The Planning and Transportation Committee reports, for the information of Council, having deferred consideration of the continuation or disbandment of the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives until its next meeting, scheduled to be held on April 17, 1996.

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives on February 19, 1996, recommended to the Planning and Transportation Committee:

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives reports, for the information of the Planning and Transportation Committee, having:

(Report dated February 13, 1996, entitled

"Pro-Transit Strategy and Transportation Funding",

addressed to the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives

from the Deputy Commissioner of Planning, as Chair of

the Technical Transportation Planning Committee.)

Recommendations:

It is recommended that this report be received and that the relevant agencies bring forward, as practicable, implementation plans for the elements of the pro-transit strategy, these plans to be co-ordinated by the Technical Transportation Planning Committee.

Background:

Annual TTC ridership has declined from a high of 463.5 million in 1988 to 388.2 million in 1995. To bring revenue and operating expenses into balance, it has been necessary since 1991 to supplement transit fare-box revenues with special subsidies as well as to reduce transit service and increase fares. Service reductions and increased fares, along with demographic changes, mean that further decreases in ridership can be expected. The ridership projected for 1996 is lower yet at 376 million.

A recent article by Anthony Perl and John Pucher provides an independent perspective on the urban public transit situation in Canada and, more particularly, in Metropolitan Toronto. Some relevant quotes from that 1995 article from the journal "Canadian Public Policy" are as follows:

The Toronto Transit Commission, on March 28, 1995, considered a report outlining a response to a projected revenue shortfall for 1995. In approving the recommendations of the report, the Commission requested that staff bring forward a comprehensive plan to enhance transit vis-a-vis the automobile. Since the Planning Department had already developed a broad Travel Demand Management strategy which included a pro-transit element, Planning staff were requested to prepare a short-term pro-transit strategy. The Technical Transportation Planning Committee acted as the steering committee for this effort. Representatives of the Planning Department, the Transportation Department, the Toronto Transit Commission, the Chief Administrator's Office, the Economic Development Division, the Legal Department, the Provincial Ministry of Transportation, GO Transit, the Metropolitan Toronto Board of Trade, and the Canadian Urban Transit Association participated in the development of the strategy through a working group.

In reviewing the draft pro-transit strategy, the Technical Transportation Planning Committee agreed that the financial direction being taken by the new Provincial Government indicated a much more serious problem, that of maintaining a stable transportation funding source to offset cuts in Provincial transfer payments. The Technical Transportation Planning Committee concluded that the key elements of the pro-transit strategy should be reconsidered in view of their potential to generate revenue to maintain a basic level of funding for Metropolitan transportation services.

Discussion:

A Draft Short-Term Pro-Transit Strategy:

In the Spring of 1995, a short-term pro-transit strategy was seen as necessary to reverse declining TTC ridership trends, and to achieve progress towards the objectives and policies of the Metropolitan Official Plan, including those aimed at reducing automobile use and improving air quality, over the longer term.

The following broad approaches to increasing transit ridership were considered:

Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages in the context of Metro’s immediate requirements. Land-use measures, education programs, and employer programs cannot be relied upon to produce short-term results. Transit discounts, education programs, employer programs, and transit priority schemes need substantial resource commitments. Regulatory measures limit travel choices and could be seen as draconian. Market-based programs, such as fees, taxes and tolls, while generally preserving travel choices, would be perceived as increasing the costs of living and doing business. Specific pro-transit measures considered for inclusion in the strategy proposal are summarized in Appendix A.

The attached draft report, entitled "Draft Proposal for a Short-Term Pro-Transit Strategy" identifies five measures which have the best chance of increasing transit ridership within a two to four-year time frame, assuming a collective will to implement these measures. This package of measures attempts to balance effectiveness, financial self-sustainability and public acceptability. Measures that discourage auto use are balanced by measures that improve transit as an alternative in terms of travel cost and travel time, the key factors that influence modal choice. The strategy as a whole can be designed to be self-funding. While being aimed at achieving short-term results, the strategy also lays the groundwork for longer-term efforts. Developed prior to the election of the current Provincial Government, this strategy was considered to best meet the requirements identified at that time.

The five elements of the draft pro-transit strategy are:

To achieve maximum ridership gains and to avoid disparate economic impacts among Greater Toronto Area (GTA) municipalities, it is essential that this pro-transit strategy be implemented on a GTA-wide basis.

It was estimated, based on reported experience with the relationship between changes in travel costs and travel mode choice, that implementation of the proposed pro-transit strategy could increase annual TTC ridership by between 30 and 40 million riders. This includes only the estimated impacts of the transportation and environment user fee and accompanying transit discounts within Metro and of the discounted post-secondary student transit pass. The analysis assumes a five cents per litre increase in gas prices and a $1/day parking charge or increase in existing charges for employees. The projected increase in ridership is less than the 75 million riders lost over the past seven years but still represents a significant improvement. The analysis does not include the impacts of the transportation and environment user fee beyond Metro, extension of the Metro Hall employee program to other employers, further expansion of the transit priority program, and success in achieving the proposed amendments to the Federal Income Tax Act.

The most significant ridership increases would be realized through the transportation and environment user fee in conjunction with transit pass discounts. There is a risk that this fee would be perceived as increasing the cost of doing business in Metropolitan Toronto, but it is important to note that the fee is proposed for auto users while goods movement costs may be lower through reduced congestion. The fee would be aimed at gasoline users, leaving untouched commercial and other users of diesel and alternative fuels. All-day parkers, such as those driving to work, would be affected rather than shorter-term parkers, such as shoppers, business clients, and many tourists.

The acceptability of such a fee would be improved if a significant portion of the revenue was allocated on a priority basis to reducing transit fares and maintaining and improving the transportation system. It was, however, recognized that actual dedication of revenue for this purpose would not be consistent with the financial policies of most governments, including Metro. Application of the pro-transit strategy on a broader basis across the GTA is considered essential to reduce the potential for disparities in economic competitiveness among GTA municipalities while increasing the availability of funding for transit service improvements across the GTA commuter-shed. It would, therefore, be necessary to gain widespread support for, and promote participation in, the implementation of the pro-transit strategy across the GTA. A more detailed evaluation of potential economic impacts from a Metro perspective would need to be undertaken.

The Need for an Alternative Source of Long-Term Transportation Funding:

The financial direction advocated by the new Provincial Government raises some additional issues that impact directly on the planning and implementation of the draft pro-transit strategy. First is the stated intention of the government to reduce the tax burden for Ontarians. At the same time, the government appears to be more favourably disposed towards user fees and has provided the legislation for implementing such fees through Bill 26. However, the Minister of Municipal Affairs has stated that municipal gasoline taxes are excluded from Bill 26. Recently, the GTA Task Force recommended that the proposed Greater Toronto Council should be allowed to introduce user fees on private vehicles, including a region-wide user fee on gasoline, and that the revenue should be dedicated to transportation and transit infrastructure.

Second, reductions in transfer payments from the Province to Metro and other changes in financial arrangements will significantly reduce the funding available for maintaining existing TTC services without increasing fares, for essential maintenance and rehabilitation of Metropolitan road and transit infrastructure, and for needed capital improvements. Further deferrals of maintenance and rehabilitation work raise real doubts that the integrity of the Metro road and transit systems can be maintained. Loss of the integrity of the Metro road and transit networks, which could well result from continued reductions in transportation funding levels, would have a major debilitating effect on the Metro economy, Metro competitiveness, and the personal mobility of Metro residents.

In the past, funding of the transportation system has been derived both from what may be considered user fees such as transit fares, fuel taxes and vehicle registration fees, and from subsidies derived from income and property taxes and other sources. However, it is clear that Metro will have to look more closely at obtaining a much larger share of future transportation funding from rationalized user fees that more closely reflect the costs associated with transportation. It is estimated that each five cents per litre applied as a user fee to gasoline sales would generate just over $100 million annually for Metro and a similar amount across the remainder of the GTA. A $1.00 per day fee applied to daily employee parking in Metro would generate a further $100 million annually less administration costs.

The pro-transit strategy as drafted was designed to increase transit ridership, provide some revenue for transportation purposes and move towards achievement of the environmental objectives of the Official Plan. As such, it represents a good, balanced start to responding to these needs. However, the establishment of a stable, long-term transportation funding source must now be added to these objectives as a high priority.

Next Steps:

In order to pursue the pro-transit strategy further, the Technical Transportation Planning Committee would have to undertake the following:

Conclusions:

A pro-transit strategy has been drafted to respond in the short term to declining TTC ridership trends and TTC revenue shortfalls and to help achieve progress towards the environmental objectives of the Metropolitan Official Plan.

Recent changes in the level of Provincial financial support have significantly changed the context for the strategy. Provincial subsidies for 1995 were reduced, resulting in a reduced capital funding cap and a number of capital project deferrals, the September, 1995, fare increase and reductions in Wheel-Trans service. Reductions in Provincial transfer payments will reduce funding available to the TTC for 1996 and subsequent years. This will likely mean a second fare increase and significant reductions in transit service, leading to further decreases in transit ridership and fare-box revenues. There are similar funding pressures related to the maintenance and rehabilitation of the Metro road system. The net result will be a significant threat to Metro's ability to provide needed transportation services and maintain transportation infrastructure in a safe and usable condition. This could have a major impact on the Metro economy and on the mobility of Metro residents.

In order to pursue the strategy further, the next steps outlined in this report would have to be undertaken.

This report and its recommendations are supported by the Chief Administrative Officer, the Commissioner of Transportation, and the Chief General Manager of the Toronto Transit Commission.

This report will be forwarded to the Toronto Transit Commission for its information.

Summary Chart:

This report conforms with the following:

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Mr. Rob Pringle, Planning Department, 392-8115.

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives at its meeting on December 12, 1995, recommended to the Planning and Transportation Committee, the adoption, in principle, of the draft "Short-Term Pro-Transit Strategy".

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives reports having requested the Commissioner of Planning to report further to the Sub-Committee on the following:

(1) the specific recommendations required to implement the policy objectives outlined in the Discussion Paper;

(2) any other initiatives discussed at the Sub-Committee, that were previously considered but not included in the Discussion Paper (i.e., fee honour system for buses); and

(3) initiatives that result in either a revenue-neutral or positive impact on overall TTC revenues.

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives reports, for the information of the Planning and Transportation Committee, also having had before it a communication (December 12, 1995) from the Chief General Manager, Toronto Transit Commission, reporting, as requested by the Sub-Committee at its meeting on November 13, 1995, on:

(a) the subsidy that would be required by the TTC in order to sell the monthly Metropass for:

(b) other alternative methods of increasing TTC ridership, including any subsidy requirements;

advising that reducing the price of the Metropass from $78.00 to $60.00 or $70.00 will increase ridership, but will significantly worsen the TTC's financial picture by decreasing passenger revenues; that initiatives to improve ridership would require additional funding, and in light of the funding cuts facing the TTC, efforts should be devoted to minimizing the erosion among the existing ridership base; and recommending that the Commission receive this report for information, and forward it to the Metropolitan Toronto Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives.

At its meeting on Tuesday, February 6, 1996, the Toronto Transit Commission (Commission) considered the attached report, entitled "Request from Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives".

The Commission approved the recommendations contained in the report as follows:

(1) receive this report for information; and

(2) forward this report to the Metropolitan Toronto Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives.

The foregoing is forwarded to the Metropolitan Toronto Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives for information.

(Toronto Transit Commission, Report No. 3, headed

"Request from Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives.")

Recommendations:

It is recommended that the Commission:

(1) receive this report for information; and

(2) forward this report to the Metropolitan Toronto Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives.

Background:

At its meeting of November 13, 1995, the Metro Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives "requested the Chief General Manager, Toronto Transit Commission, to report to the next meeting of the Sub-Committee regarding:

(a) the subsidy that would be required by the TTC in order to sell the monthly Metropass for:

(b) other alternative methods of increasing TTC ridership, including any subsidy requirements".

This report responds to these requests.

Please note that this is a corrected version of Report No. 6 from the Commission Meeting of December 12, 1995. The revised Net Ridership Gain figures strengthen the argument advanced in the remainder of this report. The changes are as follows:

(a) for the $60.00 Metropass, the Net Ridership Gain is 0.9 million to 14.3 million (instead of 44.6 million to 58.0 million); and

(b) for the $70.00 Metropass, the Net Ridership Gain is 0.2 million to 0.4 million (instead of 1.8 million to 2.0 million).

Discussion:

Reducing the price of the Metropass from $78.00 to $60.00 or $70.00 will lead to increased ridership, but revenue will decrease substantially. At $60.00, it is estimated that ridership would increase by 0.9 million to 14.3 million, while revenue would decrease by $33.1 to $49.6 million. At $70.00, ridership would increase by 0.2 million to 0.4 million, while a revenue loss of $9.1 to $13.6 million would occur. (More detail on these estimates is provided in Attachment 1.)

These figures do not take into account any cost increases. Costs would increase as a result of the higher service levels required to accommodate the higher ridership and from the production and distribution costs associated with supplying additional Metropasses. As well, the TTC is limited in its ability to carry more riders on surface routes by the unavailability of buses.

Increasing ridership is obviously a desirable goal, but in the current fiscal environment the TTC will be challenged simply to maintain existing ridership. In response to the funding reduction facing the TTC next year, service cuts are planned for February, 1996. Undertaking initiatives to improve ridership typically requires additional funding and, in light of the cuts facing the TTC, efforts should be devoted to minimizing the erosion among the existing ridership base. To achieve this, a stable funding formula ensuring predictable and adequate levels of operating funding from year to year is required.

Also fundamental to retaining the existing customer base is adequate capital funding. Capital budgets have been reduced, and funding for the Capital Program for 1996-2000 may not be sufficient to undertake all of the capital projects required to keep the system in a state of good repair and to ensure legislative compliance. Keeping the system in good shape is essential to maintain existing customers and attract new riders. Any plans to maintain and, ultimately, increase ridership should address the capital limitations currently facing the TTC.

Justification:

Reducing the price of the Metropass from $78.00 to $60.00 or $70.00 will increase ridership, but will significantly worsen the TTC's financial picture by decreasing passenger revenues. Initiatives to improve ridership would require additional funding and, in light of the funding cuts facing the TTC, efforts should be devoted to minimizing the erosion among the existing ridership base. To achieve this, a stable operating funding formula and adequate capital funding are required.

Purpose:

This report responds to a request from the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives for a report on giving transit routes priority in the rehabilitation of road infrastructure.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that this report be received for information.

Background:

The Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives at its meeting of February 19,1996, when dealing with the Planning Department's report on a Pro-Transit Strategy, requested that the Commissioners of Transportation and Planning report to the Planning and Transportation Committee on giving transit routes priority in the assignment of capital funds for the rehabilitation of roads and bridges.

Discussion:

In a report dated September 20, 1995, entitled "Rehabilitation Funding Needs for the Metropolitan Road System", and in reports dated September 14, 1995, November 24, 1995 and January 23, 1996, on the 1996-2000 Capital Works Program, details were provided on how the Department develops the Capital Works Program and the priorities assigned to each element of the program. To reiterate, the priority assigned to each category is based on the following, in descending order of importance:

(A) Maintenance of Existing Assets:

(1) Bridge Rehabilitation;

(2) Road Resurfacing; and

(3) Road Reconstruction.

(B) Enhancements:

(1) Projects with Special Funding;

(2) Traffic Control; and

(3) Road Improvements:

Within the Maintenance of Existing Assets area, individual projects are assigned priority based upon our bridge maintenance management and pavement management programs. These programs rate the condition of each bridge and road section and, based on these ratings and the objective of minimizing life-cycle costs, a priority is assigned. The highest priority projects are scheduled for construction until the available funding for that year is exhausted.

Priority for roads with transit routes and for the busiest transit routes is implicit in the work undertaken by the Department. Over 80 per cent. of TTC bus routes use Metro Toronto arterial roads. With few exceptions, most notably the F.G. Gardiner Expressway and the Don Valley Parkway, Metro roads have bus routes on all or part of the length of the road. The condition of pavements and, as a result, the priority assigned by our pavement management program, is heavily influenced by the level of traffic using a particular road and by the weight of the vehicles. Fully-loaded TTC buses have wheel axel loadings in excess of the maximum load limits allowed under Provincial regulation. Therefore, on the most heavily-travelled TTC routes, which by inference have the most number of fully-loaded buses on them, the degree of wear and tear on the road pavements is severe. As a result, these roads show up as needing maintenance more frequently than other roads with either no bus route or only lightly-travelled routes.

In recognition of the degree of damage to pavements caused by fully-loaded buses and the impact on the buses and bus riders caused by poor pavements, we requested special consideration from the Ministry of Transportation, Ontario (MTO) for extra road rehabilitation funding. This request was denied.

Summary:

The Transportation Department assigns capital funding priority to projects based upon minimizing the life-cycle costs of the road and bridge infrastructure. For safety reasons bridges are assigned the highest priority for funding, followed by road resurfacings. Funding priority for roads with the most heavily-travelled transit routes is implicit in our pavement management program because of the damage caused to road pavements by fully-loaded TTC buses which have wheel axel loadings in excess of Provincial regulations.

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Mr. T.W. Mulligan, P. Eng., Assistant Director, Planning, Design and Programming, 392-8329.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that this report be received for information.

Background:

At its meeting on February 19, 1996, the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives received a brief from Mr. S. Munro commenting on various issues related to the proposed Pro-Transit Strategy, which was the subject of a report to the Sub-Committee, and, more generally, to transit fares and passes. The Sub-Committee requested the Commissioner of Transportation, the Deputy Commissioner of Planning, and the Chief General Manager of the Toronto Transit Commission to submit a report on the issues raised by Mr. Munro to the March 6, 1996, meeting of the Planning and Transportation Committee.

Discussion:

The following comments respond to the points raised in Mr. Munro's brief:

(1) Mr. Munro feels that the Pro-Transit Strategy as proposed is too little and too late. He believes that dramatic changes are required in the way we think about transit. (Page 1, introductory remarks).

The pro-transit strategy was developed to meet the need for actions which:

(2) Mr. Munro questions the appropriateness of the proposed Metro Workplace Commute Options Demonstration Project. (Page 1, section (1).

Regarding limited ridership benefits to be gained through the Metro Workplace project: we acknowledge that it would be difficult to achieve dramatic increases in transit ridership in a situation, such as Metro Hall, where about 60 per cent. of commuters currently use transit. However, the principal value of the Metro Workplace project is not necessarily in its contribution to increased TTC ridership but in its role as an implementation model for other employers and as an example of public leadership. We do not see the Metro Workplace Project as a benchmark, in terms of results achieved, for the entire region. However, the demonstration of benefits in the Metro Hall context and the documentation of lessons learned from such a demonstration would facilitate the implementation of similar programs by employers in more favourable circumstances.

Regarding the appropriateness of the proposal to provide discounts to all riders rather than just to those who are not using transit at present: this will always be a question of economic efficiency vs. equity. At what point does a new rider become one who is "already using the system"? Pricing of the Metropass may be seen as a system-wide issue but transit pass discounts may also be seen as a benefit provided by an individual employer to its employees in the same way that a parking space may be supplied.

Regarding the inclusion of ridesharing in the Commute Options Project: this particular project was developed to encourage all alternatives to single-occupant auto use, including walking, cycling, transit, and ridesharing. Flexible work hours provide opportunities for employees to adjust their working hours to match with other ridesharers.

(3) Mr. Munro comments on transit priority issues. (Page 2, section (2)).

Regarding the enforcement of reserved transit and HOV lanes: Mr. Munro is correct in identifying enforcement as a key requirement with respect to reserved bus lanes and HOV lanes. The main issue was, and is, the efficient allocation of law enforcement resources.

Regarding transit priority treatment on King and Queen Streets: Mr. Munro states that if King Street and Queen Street were made one-way for traffic while retaining existing two-way streetcar operations in reserved lanes, cars and not transit would be the beneficiaries. Staff maintain that this proposal should be explored further. One of the key advantages is minimization of the impacts of left-turning vehicles on streetcar operations, a major source of delay. Since lanes would be reserved for exclusive streetcar operations in both cases, it is difficult to see how these changes would "speed cars on their way through downtown" as Mr. Munro claims. We agree that restricting the central parts of Queen and King Streets to non-automobile travel during the peak period would be a much more aggressive pro-transit measure but previous attempts to gain approval for this have been unsuccessful.

Regarding transit priority signals: Mr. Munro questions the pace at which transit priority signals are being implemented in Metro. Since the first demonstration project in 1990 on Queen Street between Dovercourt Road and Bathurst Street showed positive effects on streetcar operations, transit priority capability has been added to 66 signalized intersections on sections of King Street, St. Clair Avenue West, Roncesvalles Avenue and Broadview Avenue served by streetcar. Further implementation of traffic signal priority for streetcars is planned, beginning with Carlton Street. A traffic signal priority demonstration project for buses is now underway on Brimley Road, including a further ten traffic control signal installations. Implementation on other roads served by bus routes will await evaluation of the Brimley road demonstration project. The pace at which transit priority measures can be implemented depends primarily on the availability of funding.

Regarding the cost implications of transit priority measures: transit operating costs can be reduced through transit priority measures by reducing the number of transit vehicles required in operation to maintain a given headway. We agree that reducing waiting time for customers is important but the best allocation of resources saved through transit priority must be considered system-wide.

Regarding HOV lanes: Mr. Munro comments on the suitability of HOV lanes in a transit priority context. A report on HOV lane operation and policy (September 19, 1995) from the Commissioner of Transportation and the Chief General Manager of the Toronto Transit Commission addresses this issue and was also forwarded on to Planning and Transportation Committee for its March 6, 1996, meeting by the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit Initiatives.

(4) Mr. Munro provides some comments on the transportation and environment fee. (Page 3, section (3)).

Regarding the appropriateness of capital expenditure on a "smart-card" fare system: an advanced fare collection system was only one of a number of possible transit improvements that were identified as candidates for possible funding from the proposed transportation and environment fee. A comprehensive review would be required before a decision was made as to whether or not such a system would be beneficial in a TTC context. However, we do note that "smart-card" systems would facilitate inter-regional transit fare integration as well as the implementation of differential fare policies, including different peak and off-peak fares such as found on a number of other transit systems. We note that the Ministry of Transportation of Ontario is currently investigating advanced fare collection schemes.

Regarding the idea that service cutbacks will more than offset ridership gains from pro-transit measures: Mr. Munro has not provided any basis for his assertion that the effects of an additional tax on gasoline, a new or additional charge on all-day parking and partial application of the resulting revenue to transit pass discounting, as proposed in the Pro-Transit Strategy, would be outweighed by the impact of service cutbacks which themselves reflect low transit rider demand. The proposed Pro-Transit Strategy does include a transit priority element oriented to reducing transit travel times. It is not clear that changes in transit headways would play a significant role in travel decisions as Mr. Munro asserts. We would be very interested to see a comparison of these effects. We note that GO Transit has achieved strong growth in ridership and market share despite relatively high headways and limited service.

Regarding the suggestion that property tax on parking be increased rather than just parking charges for all-day parkers (largely commuters): commuters travelling in the peak periods typically have access to a higher level of transit service than people travelling for shopping or other reasons. Increasing costs for Metro businesses and their customers is not conducive to economic growth and competitiveness. Increased property taxes may not be passed on to parkers in a way that is visible and would have a direct impact on travel decisions. In addition, increasing property taxes for this reason would likely be seen as an indirect and, therefore, questionable tax.

(5) Mr. Munro questions the suitability of the proposed post-secondary student transit pass discount. (Page 4, section (4)).

Mr. Munro's comments do not seem to recognize the fact that all other students travelling in Metro (including post-secondary students on GO Transit) have access to a discounted transit pass and that the proposed pass would be financed in part through student contributions. Furthermore, there is potential value beyond the immediate ridership gain in that development of a transit habit now among students could reap longer-term benefits in terms of future decisions on auto purchases, living and working locations, and transit use. There are many cases world-wide of successful post-secondary transit discounts.

(6) Mr. Munro provided detailed comments on the transit fare structure of the TTC.

The appendix to Mr. Munro's brief contains detailed comments on the TTC's fare policy with specific reference to Metropass pricing. TTC staff have prepared a detailed response to these comments which is attached as Appendix A. TTC staff are also arranging a discussion with Mr. Munro and others on this topic. Furthermore, the Sub-Committee has requested a comprehensive report on alternative fare structures for submission to a later meeting of the Sub-Committee.

Conclusions:

This report summarizes our comments on the issues raised by Mr. S. Munro in his brief to the Sub-Committee concerning the proposal for a Pro-Transit Strategy. Mr. Munro made a number of interesting points which typically were considered in the development of the proposed strategy. Mr. Munro's detailed comments on fare policy will be further addressed through discussions being arranged between Mr. Munro and TTC staff and through a further report requested by the Sub-Committee on fare structure alternatives.

The proposed pro-transit strategy proposal combines a balanced package of complementary measures which staff maintains has the highest potential to achieve the objective framed for the strategy, that of increasing transit ridership in the short-term. The strategy includes a combination of measures to discourage auto use, or "sticks"; with measures to make transit use more attractive, or "carrots". The Metro Workplace Commute Options Project and the discounted post-secondary transit pass are both demonstration projects which, although relatively limited in scope, could potentially reap much greater benefits if applied on a broader basis to other employers and post-secondary institutions.

Staff will consider Mr. Munro's suggestions further in developing implementation plans for the Pro-Transit Strategy.

The Commissioner of Transportation and the Chief General Manager of the Toronto Transit Commission were consulted in the preparation of this report.

Mr. Rob Pringle, Planning Department, 392-8115.

Appendix A

TTC Staff Comments on Metropass Pricing

Issues Raised by Mr. S. Munro

Recommendation:

It is recommended that this report be received for information.

Background:

At its meeting on February 19, 1996, the Sub-Committee on Pro-Transit initiatives considered a report (February 13, 1996) from the Deputy Commissioner of Planning (as Chair, Technical Transportation Planning Committee) proposing a Short-Term Pro-Transit Strategy to address declining TTC ridership as well as revenue shortfalls. In recommending adoption of this report to the Planning and Transportation Committee, the Sub-Committee requested that the Deputy Commissioner of Planning report on the number of cars that are coming into the downtown core compared with the loss of TTC ridership over the last four to five years. This report was requested for the March 6, 1996, meeting of the Planning and Transportation Committee.

Discussion:

A previous report (April 3, 1995) on travel trends related to the Central Area was prepared by the Commissioner of Planning and submitted to the Financial Priorities Committee last year. A copy of that report is appended along with a copy of the 1995 Central Area Monitoring Program Bulletin. For the purposes of the current report, we have updated the relevant information of the previous report to include information obtained through the 1995 Cordon Count program. Detail beyond that provided in the current report may be obtained from the earlier report.

Appendix A summarizes travel by mode to the Central Area for 1989 and 1995 and highlights changes in travel by the various modes. Also included are Central Area population and employment over the period 1989 to 1993. The travel information presented in the Appendix and discussed below is for morning peak-period trips into the Central Area, predominantly commuting to work. It should be noted that the market share information presented does not account for a relatively small number of people who walk or bicycle to the Central Area from outside this area.

Between 1989 and 1995, TTC ridership for morning peak-period trips into the Central Area fell by 32,900 or 18.4 per cent. This represents a drop in market share from 55.2 per cent. to 49.3 per cent. A comparable decrease of 16.2 per cent. in annual TTC ridership, from 463.5 million in 1988 to 388.2 million in 1995, indicates that not only commuting, but other transit travel, has been affected. Although the reasons for the decrease in transit ridership cannot be attributed precisely, the following trends are worth noting in this regard:

It appears from the above that the recent economic downturn and resulting drop in Central Area employment has played a major role in the drop in TTC ridership. A further report on the changing nature of Central Area employment is being prepared which may indicate whether or not the jobs being lost were previously held by population groups favouring the TTC as a commuting mode. The fact that the proportion of Central Area workers living within Metro has been steadily decreasing is also significant.

The increase in the number of commuters using auto or GO Transit during this period is notable, particularly given the overall decrease in employment and in total trips to the Central Area. This almost certainly indicates a switch in travel mode from the TTC. Reasons may include a reduction in the number of Central Area workers living within Metro, two TTC fare increases in this period, the 1991 transit strike, and a reduction in downtown parking prices caused, at least in part, by an increase in the number of surface parking spaces on developable lots. However, the increase in auto commuting is small relative to the drop in TTC ridership.

Conclusion:

It appears that a significant drop in TTC ridership for peak-period trips into the Central Area experienced between 1989 and 1995 is related strongly to decreasing Central Area employment and, to a lesser extent, to a switch from TTC use to GO Transit and to driving.

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Mr. Rob Pringle, Planning Department, 392-8115.

(Report dated April 3, 1995, entitled

"Central Area Travel Demand", addressed

to the Financial Priorities Committee

from the Commissioner of Planning.)

Recommendation:

It is recommended that this report be received and forwarded to Council for information.

Background:

At its meeting on March 30 and 31, 1995, in considering the Toronto Transit Commission's 1995 Operating budget submission, the Planning and Transportation Committee requested that the Commissioner of Planning submit a report directly to the Financial Priorities Committee summarizing trends in automobile travel to the Central Area from within and outside Metropolitan Toronto over the past ten years. This report responds to that request.

Discussion:

Travel data from two main sources are summarized in this report:

Conclusions:

Since 1989, there has been an increase in GO Rail and auto person trips to the Central Area and decrease in TTC ridership. The cordon count and TTS data indicate that most of the growth in travel to the Central Area originating in the Regions surrounding Metropolitan Toronto has been accommodated by GO Rail, with a relatively small increase in auto trips. The data also show there has been a mode shift from transit to auto for trips to the Central Area from within Metro. These trends coincide with increases in TTC fares, reduced parking costs in the Central Area and a shift in the home residence of Central Area workers to outside Metropolitan Toronto.

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Mr. Randy McLean, Planning Department, 392-8787.

Table A*

Change in Number of Morning Peak Period Trips

Entering Central Area Cordon, 1989 to 1993

* Source: Metro Cordon Count

Table B**

Number of Trips and Modal Split for

Morning Peak Period Trips Destined to

Toronto Central Area (Planning District 1)

** Source: 1986 and 1991 Transportation Tomorrow Surveys