Toronto City Hall

100 Queen Street West

Toronto, Ontario

Canada M5H 2N2

www.city.toronto.on.ca

Tel: 416-392-0070

Fax: 416-392-0071

Urban Planning and Development Services

November 17, 1998

To:Urban Environment and Development Committee

From:Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services

Subject:Access to the City Centre Airport: Status Update

Purpose:

To provide a response on the actions of the special joint meeting of the Urban Environment and Development Committee and the Economic Development Committee held on September 29^th, 1998 regarding the proposal to build either a bridge or a tunnel to the City Centre Airport.

Source of Funds and Implications:

There are no immediate funding requirements arising from the recommendations of this report. However, this report puts forward suggestions for addressing some of the safety concerns at the City Centre Airport the assessment of which will require further reporting.

Recommendations:

1.The Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services, in consultation with appropriate staff, be directed to continue discussion and consultation on the appropriate role of the City Centre Airport and its relationship to other uses and activities in the waterfront, and the impacts that these matters might have on the terms of both the Tripartite and the Subsidy Agreements to which the City is a party.

2.The Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services and the Commissioner of Works and Emergency Services be requested to report on an assessment of the emergency response capability of the bridge, tunnel and ferry including suggested improvements to the operation of each option.

3.That the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services, in consultation appropriate staff, continue to compile technical information on the bridge and tunnel options but the decision on the type of fixed link required be deferred until the matters raised in Recommendations 1 and 2 have been further resolved.

Executive Summary:

As a result of a special joint meeting of the Urban Environment and Development Committee and the Economic Development Committee held on September 29, 1998, numerous requests for further staff reporting on the issue of access to the City Centre Airport were made. Most of these requests were for more information about the bridge and tunnel options to the airport and how these two alternatives compared. Staff is continuing to compile this information.

The Special Joint Committee also adopted the recommendations of my September 18^th, 1998 report on the fixed link which called for a fuller assessment of the future role of the City Centre Airport and the means by which airport activities can be balanced with the other activities and uses in the waterfront area. The question of determining the appropriate form of access to the City Centre Airport involves matters that go beyond conventional land use planning considerations and is enmeshed in a number of wider issues including those related to organizational and financial aspects of the airport's operation. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' plans or vision for the future of the City Centre Airport are quite different from those that would apply if the GTAA were to have control of the airport. The City requires more time to assess the relative merits of these competing visions, including the impacts that different operating strategies might have on both the Subsidy and the Tripartite Agreements to which the City is a cosignatory. This assessment is an unavoidably complex task and there is an inherently political component attached to it. It is my view that these broader, strategic questions relating to the "role and compatibility" of the airport need to be addressed. City staff are continuing to discuss and consult on these broader issues regarding the "role and compatibility" of the City Centre Airport and further time is required to achieve closure on these matters. It is only after these wider issues have been resolved that the specific operational decision on the form of a link required can be properly made.

In addition, the Emergency and Protective Services Committee, at its meeting dated October 6, 1998, requested the Chief of Police, the Fire Chief and the General Manager, Toronto Ambulance, to report jointly to the Urban Environment and Development Committee on whether the City Centre Airport should be immediately closed down and remain closed until a fixed link is in operation because of unacceptable safety concerns. A joint letter from the Fire Chief and the General Manager of Ambulance Services (appended to this report) concludes that the emergency response to the City Centre Airport and the Toronto Islands could benefit from a fixed link of appropriate design although the ferry option was not declared as inadequate or unsafe. This is important from the standpoint of the City's current responsibility with providing secondary response in the event of an emergency. The joint letter also indicates that the adequacy of the existing specialized crash rescue trucks and staffing at the airport should be reviewed. Also noted is the potential role of the Ministry of Health two ambulance helicopters in the event of an emergency. While the tunnel is preferred, the proposed bridge option could be considered acceptable if altered in accordance with the criteria listed above. In light of the City's responsibility to provide secondary response in the event of an emergency and given the concern of both the Fire Chief and the General Manager of Ambulance Services with respect to the adequacy of crash rescue equipment and staff at the airport, it is recommended that the emergency response capability of the bridge, tunnel and ferry should be reassessed.

1.The Issues of Role and Compatibility

1.1The Existing Situation

Before looking at alternative future roles for the City Centre Airport, it is useful to briefly review where matters currently stand.

The City Centre Airport is operated by the Toronto Harbour Commissioners on its own behalf in accordance with the Toronto Harbour Commissioners Act 1985. Currently, the airport provides general aviation services which include private planes, corporate aircraft, training and some recreational activity as well as limited scheduled air-passenger services. The scheduled air service includes flights to Ottawa, Montreal and London and, in 1997, some 115,000 passengers flew into and out of the airport. The maximum annual volume of passengers handled at the airport was achieved in 1987 at around the 400,000 level.

It must be remembered too, that the operation of the airport is subject to certain limiting conditions spelled out in the 1983 Tripartite Agreement. The Tripartite Agreement is, essentially, a 50-year lease agreed upon by the three owners of the airport lands, namely the City, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and the Federal Government. The Agreement contains some key conditions including the imposition of strict noise controls on flights to and from the airport, including a ban on jet aircraft, and the acknowledgement that runways are not to be extended nor a fixed link built to connect the airport and the mainland. Since the time of the signing of the Tripartite Agreement, the former City of Toronto has agreed, in principle, to relaxing some of these restrictions. As a result of technological advances that have led to improvements in aircraft noise performance, the City has agreed to broaden the definition of Type III turbo-prop aircraft that can use the airport. Several years ago a review of the emergency response needs of the airport resulted in the City's conditional approval to consider a fixed link and the recently completed Environmental Assessment Study concluded that a bridge would be the best means by which to improve emergency access. The terms of the Tripartite Agreement are expected to apply to the Toronto Port Authority when it comes into being and any changes to the Agreement will require the concurrence of all three parties.

In 1994, the former City of Toronto entered into the Subsidy Agreement with the Toronto Harbour Commissioners which followed from the transfer of approximately 400 acres of land in the eastern harbour from the Harbour Commissioners to the newly created Toronto Economic Development Corporation (TEDCO) and 200 acres to the City. As a result, the City pays the Toronto Harbour Commissioners an operating subsidy of $2.8 million annually. Of this total subsidy, $2.4 million is funded by TEDCO through its operating budget, which does not rely on taxes, and the remaining $0.4 million comes from the City's tax-supported operating budget. The Subsidy Agreement further specifies that up until the year 2000 capital expenditures will be funded from the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' reserves but, thereafter, additional capital expenditures could be funded by the City if required.

In 1998, the City Centre Airport, which is only one component of the Toronto Harbour Commissioners' operations, is expected to operate at a loss of $624,000. The majority of this airport operating deficit is attributable to the ferry service which operates at a loss of about $500,000 a year after the revenues from the charges on passengers and vehicles are deducted. Consequently, the City and TEDCO, through the Subsidy Agreement, subsidize the operating costs of providing ferry access to the Airport. Clearly, the City has a direct financial interest in any proposals to alter the access arrangements to the airport since any such change could impact on both the City's operating and possibly capital budgets. Even if the money to build the bridge were borrowed privately, paying the carrying costs is largely dependent on increased passenger use of the airport. If the expected passenger volumes do not materialize, the airport will be in a deficit position once again. The City would then in effect be paying for the carrying costs of the bridge.

With the recent passage of the Canada Marine Act, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners are soon to become the new Toronto Port Authority although the letters patent that are required to effect this transfer of control have yet to be finalized. The Toronto Port Authority comprises seven directors, only one of whom will be appointed by the City. It is expected that the City's financial obligations, as defined in the Subsidy Agreement, will carry over to the new Toronto Port Authority.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners would like to terminate the Subsidy Agreement relationship with the City provided they are fairly compensated since the Subsidy Agreement resulted from the transfer of certain lands in the port area, previously owned by the Toronto Harbour Commissioners to TEDCO and the City. At its meeting held on July 29 and 30, 1998, City Council adopted a motion requesting the Commissioner of Urban Planning and Development Services and other staff as necessary to meet with the Toronto Harbour Commissioners and TEDCO to discuss options for eliminating the City's obligation to provide an annual subsidy. Subsequently, the Strategic Policies and Priorities Committee, in camera, has recommended that discussions continue and that progress reports be brought forward as needed.

The letters patent will describe the mandate of the new Port Authority. The letters patent will:

• define the port's jurisdictional boundaries
• define the federal property to be managed
• describe the property the port authority will hold or occupy
• set out the board of directors
• describe the extent of the activities of the port authority and any wholly-owned subsidiary
• describe the limits of the port authority to borrow money, and
• any other provision the Minister considers appropriate

City Council has passed several motions related to its interest in being involved in the preparation of the letters patent. The Canada Marine Act does not allow for any involvement by municipalities in the development of the letters patent other than to nominate a member to the board of directors. The negotiations over the elimination of the Subsidy Agreement requirements offer City Council an opportunity to ensure its participation in the process of drafting the letters patent. Any resolution to the obligation under the Subsidy Agreement should include a guarantee that City Council will have been permitted to review and consent to the letters patent of the new Port Authority. Similarly, City Council should ensure that any amendments to the Tripartite Agreement permitting a fixed link should not occur until letters patent have been reviewed and the Subsidy Agreement discussions concluded.

1.2The Toronto Harbour Commissioners' Vision

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners clearly view the City Centre Airport as a potential profit centre that could not only help improve their own financial position but also strengthen the downtown economy and bolster the City's Olympic bid. Right now, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners see the airport as "a lost economic opportunity." Presently, only one airline, Air Ontario (a subsidiary of Air Canada), operates scheduled passenger service from the airport. It is through significantly expanding passenger use that the airport can achieve financial profitability. A number of other passenger airlines are said to be prepared to begin operations at the airport once the necessary upgrades have been made. The Toronto Harbour Commissioners see the building of the bridge as one of the key improvements to attracting more airport passengers. With the new bridge in place and a 400-space garage at the airport to park cars, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners believe that within a few years the break-even level of 400,000 passengers a year would be achieved.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners prefer the bridge option mainly because it is cheaper than a tunnel. The lift bridge is estimated to cost $16.0 million, while a tunnel might cost upwards of $50.0 million. Further, the Environmental Assessment study, which the Toronto Harbour Commissioners funded, is completed and recommends the bridge solution. Past experience indicates that the airport can cope with up to 400,000 passengers a year, even with just the ferry service, but beyond this level community disruption may become a more significant factor and the higher-cost of a tunnel might become justifiable as a means of addressing neighbourhood concerns. The Environmental Assessment study notes that when passenger volumes reach 600,000 a year vehicle congestion on the Bathurst Street approach to the bridge will become problematic and City staff recommended that at this level of use an off-site (remote) terminal building is required. Expanding the airport beyond the 600,000 level will require a further round of substantial capital investments.

The Toronto Harbour Commissioners see the City Centre Airport as in direct competition with Pearson International Airport for the patronage of the lucrative business traveller. Consequently, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners wish to see the bridge built as soon as possible and the City Centre Airport aggressively marketed to beyond the 400,000 passengers a year level as there is ".... a significant potential for profit with higher utilization." In their Business Plan for the City Centre Airport, the Toronto Harbour Commissioners put forward estimates of passenger growth that envisage volumes of around 575,000 passengers in the year 2002, a five-fold increase over today's levels. It is through passenger user fees that the Toronto Harbour Commissioners expect to produce the revenues to cover expenses, generate profits and, perhaps, eventually expand the airport to an ultimate level of around 900,000 passengers a year.

1.3The Greater Toronto Airports Authority's (GTAA) Vision

The GTAA views the City Centre Airport as a part of an integrated and coordinated regional airport system under the control of a single operator. Each airport in this regional system would have a distinct role that complements that of the others and, in this way, full advantage can be taken of the economies of scale and operational efficiencies that such an integrated airport system offers. In particular, strategic cross-subsidization of facilities in the system can eliminate counter-productive and wasteful competition between airports in the region.

Like the Toronto Harbour Commissioners, the GTAA regards the City Centre Airport as primarily serving short-haul passenger routes catering to the business and leisure traveller in selected corridors in the Canada and U.S. markets. However, the GTAA feels that, although the City Centre Airport should become financially self-sufficient, it should be operated on a not-for-profit basis. The GTAA claims that its aim would be to phase-out the need for any subsidy from the City and that, eventually, it would be prepared to share any excess revenues that might arise from City Centre Airport operations with the Toronto Port Authority. In this context, the GTAA considers that 400,000 passengers a year would be likely the maximum level of use by commercial airlines operating at the City Centre Airport and is prepared to recognize this as the figure to take for future planning purposes.

However, even at the more limited target figure of 400,000 passengers a year, the GTAA feels that a fixed link would be an asset both in terms of increasing the attractiveness of the airport for passenger use and addressing the need for emergency access by fire, ambulance and police services. The GTAA's position is that the fixed link, in either a bridge or tunnel form, should provide only limited or controlled access to the airport. In this regard, the GTAA feels that there should be no public parking provided at the airport and that an inter-modal passenger terminal and transfer point should be established off-site at Union Station. The fixed link itself should be designed to reduce the impacts of the airport on other uses and activities in the surrounding community and to be compatible with the level and type of access demanded by the airport in its planned or mature state. However, while the GTAA has indicated a preference for the tunnel as the best option in terms of minimizing community disruption, further review of the financial viability of the tunnel must be undertaken. With the resources at its disposal, the GTAA is able to take a more flexible approach to the access issue than the Toronto Harbour Commissioners are.

1.4The Question of Compatibility

The City Centre Airport represents something of a mixed blessing in the waterfront area. Clearly, the airport has the potential to be a key economic generator but its unbridled expansion would create stress among a number of the other legitimate uses and activities that share this waterfront location. There needs to be a generally acceptable balance struck between the expansionary ambitions of the airport's proponents and the concerns of those sectors of the surrounding community negatively impacted by increased airport activity.

As noted in David Crombie's letter of September 11^th, 1998:

"The Waterfront Regeneration Trust has always sought to promote a balance between increased investment in the waterfront and the natural attributes of the waterfront environment. Our 1997 study, Development Activity on the Waterfront, commissioned from Hemson Consultants, identifies over $2.5 billion in new investment planned or underway in the next 5-7 years. The investment is primarily in residential, recreation, entertainment and cultural uses.

We continue to support the airport's historic role of serving general aviation and a limited amount of the air commuter market. In this way, the scale of airport operations would remain compatible with adjacent waterfront development and the all important balance among waterfront uses would be maintained".

Also, as pointed out in my previous report of September 18^th, 1998, the former City of Toronto endorsed the construction of a fixed link based on the understanding that the airport operations would remain compatible with other waterfront uses. It was envisioned that, through negotiation, specific restrictions on airport operations would be developed at the same time the Environmental Assessment for the fixed link was being prepared.

Other reports have noted the various existing uses and activities in the waterfront area that are sensitive to the impacts of expanded airport operations. Among there are the nearby residential developments; the local school and adjacent park; recreational and commercial boating activities, and the use of the islands as an area of natural parkland for the enjoyment of people throughout the region. As noted above, many of these activities and uses will be continuing to expand over time in the waterfront and, in this sense, the airport threatens to become an increasingly incompatible activity with this outcome being further compounded by any expansion that the airport itself might undergo.

The long-term role of the City Centre Airport must remain compatible with the overall planning strategy for the area. Existing and proposed developments along the central waterfront have been developed in accordance with a land use plan that accounts for the existing role of the airport. Changes to the role of the airport must be carefully considered with respect to the impact on the current land use policies for the central waterfront.

2.Emergency Response Requirements

The General Manager of Toronto Ambulance and the Chief of Toronto Fire Service, in a joint, letter dated November 16^th, 1998 and addressed to the Commissioner of Works and Emergency Services, provide an up-dated assessment of the City Centre Airport's emergency response requirements (see Appendix A). Access is identified as one of three key requirements, the other two being staffing and equipment.

In comparing the access options, the review found that existing ferry (supported by the fire boat , if necessary) to be problematic mainly because it operates until 11 p.m. only. A tunnel was preferred choice of access owing to its reliability of access at all times. The bridge proposal was not considered acceptable in its current design. However, the bridge proposal could be considered acceptable if the 12 criteria outlined below could be incorporated into the design. Also, there would remain the need for a back-up system, presumably a ferry, in the event the bridge is not available as a result of some type of mechanical failure, maintenance work or accident repair.

In examining the equipment and staffing requirements, Toronto Fire and Ambulance staffs concluded that the most effective way of coping with such a major emergency, under current conditions, is to establish a "command and control" centre at the scene to implement the orderly deployment of equipment and manpower from a staging area on the mainland to give support, as required, to the first response. Such protocol would apply no matter which access option is chosen.

Nevertheless, the review finds that, overall, there are inadequacies today in terms of access, equipment and staffing levels with respect to fire, crash-rescue and emergency medical response to the City Centre Airport. Improving access alone, by either a bridge or tunnel, will not remedy the situation. Indeed, it is important that adequate equipment and staffing needs are provided. With respect to equipment needs, the review observed:

"What is actually required, then, at the Toronto City Centre Airport, is a sufficient number of aircraft crash rescue trucks, staffed by dedicated firefighters. This resource should then be "backed-up" with conventional fire apparatus from the Toronto Fire Service, such as a rescue truck and a command officer who will determine whether any additional response is required".

The staffing concerns appear twofold. First, there is the concern that there is not a sufficient number of dedicated fire-fighting staff at the airport and, secondly, neither the airport fire service or the ferry are operational during all the periods of the day that an emergency situation might arise.

The ferry already handles an average of ten medivac cases a day and, in critical situations, the airport-control tower can summon the ferry on demand even if this means it has to reverse direction in mid-crossing. This feature of the ferry service is important and sets the standard by which any other access option must meet. While the tunnel appears adequate in this regard owing to its uninterrupted flow of traffic , the bridge was considered inferior because of the length of time it might take to close the bridge if it is in the open position during an emergency. However, if the airport expands its activities in the future as contemplated by the THC vision outlined above, the emergency response capability of the ferry service will become increasingly less effective.

The joint letter also notes that the Ministry of Health has two ambulance helicopters stationed at the City Centre Airport. While only one is normally staffed, the second be place in service rather quickly. These aircraft are capable of transporting 2 to 4 of the most critical patients from the site to the heliport on top of the Hospital for Sick Children.

The letter from the General Manager of Toronto Ambulance and the Fire Chief concludes with the following criteria that must be met in order for the bridge to receive their support:

1. The opening and closing of the lift or swing bridge mechanism should take no more time than a crossing on the existing ferry service (3 minutes).
2. Any lift or swing bridge mechanism must be reversible in mid cycle.
3. Traffic flow onto the bridge must be controlled to eliminate any queuing on the bridge.
4. Any lift or swing bridge be staffed by an operator twenty four hours per day.
5. Direct telephone line access from the Toronto Ambulance Communications Centre and Toronto Fire Service Communications Centre to the operator must be provided.
6. The bridge operator must monitor Marine Channel 16 continuously, in order to be aware of any emergencies occurring on the water, so that the bridge position can be adjusted accordingly.
7. The airport's crash alarm system should be extended to the bridge operator's booth and the operator instructed that on activation of the crash alarm, the bridge is to be place in the down position and left there until advised that it is no longer required.
8. Vehicular traffic to Toronto City Centre Airport is to be actively discouraged.
9. Both Fire and Ambulance divisions should be consulted prior to any construction activity which will alter or impede our access to the Toronto City Centre Airport.
10. Both Fire and ambulance divisions will receive at least two weeks advance notice prior to the implementation of any changes to airport access which are contemplated.
11. Alternatively, both Fire and Ambulance divisions would favour a conventional bridge which is high enough to permit the unrestricted passage of both pleasure craft and the fireboat and the permanent rerouting of all commercial traffic though the Eastern Gap.

12.The approaches to either a bridge or a tunnel must not exceed the 8% required to accommodate the operation of large emergency vehicles.

The joint letter from Fire and Ambulance Services concludes that the emergency response to the City Centre Airport and the Toronto Islands could benefit from a fixed link of appropriate design although there the ferry option was not declared as inadequate or unsafe. This is important from the standpoint of the City's current responsibility with providing secondary response in the event of an emergency. The joint letter also indicates that the adequacy of the existing specialized crash rescue trucks and staffing at the airport should be reviewed. Also noted is the potential role of the Ministry of Health two ambulance helicopters in the event of an emergency. While the tunnel is preferred, the proposed bridge option could considered acceptable if altered in accordance with the criteria listed above.

In light of the City's responsibility provide secondary response in the event of an emergency and given the concern of both the Fire Chief and the General Manager of Ambulance Services with respect to the adequacy of crash rescue equipment and staff at the airport, it is recommended that the emergency response capability of the bridge, tunnel and ferry should be reassessed.

Contact Name:

Joe D'Abramo

Senior Advisor on Harbour Lands Issues

(416) 397-5260

and

Greg Stewart

(416) 392-0070

Reviewed by:

Paul J. BedfordVirginia M. West

Executive Director and Chief PlannerCommissioner of

City Planning DivisionUrban Planning and Development Services

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APPENDIX 'A'

Joint letter from Toronto Ambulance and Toronto Fire Service, November 16, 1998 to Commissioner, Works and Emergency Services:

"Re:Emergency Response Implications, Fixed Link Proposal

At the joint meeting of the Urban Environment and Development Committee and the Economic Development Committee on September 29, a motion was passed, requesting that you prepare a report on the implications of emergency response to the Toronto City Centre Airport, with respect to their consideration of the proposal to construct a fixed link, in either bridge or tunnel form, to the Toronto City Centre Airport. In considering the implications of this fixed link, it is not enough to merely consider the crash-rescue response; all types of emergencies must be considered. In the spirit of our closer strategic alliance, our two Divisions have jointly prepared this report for your consideration.

There is no doubt that the construction of a fixed link between the Toronto City Centre Airport and the mainland has the potential to improve access, but, depending on the design of the option selected, it also has the potential to create problems. These problems have the potential to impact significantly on the operations of both Toronto Ambulance and the Toronto Fire Service. Both agencies are concerned with the impact of a fixed link on the timing of reaching the City Centre Airport. In an emergency, seconds can be critical, and any time wasted trying to gain access can be disastrous. In addressing this issue one must look at the key elements of emergency response; access, manpower, and equipment.

The first element, access, is problematic under the current system. Under normal circumstances, the vehicle ferry from the bottom of Bathurst Street only operates until 11 p.m. The Toronto Fire Service keeps an extra pumper and aerial, unstaffed, at the Island Fire Hall, because transporting firefighters to the islands in Police vessels has proven more effective than waiting for a ferry to be brought back into service to transport fire apparatus, in an emergency. The creation of a fixed link could eliminate this access problem. A lift or swing type bridge, could pose problems from an emergency response perspective.

The Toronto Harbour Commission declared its' intention to permit private vehicles to access the airport directly, via this bridge. This plan would include the creation of a 400 space parking garage immediately east of the terminal building. Any queue of cars could block the passage of fire apparatus or ambulances across the bridge in an emergency. Both Divisions share concerns about the logistics of unrestricted vehicle access to the Toronto City Centre Airport. Airports are notorious sources of traffic congestion. Traffic 'jams' may occur, particularly when regional commuter flights are arriving and departing. unless vehicular access is strictly controlled, the potential will exist for delays in ambulance response, every time a medevac flight and a commuter flight coincide. Nor would this be the only issue of concern with a bridge. In the down position the Toronto Fire Service fireboat, the Wm. Lyon Mackenzie, would be unable to pass through the Western Gap to respond to a call. At a minimum, the fireboat would be delayed while the bridge was raised, but any queued cars would prevent the raising of the bridge, and the fireboat might have to be rerouted, delaying its' response to an emergency.

The Outer Harbour area sees heavy recreational usage by pleasure craft, particularly during the months of April-October. At most times there are a large number of people in boats on the water. It is not uncommon for the Toronto Police Service Marine Unit to have to respond quickly to boaters in distress. Any obstacle to the speed of that response has the potential to be disastrous. When boaters develop an on board emergency, such as a heart attach in one of the passengers, there has been a long standing tradition of proceeding to the Toronto Police Service Marine Unit docks with all speed for assistance. There, they are generally met by an ambulance for transport to hospital. Any delay while waiting for a bridge to open so that the vessel can pass safely constitutes a delay in the victim receiving medical aid.

At the moment, the Toronto Fire Service also provides first response for medical emergencies in the island communities. Patients are then transferred to either the fireboat or Toronto Police Marine Unit vessels, for transport to the mainland. There they are met by Toronto Ambulance paramedics and taken to hospital. Medical treatment would begin sooner if, as in the rest of the city, an ambulance could meet the Fire Service crew at the patient's side, and transport the patient to the hospital lin a more controlled environment. A fixed link could make this possible.

Additionally, both Divisions have concerns with respect to the mechanical reliability of the bridge option. Presumably, such a bridge system would require repairs from time to time. The Harbour Commission advised during the September 29 Committee meeting that they had no intention of retaining either of the ferries; the vessels are to be sold and the crews retrained for other jobs. The Harbour Commission has indicated that, if the bridge were to be disabled, they would maintain the ferry service using a barge and tug. The result is potential 'windows' between the failure of the bridge and staffing of the ferry, during which access to the Toronto City Centre Airport would be impossible, even in an emergency.

The aircraft currently in use typically seat between thirty and forty passengers, with a current maximum of fifty. From an Emergency Medical Service perspective, this translates as a potential for thirty to fifty victims in the event of an emergency. Technology which is about to be released into the marketplace (ie. DeHavilland Dash 8-400) would result in a fifty percent increase in these capacities. Such an emergency would require a substantial commitment of resources. Firefighting resources at this airport are quite limited, and there is no ambulance dedicated to that location. In the event of any major emergency, such as an aircraft crash, the emergency resources responding must come from the mainland. The survival of the victims of a survivable plane crash is directly related to the speed of the response of emergency services. Any obstacle to that response can potentially have a direct impact on the survival of victims.

The fighting of aircraft fires is a completely separate discipline. In order to guarantee the survival of victims, what is needed is an adequate supply of specialized crash rescue trucks, such as those used at Pearson International Airport. Aircraft fires are by nature very hot and intense, and are extinguished using special fire retardant foam generators, which deploy their chemicals from a safe distance. Conventional fire trucks are not particularly effective with this type of fire, and the necessity of fire crews to work 'close in' with conventional equipment provides a level of risk to firefighters which is inappropriate.

What is actually required, then, at Toronto City Centre Airport, is a sufficient number of aircraft crash rescue trucks, staffed by dedicated firefighters. This resource should then be 'backed up' with conventional fire apparatus from the Toronto Fire Service, such as a rescue truck and a command officer, who will determine whether any additional response is required. Any additional firefighting resources would then be deployed from a staging area on the mainland side, based upon the command officers' assessment.

The Ministry of Health has two ambulance helicopters at Toronto City Centre Airport. It was suggested at the Committee meeting that these constituted the medical first response capability of the airport. What was overlooked was the fact that the aircraft and their crews are away on calls a great deal of the time. Even if they are present, the use of this staff for on scene triage and treatment of patients would represent a waste of a rapid transport resource. While only one is normally staff, the second could potentially be placed in service very quickly, using Toronto Ambulance paramedics as attendants. It is anticipated that these aircraft would transport 2-4 of the most critical patients from the site.

From a fire suppression perspective, the island communities would benefit from a fixed link, because Toronto Fire Service would not be dependant on the ferry system to transport additional firefighting resources, such as a rescue truck or aerial ladder truck to the islands, in the event of a major fire. It would also improve our ability to staff the island Fire Hall in a cost effective manner, while being able to deploy additional personnel resources rapidly, in an emergency. Other response capabilities would also be improved, as the need to 'stage' responding ambulances and fire apparatus on the mainland side would be eliminated.

Toronto Ambulance also has some concerns which solely impact on their operation, primarily revolving around the issue of medevac flights. For many years now, within the province of Ontario, medical teaching and specialty training have been concentrated in only four centres (Toronto, Hamilton, Kingston, Ottawa). As a result, the majority of high-tech health care, as well as certain medical specialties, such as trauma care, have been concentrated in the City of Toronto. This trend was driven by population size, and occurred primarily as a result of a desire for cost-efficiency. What this has meant for the residents of Northern Ontario, as well as other rural locations, is that to receive trauma care, advanced cardiac care, pediatric and neonatal intensive care, or even oncology, one had to travel to Toronto by air, and usually on an emergency basis.

Throughout this period, Toronto Ambulance, and its' predecessor, Metro Ambulance, has served as the final link on the journey from smaller communities to the medical teaching centres of our city. Most days, Toronto Ambulance meets approximately ten medevac flights at the Toronto City Centre Airport, and transports these patients to the City's hospitals for the care which they require. In many cases, these patients are in critical condition; they have already endured an extended journey in a poorly controllable environment, and they need to be back in a hospital as quickly as possible. At the moment, when an ambulance needs to get to Toronto City Centre Airport for an emergency, the dispatcher contacts the airport Control Tower, which contacts the ferry captain, and asks him to wait for the ambulance before making the crossing from the mainland. In the event that the time necessary to assess and load the patient is short, the ferry will simply wait for the ambulance before making the return trip. Even in a worse case scenario, where the ferry is already returning to the mainland when the paramedics discover that the patient is in worse condition than anticipated, the ferry has been known to simply reverse to the island side, so that the patient can be removed without undue delay. In an emergency, the crossing time takes approximately three minutes.

The Toronto Harbour Commission has suggested that they would attempt to attract more medevac flights. It can be safely suggested that this is unnecessary. Since almost all medevac patients are transported to downtown hospitals, it is almost certain that the creation of a fixed link would result in all medevac traffic shifting to the Toronto City Centre Airport. With the landing restrictions of the heliport license at the Hospital for Sick Children, it is reasonable to assume that many Transport Team calls would also be taken to the Toronto City Centre Airport, with the rooftop heliport reserved for only truly critical patients. This would result in an almost immediate doubling of the existing medevac load.

There have been some inaccurate statements made, with respect to the tunnel option which relate to our operations. it was stated, at the September 29 Committee meeting, that fire apparatus would be unable to negotiate a tunnel because of turning radii, and this is untrue. Since we operate in a predominantly urban environment, with many narrow residential streets and tight corners, Toronto Fire Service is fully aware of the performance characteristics of each piece of apparatus which we operate, including turning radius, and it would be a simple matter of not assigning the vehicles in question to a response through the tunnel.

There have also been statements made with respect to the severity of grade, and the impacts on fire apparatus. There is some validity to this. The maximum grade which a fire truck may safely traverse is 8%, and this is written into the Ontario Building Code. Because of the angle of departure on the back of fire trucks, and indeed, ambulance buses, any steeper grade would result in an impact by the back of the fire truck with the road surface, at some point on the grade. But it must be pointed out that the same restriction is true for bridges, and that to construct a bridge from the foot of Bathurst Street, this restriction would certainly be a consideration.

In summary, both Divisions have concerns regarding the process of construction of the fixed link. Any construction process which impeded or significantly altered the existing access to the Toronto City Centre Airport would constitute a concern for both the Ambulance and Fire Services. The Divisions would require, at minimum, prior consultation with the contractor and the Superintendent of Ferries, prior to initiation of any change. They would also require a minimum of two weeks advance notice, prior to any change in access occurring, so that staff can be notified.

In order for the bridge option to receive our support, the following criteria must be met:

1.The opening and closing of the lift or swing bridge mechanism should take no more time than a crossing on the existing ferry service (three minutes).

2.Any lift or swing bridge mechanism must be reversible in mid-cycle.

3.Traffic flow onto the bridge must be controlled to eliminate any queueing on the bridge.

4.Any lift or swing bridge be staffed by an operator twenty four hours per day.

5.Direct telephone line access from the Toronto Ambulance Communications Centre and Toronto Fire Service Communications Centre to the operator must be provided.

6.The bridge operator must monitor Marine Channel 16 continuously, in order to be aware of any emergencies occurring on the water, so that the bridge position can be adjusted accordingly.

7.The airport's crash alarm system should be extended to the bridge operator's booth, and the operator instructed that an activation of the crash alarm, the bridge is to be placed in the down position, and left there until advised that it is no longer required.

8.Vehicular traffic to Toronto City Centre Airport is to be actively discouraged.

9.Both Divisions should be consulted prior to any construction activity which will alter or impede our access to the Toronto City Centre Airport.

10.Both Divisions will receive at least two weeks advance notice, prior to the implementation of any changes to airport access which are contemplated.

11.Alternatively, both Divisions would favour a conventional bridge which is high enough to permit the unrestricted passage of both pleasure craft and the fireboat, and the permanent re-routing of all commercial traffic through the Eastern Gap.

12.In any case, the approaches to either a bridge or a tunnel must not exceed the 8% required to accommodate the operation of large emergency vehicles.

In conclusion, both Toronto Fire Service and Toronto Ambulance believe that the current emergency response capability to the Toronto City Centre Airport, and to the island communities could be improved with a fixed link of the appropriate design. It is our position that a fixed link to the Toronto Islands, via the Toronto City Centre Airport, would benefit the community through improved airport safety and better emergency response."