requirements, financing arrangements, labour relations framework, culture and traditions, job skills,
training needs and infrastructure needs@. It recommended that opportunities for the sharing of resources and support
services be pursued instead.
Budget Restraint and Effect on Performance:
The six collective fire departments which now make up the Toronto Fire Services have undergone considerable budget
restraint over the last six years. During a period where all municipalities have been affected by notable financial pressure,
fire service budgets have either been flatlined or reduced. Through serious service and administrative rationalizations, an
acceptable level of fire service delivery has been maintained in most municipalities.
Similarly, Toronto Ambulance has seen the equivalent of a 15% reduction in its operating budget since 1991. In spite of
this it has been able, through aggressive restructuring and reorganization of its operating practices, to actually improve its
service performance, a trend which is continuing.
The introduction of full amalgamation into the two services would likely have a deleterious effect on the continuity of the
efforts that each organization has invested in becoming more efficient while coping with ongoing expenditure reductions.
Achieving Integrity of Current Fire Service Amalgamation:
The Toronto Fire Services has the extremely challenging task of consolidating the six previous municipal fire services into
one single fire service. This will not be an overnight process. Significant planning has been involved, and while there is
imperative to consolidate as soon as possible, each step must be conducted carefully and properly. The impact on staff of
the changes associated with fire service consolidation can not be understated. The changes also come at a time when there
is a momentous change in municipal structure, and in some of the processes which will govern fire service.
To introduce an ambulance service amalgamation into these initiatives would be to jeopardize the success of both
consolidation efforts. A more prudent approach would be to allow the fire service to effectively complete its own
integration, and to revisit the potential for further alignment with ambulance services, if feasible, at a later date.
Other Factors Which May Impact Ambulance Service:
The timing of the possibility of full amalgamation of fire service with ambulance service is highly unfavourable in light of
the uncertainty of the present health care system environment.
The full effects of health services restructuring are unknown. The continued closure of hospital emergency departments,
and the overall increase in patient care demands, make it very difficult to forecast with any accuracy the emergency
pre-hospital needs and demands for both the near and distant future. Any amalgamation would have to consider service
volume changes, and related resource requirements.
In addition, while Toronto=s Ambulance Service is now being exclusively funded and operated by the City of Toronto, it
still has legislative and service linkages with the Province. There have been a number of discussions with respect to
Toronto Ambulance assuming limited service partnerships with parts of the GTA, on a cost-recovery or cost-recovery plus
basis (e.g. vehicle and equipment purchases, disaster resources, training). These discussions have also included the
possibility of Toronto Ambulance assuming control of the operations of some of the GTA ambulance dispatch functions.
Any amalgamation may serve to undermine or preclude these initiatives.
Lastly, health care rationalization is becoming increasingly focussed on community based care and service. In this context,
ambulance service is being seen not just as an access point to the emergency care or hospital system, but as part of a greater
health care continuum. It is widely expected that in the future, ambulance services will play a role much larger than simply
providing emergency care and transportation to the community.
Conclusions:
It has been suggested on more than one occasion that a full marriage of fire and ambulance services is a natural and logical
path to follow. While this may appear to be so on the surface, the reality is that both are very different and very
operationally distinct organizations.
The Toronto Fire Service is currently undergoing its own significant amalgamation of the six fire services from the
previous Toronto area municipalities, a process which will take some time to complete. Likewise, Toronto Ambulance is in
the middle of implementing a number of consultant determined recommendations which will assist it in becoming a more
efficient and cost effective department.
In the meantime, both services are engaging in a strategic partnership, seeking out common areas for cost savings and
further service and organizational efficiencies. One of these is the move to a shared headquarters facility, and another is the
participation in a joint station facilities study. While this is taking place administratively, the cooperative operational
practices of tiered response continue to go on. On specific emergency medical calls, both services continue to respond
together, working as a team in the best interests of patient care.
The Chief of Toronto Fire Services and the Acting General Manager of Toronto Ambulance Services - and senior staff -
are unanimous in their endorsement that both services maintain the present course of strategic alliance. Full amalgamation
may be an option to be reconsidered at a later time, but at present there are many convincing reasons why it should not take
place, and why it might, in fact, jeopardize the ultimate effectiveness of both services.
The Toronto Fire and the Toronto Ambulance Services have, as separate entities, enjoyed a successful history of providing
emergency service to the citizens of, and visitors to, the City of Toronto. It is fully expected that this high quality of service
will continue, even in light of the pressures being faced through consolidation and transition.
Toronto continues to enjoy the best fire and ambulance services in all of North America. Through strategic partnerships
they will become even stronger.
Contact Name:
Alan Speed
Phone: 397-4300 Fax: 397-4325
Ron Kelusky
Phone: 397-9240 Fax: 392-2115
Alan F. SpeedRon Kelusky
Fire ChiefActing General Manager
Toronto Fire ServicesToronto Ambulance Services
Barry Gutteridge
Commissioner, Works and Emergency Services