March 9, 1999

Subject: Speed Limit Compliance On Major Arterial Roads - Update

Purpose:

The purpose of this report is to provide City Council with a comprehensive report on various issues which have an effect on the speed of vehicles on major arterial roads (primarily those which previously fell under the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Toronto). Staff have attempted to provide the most current information available on the broad subject of speed compliance as well as to report on the results of field tests.

This report is primarily intended to be informational, and therefore only one recommendation is proposed at this time. However, staff will report on some of the items referenced in this discussion, in more detail in the future, and more recommendations will be made when those specific issues are addressed.

Funding Sources:

Not applicable.

Recommendation:

It is recommended that the Toronto Police Services be asked to submit a report to the Urban Environment and Development Committee on the potential effectiveness and practicality of applying photo radar enforcement on major arterial roads within the City of Toronto.

Background:

At its meeting on June 4, 1997, Metropolitan Toronto Council adopted Clause No. 2, Report No. 14 of the Planning and Transportation Committee entitled "Discussion Paper Regarding Ways of Improving Speed Limit Compliance on Metropolitan Roads." The report recommended that the paper be used as the basis for stakeholder consultation on this issue.

At its meeting on March 4,5 and 6, 1998, the Council of the City of Toronto adopted, as amended, Clause No. 14, Report No. 2 of the Urban Environment and Development Committee entitled "Improving Speed Limit Compliance On Major Arterial Roads - Status Report," which reported the results of the public consultation and described the range of field tests being conducted. Staff were asked to review the British model of traffic enforcement and submit a report on the feasibility of establishing a similar system in Toronto; to examine the feasibility of establishing a "Made in Toronto" system of traffic control signal warrants, and submit a report thereon to the Urban Environment and Development Committee; and to determine whether common policies and priorities may be established with respect to collector roads.

Discussion:

A. Introduction

In response to a number of complaints respecting the speed of traffic on major arterial roads, staff prepared the "Discussion Paper Regarding Ways of Improving Speed Limit Compliance On Metropolitan Roads" in 1997. Within the report staff acknowledge that there is growing public concern regarding aggressive driving behaviour, and that there are a multitude of influences on driver behaviour. Some of the major influences are listed below:

Staff cited lifestyle pressures and motor vehicle advertising as powerful influences upon driver behaviour. "We generally conduct ourselves quickly, search for more and more efficiency, and seek immediate response to work and recreational needs. We are being pressured to be more competitive, and advertisers are still influencing us with visions of fast and powerful cars."

Relatively speaking, motor vehicles and roads/highways have a short history, yet significant progress has been made towards improving the safety of motor vehicle occupants which may have contributed to the general public opinion that motor vehicle speeding, in moderation, is relatively innocuous. However, when coupled with aggressive driving behaviour, speeding is becoming a major concern. This is especially true for the more vulnerable road users in our city; primarily pedestrians and cyclists.

When looking at motor vehicle collision trends from the mid - 1980's to the mid - 1990's, it is apparent that the number of personal injury and fatality collisions in the province of Ontario and the amalgamated City of Toronto peaked in the late - 1980's and generally decreased from the start of this decade to the mid - 1990's. (See Appendix 1)

Within the amalgamated City of Toronto boundaries there were 114 fatalities in 1989 and 69 in 1995, compared to 1,106 in all Ontario in 1989 and 860 in 1995. Personal injury collisions were at a high in 1987 (19,143 in Metro Toronto; 80,432 in Ontario) compared to the 14,000 range in Toronto and 59,000 range in Ontario in the 1990's. Since 1987 the amalgamated City of Toronto has consistently experienced between 22% and 23% of all reportable collisions in the Province of Ontario.

During this time period the population of the amalgamated City of Toronto remained relatively stable (2,130,938 in 1986; and 2,241,001 in 1995) as has the volume of motor vehicles entering and leaving the downtown Toronto area during a typical week day (635,200 in 1987; and 618,300 in 1995). However there was steady growth of motor vehicle flow across the amalgamated City perimeter boundary during the same period: 1,232,600/day in 1987; and 1,508,700/day in 1995. Of significance, from 1986 to 1995 there was an increase in the population of senior citizens in Metro Toronto, from 247,756 to 319,325, and the proportion of seniors in the overall population increased from 11.6% to 14.2% during that ten year period.

Even though the overall downward trend in collision statistics may be encouraging in a historical context, the occurrence of fatalities amongst the most vulnerable road users is of primary concern, and staff continue to direct efforts towards reducing the risks to these people. In the past 10 years there has been an average of 43 pedestrians and 3.6 cyclists killed per year in the amalgamated City of Toronto. By comparison the average number of drivers fatally injured is 25 per year, and 16 per year for passengers. Furthermore, in the past decade, the overall trend has been a decrease in the number of motor vehicle occupant fatalities as well as pedestrian fatalities.

However, the motor vehicle occupant fatality rate has decreased at a faster rate than pedestrian fatalities, so in 1996 and 1997 more pedestrians were killed in collisions per year than occupants of motor vehicles.

In 1998, 28 fatalities (33%) occurred at traffic signals. However 46 (54%) took place where there are no traffic controls such as mid-block locations, and half of these fatalities were pedestrians. In total 37 pedestrians were fatally injured in 1998, and 26 (70%) of these pedestrians were 55 years of age or older.

Consideration of statistics can be useful, but the objectivity tends to mask the tragedy and human suffering which result from each and every fatal and personal injury collision. Furthermore we can appreciate how pedestrians and cyclists can be intimidated by motor vehicle traffic, and how senior pedestrians in particular have great difficulty crossing major arterial roads at mid-block locations, having to judge the approach speeds of traffic on two-way multilane roads in order to find a gap in traffic.

There are a number of traffic engineering measures which can and have been used in the City of Toronto to improve the crossing environment for pedestrians at mid-block locations on major arterial roads, namely traffic control signals, pedestrian crossovers (PXOs) or refuge islands. Each situation is studied and the appropriate device recommended for installation. For instance, the number of pedestrians crossing the road to warrant a new PXO is lower than the number to warrant new traffic control signals. However, if a PXO is warranted, and there is evidence that a PXO will not provide a satisfactory level of safety for pedestrians, traffic control signals are recommended. Based on these safety criteria, numerous PXOs have been replaced by traffic control signals this decade.

Pedestrian refuge islands are routinely constructed on major arterial roads, in locations where the volume of pedestrians crossing the street is low and does not warrant a protected crossing device. This allows pedestrians to concentrate on judging traffic flow in one direction at a time.

As requested by the Urban Environment and Development Committee, a separate report is being prepared by staff which examines the feasibility of establishing a "Made in Toronto" system of traffic control signal warrants. In addition to other comments and recommendations within the separate report, staff are of the opinion that pedestrian crossing volumes should be factored so that children and senior pedestrian volumes are given a weighted value, so there is increased importance given to pedestrians.

In the past, staff have responded quickly to requests to investigate uncontrolled locations on major arterial roads where pedestrian crossing desire lines have been identified, and we will continue to do so. There will be ongoing emphasis given to pedestrian issues in the years ahead.

Furthermore considerable interest has been expressed in the past five years to expand the network of bike lanes on arterial roads. Staff have expressed concerns that a significant width reduction of motor vehicle lanes in order to accommodate bike lanes on major arterial roads carrying significant volumes of truck traffic would compromise the safety of all road users, including the cyclists themselves. However, there may be some arterial roads where the introduction of bicycle lanes would be appropriate. A report will be presented in the future to address this issue in detail.

In some cases where there has been insufficient road width to accommodate safe traffic lane widths in addition to a designated bike lane, wider curb lane widths have been provided as a compromise. However, there is a concern that wider curb lane widths on major arterial roads may contribute to higher motor vehicle operating speeds in these lanes, which would be counter-productive, and intimidate pedestrians at the curb. One mitigating measure which has recently been tested (with some positive results) is the use of a white line adjacent to the curb in the wide curb lane. This measure will be discussed in more detail in Section C of this report.

Some of the former local municipalities within the amalgamated City of Toronto boundaries have installed traffic calming devices on local and collector roads. The former City of Toronto, for instance, has installed calming devices on numerous local roads and also on collector roads with two-way, 24 hour traffic volumes below 8,000 and pre-operating speeds in the 40 km/h to 60 km/h range. A number of minor arterial roads with traffic volumes up to 20,000 and 40 km/h speed limits have also been modified with traffic calming measures. The former municipalities of York, East York and North York also have various traffic calming measures in place on local and collector roads.

There is general agreement in the traffic engineering profession that traffic calming features applied to local and collector roads are not usually transferable to major arterial roads that experience relatively high operating speeds, and higher volumes of car and truck traffic.

The whole issue and debate about the design and use of traffic calming devices is detailed and complicated. Transportation Services staff will be reviewing this issue in the context of the newly amalgamated City of Toronto in 1999, and will report to Council on questions of effectiveness/uniformity/standardization at a later date.

The second report - "Improving Speed Limit Compliance On Major Arterial Roads - Status Report" attempted to define the role of major arterial roads within the amalgamated City of Toronto. Major arterial roads are expected to carry more through traffic than local traffic. "Within a major urban environment an effective network of efficient arterial roads is crucial to the economic and commercial viability of the city, and provides essential access for emergency vehicles. Arterial roadways provide access for commuters in public transit as well as private vehicles, and provide access for a wide range of commercial interests. In addition, the maintenance of a high level of service on the major arterial network allows traffic calming or traffic restrictions to be implemented in neighbourhoods by providing adequate capacity for diverted traffic." A review of road classifications in the City of Toronto will be presented in a future report.

This third report is intended to clarify the relationship between speed limits, operating speeds and design speeds on major arterial roads, and document current practices in the traffic engineering field for establishing speed limits. Also we hope to clarify the connection between speed limits and collisions. These issues are discussed in Section B.

During the past year a number of traffic engineering measures have been tested, some with and without sustained police enforcement, and the results of these studies in Toronto will be discussed in detail in Section C.

The enforcement of traffic regulations in general has received considerable attention lately, and enforcement represents a major component of this report as it relates to speed limit compliance, in Section D.

As a result of recent research and the field studies, staff have confirmed that effective traffic management and optimal safety is accomplished by a balanced strategy of proper engineering, adequate enforcement and targeted education, the latter including public awareness and safety promotion campaigns. Safety promotion is discussed in Section E.

As mentioned previously, the primary function of major arterial roads is to carry high volumes of traffic safely and efficiently and to accommodate a variety of road users. In order to facilitate the movement of large trucks and buses, adequate road dimensions must be provided. The anticipated efficient speed of major arterials ranges from 50 km/h to 70 km/h, depending upon design, land use and access characteristics.

Historically, road designs have provided a "safety buffer" to account for a variety of driving skills, and behaviour, and road and weather conditions. The posted speed limit traditionally has been 10 km/h to 20 km/h lower than the design speed. Some of the design elements which are considered in relation to design speed are vertical and horizontal curves, intersection sight lines, sight lines provided by other roadside features, and lane widths. Proper sight lines are critical, because they directly influence the safe sight stopping distance, thus providing adequate opportunity for motorists to observe other traffic and road users, and to react in an appropriate way to avoid collisions.

One popular belief is that speed limits are established assuming motorists will drive in excess of the speed limit. Reinforcing this opinion is the idea that the general public adjust their speeds to 10 km/h or 15 km/h over the speed limit because they think the police target their enforcement to motorists exceeding the speed limit by 15 km/h to 20 km/h over the speed limit. However, there is evidence that the majority of drivers choose an upper speed which is safe and comfortable for themselves, given the prevailing road and weather conditions. Unwarranted alteration of speed limits has negligible impact on drivers on major arterial roads. Police enforcement can influence a reduction in driver speeds providing it is sustained. If enforcement is temporary, speed reduction is temporary as well. (Enforcement is discussed in more detail in Section D of this report.)

Most studies of speed limits and related issues have focussed on freeways (limited access) and local roads. However, the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA) in the United States conducted an extensive seven-year study of 100 sites on non-limited access roads, where speed limits were either increased or decreased by varying degrees, ranging from 24 km/h (15 mph) increases to 32 km/h (20 mph) decreases. The alteration of speed limits had negligible impacts on operating speeds, regardless of the degree of change: the differences in recorded speeds were less than 2.4 km/h.

The extensive network of major arterial roads in Toronto is well established. It is prudent to design the reconstruction of portions of the network using design elements which have been updated to reflect modern standards, but which are also compatible with the existing road network. The introduction of drastically different design elements on small portions of a major arterial road could result in an immediate increase in collision frequency on that newly designed section of road. This is because driving behaviour is established by the prevailing conditions on the arterial road network. Drastic design changes to a small portion of an arterial road could also result in an increase in collision frequency on other roads in the immediate vicinity, such as local roads connecting two arterials, if motorists migrate from a redesigned and more congested arterial road.

It is not economically feasible to introduce significant network-wide changes to the design elements of major arterial roads because the capital costs would be significant.

The challenge for the newly amalgamated City of Toronto is to provide the most up-to-date road design standards when opportunities arise; to provide the combination of proper land use planning and traffic management techniques to safely accommodate the vulnerable road users (pedestrians and cyclists); and to maintain the integrity of the network of major arterial roads. (Traffic management is discussed in more detail in Section C of this report.)

The range of speed limits for the various classifications of roads throughout the City of Toronto are based on design. The actual establishment of speed limits on major arterial roads and freeways historically has been based upon traffic engineering studies: design elements and the 85th percentile for new roads; and these elements plus collision experience for well-established roads.

The use of the 85th percentile is still a primary factor in the traffic engineering profession when speed limits are being reviewed or established. In the Province of Quebec, for instance, where the Province approves all the speed limits on all municipal roads, the provincial government has recently completed a thorough review of speed limit determination practices, and has just issued guidelines to municipalities for the choice of speed limits. The guidelines are based upon the assertion that the majority of drivers (85%) choose safe and reasonable driving speeds.

Transport Canada commissioned a report on current Canadian practices. The first "promising approach" listed in the March 1997 report (entitled "Safety, Speed and Speed Management: A Canadian Review") suggests that reasonable speed limits should be established which are acceptable to the majority of drivers. (The full list of "promising approaches" is provided in Appendix 2.)

In 1993 the Institute of Transportation Engineers (ITE) issued Speed Zone Guidelines. In these guidelines the ITE reports that if speed zones are to be an effective safety device, the profession needs consistent guidelines, based upon engineering analysis, to determine where and when to establish these zones. Most traffic engineering practitioners support the use of the 85th percentile as a basis for determining the appropriate speed limit. Drivers who travel faster than the 85th percentile speed of the traffic stream have a higher collision involvement rate than those whose speed is close to the 85th percentile. Therefore posting the speed limit at the 85th percentile speed informs motorists of the maximum speed consistent with a low risk of collision.

The general recommended practice is as follows:

The guideline suggests that the speed limit be set at the nearest 10 km/h to the 85th percentile speed, or to the upper limit of the 15 km/h pace range. This reinforces the current staff practice to base speed limit recommendations upon traffic engineering analysis and a review of existing conditions.

C. Traffic Management (Results of field tests)

As mentioned in the previous section, current research on this issue has concluded that the 85th percentile speed is generally not impacted to a significant degree by speed limit changes alone. Furthermore, the placement of speed limit signs on major arterial roads to reinforce the statutory 50 km/h speed limit has negligible effect as well. Appendix 3A identifies test locations in Toronto where the use of 50 km/h signs has not been effective in reducing operating speeds to a noticeable degree.

Of special concern are the operating speeds on the major arterial roads along school frontages. There is provision within the Highway Traffic Act for Ontario municipalities to designate changes to speed limits in school zones (e.g. from 50 km/h to 40 km/h), at any preset times between the hours of 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on days when school is regularly held. Amber flashing beacons are usually used during these preset times to advise motorists of when the adjusted speed limit is in effect. This designation is restricted to the school frontage and 150 metres beyond the school frontage.

Three 40 km/h school speed zones have been established on four-lane major arterial roads and several of these have provided us with an opportunity to monitor their effect on driver behaviour: Keele Street near Glenlake Road; Dundas Street East between Munro Street and Logan Avenue; and Avenue Road between Elwood Boulevard and St. Clements Avenue (installed in the fall of 1998). The results of the field tests are illustrated in Appendix 3B.

There were significant speed reductions of 6 and 7 km/h on Keele Street where the 85th percentile operating speeds prior to the school speed zone were 17 and 18 km/h in excess of the 50 km/h speed limit. By comparison, there was negligible impact on Dundas Street East where the 85th percentile speeds were 7 and 8 km/h over the 50 km/h speed limit prior to school speed zone introduction.

Anticipating that police enforcement could further impact driver behaviour, speed studies were conducted in these zones when police presence was anticipated by the motoring public. As illustrated in Appendix 3B, there were additional significant reductions in 85th percentile speeds of 6 and 7 km/h on Keele Street, and 6 and 3 km/h on Dundas Street East attributable to police enforcement.

These results suggest that the selection of school speed zones on major arterial roads should be based upon traffic engineering analysis, and a careful review of existing conditions. Furthermore, available police enforcement resources should be considered before school speed zones are selected. (Enforcement is discussed in detail in section D.)

Throughout the amalgamated City of Toronto, there are over 100 elementary and secondary schools which have property fronting onto a major arterial road and which do not have school speed zones. This number does not include those schools which may abut a major arterial road and have a street address on the minor road. The costs to introduce school speed zones at 100 school properties on major arterial roads would be in excess of $2 million, and the annual maintenance costs would be approximately $100,000.00. The selection of school speed zones should be based upon rational criteria, as suggested in the previous paragraph, to provide the best use of limited funding.

As part of the overall study of speed traffic management techniques, residential sections of two parallel arterials in the Etobicoke community area were studied before and after speed limit reductions from 60 km/h to 50 km/h: Islington Avenue between Eglinton Avenue West and Dundas Street West (essentially 4 lanes wide) and Kipling Avenue between Eglinton Avenue West and Dundas Street West (essentially 5 lanes wide). The 85th percentile speed profile on both roads was similar prior to the speed limit reduction: 9 to 11 km/h over the speed limit. After the speed limits were reduced, and absent of police enforcement, the 85th percentile speeds reduced by 2 to 4 km/h, except for one section of northbound Kipling Avenue which experienced a 7 km/h decrease.

Similar to the school speed zones, 85th percentile operating speeds were monitored when police presence would be anticipated by motorists, and there was an additional decrease, which averaged 3 km/h over the study locations, which could be attributed to police enforcement.

Other traffic management techniques for major arterial roads have been studied in the amalgamated City of Toronto, and these are summarized in Appendix 3C.

As mentioned earlier, concerns have been expressed that operating speeds could increase in curb lanes that are widened to accommodate cyclists (in cases where the overall road width is insufficient to provide designated bike lanes). Several treatments were tested to try to compensate for the effect of widened curb lanes on driver behaviour.

On Lawrence Avenue East, between Tower Drive and Wexford Boulevard, white edge lines were painted approximately one metre from the curb to give the visual impression of a narrower lane. As shown in Appendix 3C, the 85th percentile prior to the treatment was 63 km/h in the eastbound curb lane and 72 km/h in the westbound curb lane. The 85th percentile speeds dropped by 3 km/h in both directions after the white edge lines were installed. Staff are of the opinion that this treatment merits additional testing in those situations where curb lanes can be widened, but not widended sufficiently to provide for a designated bike lane. For instance white edge lines will be installed on portions of Spadina Avenue in 1999.

Another test treatment in curb lanes is known as "shared lane", whereby a bike logo and legend are painted close to the curb to remind motorists that cyclists share the curb lane. Appendix 3C identifies the results of four test locations, two with 50 km/h speed limits (Spadina Avenue and Scarlett Road) and two with 60 km/h speed limits (McCowan Road and Markham Road). In one case (Scarlett Road), "shared lane" signs were also installed adjacent to the road to complement the pavement markings.

One problem with this treatment is the higher than normal level of maintenance required to maintain the visual impact of these pavement markings. Pavement marking tape was badly damaged during the winter and paint was well worn by motor vehicles during the same period. Staff monitored vehicle speeds in the curb lanes of these test locations when the pavement markings were clearly visible.

The one downtown location tested (Spadina Avenue) experienced 85th percentile speeds of 52 km/h in the curb lane, very close to the 50 km/h speed limit, prior to the "shared lane" pavement markings. The "after" speeds increased by 2 km/h southbound and decreased by 2 km/h northbound, leading to the conclusion that the "shared lane" treatment had negligible impact.

The same conclusion can be applied to Scarlett Road, a four-lane suburban arterial with a 50 km/h speed limit, where "before" 85th percentile speeds were 12 to 14 km/h higher than the speed limit. Even with the use of frequently spaced signs and pavement markings, the "shared lane" treatment had a negligible effect on motor vehicle speeds.

There are conflicting results of the effects of this treatment on 60 km/h suburban arterials which experienced a range of 85th percentile speeds of 6 km/h to 24 km/h in excess of the speed limit (over the four test locations) prior to the application of the "shared lane" markings. Furthermore the wide range of recorded speeds continued after the "shared lane" treatment. 85th percentile changes ranged from a 14 km/h decrease to a 12 km/h increase on Markham Road. The fluctuations on McCowan Road were generally less dramatic with one "after" result - an 8 km/h increase - being anomalous.

Staff conclude that there are a variety of influences on driver speeds on sections of Markham Road and considerably larger sample sizes would have to be taken over a longer period of radar study in order to have confidence in the study results.

In one study location on McCowan Road, the "shared lane" treatment may have had a minimal impact on driver speeds, reducing the 85th percentile in curb lanes by 2 to 3 km/h. However, overall the "shared lane" markings (and signage on Scarlett Road) have not impacted drivers’ speed, and, because of the relative effort and cost to maintain these markings, staff suggest that the test of this device as a measure to reduce motor vehicle speeds be discontinued.

During one large 1997 reconstruction project of a six-lane major arterial roadway, namely Avenue Road between Dupont Street and St. Clair Avenue West, the sidewalk width was increased by approximately one metre on each side of the road by narrowing the road width and width of the vehicle lanes. Before this treatment the 85th percentile speeds in this 50 km/h speed limit section of Avenue Road ranged from 56 to 66 km/h northbound and from 57 to 69 km/h southbound.

After the reconstruction the 85th percentile speeds ranged from 61 to 65 km/h northbound, and from 61 to 68 km/h southbound. Averaging the results from four study locations, the overall effect of the reconstruction was an approximately 3 km/h increase in the northbound 85th percentile, and 2 km/h increase southbound. The study results are tabulated in Appendix 3C.

Staff are of the opinion that, on Avenue Road, the impact of the new, smooth pavement surface outweighs the impact of the road width reduction.

Two major four-lane arterial roadways were converted to five-lane roadways by realigning pavement markings to create a two-way centre left-turn lane: Kennedy Road, between Lawrence Avenue East and Eglinton Avenue East; and Bayview Avenue, between York Mills Road and Post Road.

In both cases the 85th percentile speeds prior to the lane marking changes were 12 to 14 km/h over the 60 km/h speed limit. However, the impacts of the operational changes have been opposite in these two cases. On Kennedy Road staff measured a significant reduction of the 85th percentile speeds, ranging from 5 to 10 km/h. However, on Bayview Avenue there was a 4 to 5 km/h increase recorded.

Because of these contradictory results, there are probably other factors unique to each location affecting driver behaviour. More testing and research of this type of treatment is required in order to draw meaningful conclusions.

Another lane narrowing of a major four-lane arterial road with a 60 km/h speed limit occurred on Lake Shore Boulevard East, between Woodbine Avenue and Coxwell Avenue. In this case the wide four-lane road was reconstructed with a continuous centre median island (except for a new intersection constructed at the mid-point of the road section, which was signalized after the speed study was completed). The 85th percentile speeds were 74 km/h eastbound and 79 km/h westbound prior to the median island construction, and 67 km/h in both directions afterwards; a significant reduction.

Staff attribute this dramatic decrease to two primary influences: the generous lane widths prior to island construction; and the visual impact that the median island has upon drivers. Staff propose to conduct follow-up speed studies next spring to measure the impact of the newly installed traffic control signals, and to measure if the reductions in the operating speeds have been sustained.

As a result of high collision frequency on the streetcar tracks on Spadina Avenue, between Front Street and Spadina Circle, two "walls" of green bollards have been installed (at 1.5 metre intervals) to separate the streetcar right-of-way from the median lanes of general traffic. The visual impact of over 1000 bollards immediately adjacent to the travelled lanes is powerful. However, speed studies were conducted in the median lanes of general traffic, before and after the bollard installation, on this 50 km/h speed limit roadway and there was a minimal increase in 85th percentiles recorded: from 50 to 53 km/h northbound; and from 49 to 51 km/h southbound.

"Before and after" speed studies were conducted on Lake Shore Boulevard West in locations where streetcar platforms were being constructed, and bike lanes were being installed. The results are tabulated in Appendix 3C. At two study locations on this 60 km/h speed limit, four lane plus streetcar right-of-way roadway, there were no changes to the 85th percentile recorded (60 and 62 km/h). At the other study location the 85th percentile speed dropped from 65 to 62 km/h.

Staff anticipate that the impacts of these types of treatments would be more pronounced on major arterial roads if the 85th percentile speeds prior to installation were significantly faster than 60 to 65 km/h.

Summary

As a result of the various speed studies on major arterial roads, staff have confirmed that numerous traffic engineering measures have minimal impact on motor vehicle speeds, including the installation of 50 km/h (default) speed limit signs in the urban area, and arbitrary speed limit reductions which are not based upon traffic analysis and sound engineering judgement.

In cases where excessive speeds are recorded in front of schools, school speed zones can be effective in reducing speeds. However, without periodic enforcement, the effectiveness of this type of treatment on motorists may wane. The effectiveness of school speed zones would deteriorate if they were installed at numerous locations where speeding was not a significant problem in the first place. This indiscriminate use of school speed zones would also strain the limited financial resources of the City of Toronto

Two curb-side pavement marking treatments were tested (white edge line and "shared lane") and staff suggest that the white edge lines be tested further and the "shared lane" test be discontinued.

Two-way centre left-turn lanes are a useful traffic engineering device to mitigate left-turn collision frequency problems, and should continue to be considered for this purpose. When they are used, "before and after" speed studies should be conducted in an effort to identify the effects this measure has on operating speeds.

Furthermore, modern urban design standards will continue to be used when road reconstruction and resurfacing projects are undertaken, and the variety of design elements which will be considered and applied will probably have a small accumulative impact on operating speeds on major arterial roads in the years ahead.

Consistently the one single factor which has the greatest individual impact on the operating speeds of major arterial roads is police enforcement.

D. Enforcement

From a safety perspective, enforcement of traffic speeds on major arterial roads should be targeted at those motorists who exceed speed limits significantly, and who generally represent the top 5th to 10th percentile of traffic speeds. As mentioned earlier, these motorists are more likely to be involved in collisions. Furthermore, the severity of injuries and collisions increases the higher the operating speed at the moment of the crash.

Reports of international experience indicate that public acceptance of police enforcement has been good in situations where the objective is to reduce collision frequency. For instance, photo radar is deployed in England at locations where collision frequency and safety have been public concerns. Similarly, in Toronto, public support for the use of photo technology to catch red-light runners is high because of the well-documented collision risk associated with this behaviour.

Not only has the strong influence of police speed enforcement on vehicle speeds been identified in the limited traffic studies conducted in the City of Toronto, a Ministry of Transportation of Ontario (MTO) study undertaken before and during the early months of photo radar revealed the same connection.

The MTO installed vehicle speed and volume detection devices at three study sites prior to the August 15, 1994 commencement of photo radar enforcement on provincial highways. One site was on a two-lane road, one on a four-lane road, and the other on a six-lane road. Vehicle speeds and volumes were recorded for approximately one month prior to photo enforcement, and four months after. Approximately 18 million vehicles were recorded in total at the three study sites, which is a very large sample size.

In a document published in January 1997 the MTO reports that, by the end of the fourth month of photo radar use, average speeds had decreased on the two-lane highway from 88.6 to 86.1 km/h, on the four-lane highway from 111.7 to 105.9 km/h, a decrease of 5.8 km/h; and on the six-lane highway from 105.9 to 98.6 km/h, a 7.3 km/h decrease in the average speeds. The MTO also reports that there were even larger decreases in the proportion of high end speeders.

MTO staff attribute these substantial speed reductions not only to the photo radar initiative itself, but also to associated signage and advertising/media attention.

Traffic enforcement in Toronto has been under scrutiny recently, within the context that the Toronto Police Service has insufficient human resources to conduct adequate conventional traffic enforcement. Hence the interest in finding alternatives through either technological means or alternate manual enforcement programs.

Photo radar is of course a technology which is readily available, but municipalities in Ontario do not have the legislative authority available at this time to use this device for enforcement, for the same reasons as red-light cameras could not be used as an enforcement tool until Bill 102 received Royal Assent. A similar provincial legislative change would be required for photo radar use.

As mentioned earlier, public acceptance and support for enforcement is considerably greater if it is linked directly to safety concerns. Because of the way in which it was applied, photo radar used by the Province of Ontario was generally seen as more of a revenue generator than a bona fide safety initiative, and its public image in Ontario has been tarnished as a result. However photo radar is used in Canada, including the Province of British Columbia, and cities in Alberta (Calgary, Edmonton and Lethbridge), as well as many other countries.

States in the USA where active photo radar enforcement can be found include Arizona, California, Colorado, Missouri and Oregon. Furthermore photo radar is used in the Netherlands, Germany, Sweden and Australia.

In order to have an effective prosecution procedure using photo radar evidence, without identifying the driver, a basic premise has to be established in law- that the owner of a vehicle is ultimately responsible for the vehicle, including the requirement to identify who was operating their vehicle at a specific time if they were not the driver. Other jurisdictions have successfully addressed this issue.

A study commissioned by the Netherlands Ministry of Transport and provincial road authorities resulted in a report published in 1996: "Automatic Speed Management in the Netherlands." The report concluded that to change driver behaviour effectively and reduce driving speeds, speed enforcement would need to be a higher priority. In addition, enforcement must be automated to provide the efficiency and frequency of application that will make increased enforcement practical.

In Toronto there are a number of locations where the use of photo radar would likely receive public support, such as school zones and locations experiencing high collision frequency. However, if photo radar were available for use, and there was interest in trying to reduce the operating speeds on the network of major arterial roads, then some units would have to be mobile. Motorists would have to consider the risk of encountering photo radar enforcement to be system-wide, as opposed to at select, well-signed locations, before there would be a chance of a general behavioural shift to slower speeds. As mentioned earlier, the success of photo radar use would be enhanced if complemented by education and promotional campaigns, as well as high profile media attention.

One technological innovation, which arguably is more of a future traffic management tool than an enforcement device, is referred to as Intelligent Speed Adaption (ISA) in Sweden, where the national government is planning large-scale trials in four cities. The $10 million demonstration project will be administered by a federal agency, with the co-operation of local authorities.

Each city will be the site of a different test, utilizing a variety of technologies from advisory messages to "active throttle control." In one city, up to one thousand vehicles will be equipped with a small computer, digital map and a satellite transmitter/receiver to monitor vehicle speeds, and a warning system. If a vehicle exceeds the speed limit by a preset degree, an on-board warning will sound. If the driver continues to speed, a violation notice will be recorded in the computer, which can be retrieved by the road authority.

At another city 10,000 vehicles will be equipped with dashboard speed-warning devices activated by roadside radio frequency beacons which transmit speed limits and warning messages to the on-board device. In another municipality approximately 1,500 vehicles will be fitted with "active accelerator pedals" which will prevent vehicles from being accelerated in speed control zones. In the fourth city speed cameras and speed bumps will be used in conjunction with a dashboard warning system.

These devices will be installed from 1999 to 2001 and the entire test is considered the first phase of a program to gain experience with a large test sample of "dynamic speed adaption" technologies, to build public support for these techniques, to encourage small and medium sized manufactures to enter the market, and to help promote alternate funding sources.

With respect to alternate or additional deployment of manual traffic enforcement, the Chief of the Toronto Police Service reported his concerns about the use of unarmed constabulary for traffic enforcement in a report to the Toronto Police Services Board dated July 23, 1998. The Chief cites legal concerns: that the current legislation empowers only police officers to stop traffic. He also explains that stopping vehicles is a dangerous task, and expresses concerns for the safety of the enforcement personnel. In response to this report, and to the proposal by Board member Councillor Judy Sgro to establish a Community Road Safety enforcement unit, the Board decided to establish an inter-agency staff committee to deal with the issue of Community Road Safety enforcement.

When this item was before the Emergency and Protective Services Committee on November 3, 1998, the committee requested a report on the British model of traffic enforcement. Attached to this report as Appendix 4 is a lengthy discussion written by staff entitled "General Information on the British Model of Traffic Enforcement." The use of Special Constables (volunteer police officers) in Britain seems far more prevalent and well established, and their duties more far reaching, than volunteers (auxiliaries) in Toronto. However, we are advised that Special Constables in Britain are not deployed on their own to enforce the rules of the road, such as speeding and other driving offences. They are not assigned to stop traffic for the purpose of traffic enforcement.

Similarly, the City of New York has a program of using unarmed civilian volunteers (auxiliaries) to assist police officers, but they too are not allowed to stop traffic for the purpose of enforcing moving traffic violations.

Within the Toronto Police Service there is limited use of auxiliaries in relation to moving traffic infractions. For instance 31 Division in the North York community area recently embarked on a program to train civilian auxiliaries to observe stop sign infractions, record licence numbers and vehicle descriptions. Under no circumstances are the auxiliary officers permitted to stop vehicles. Later a letter is sent to the owner of the vehicle advising them of the violation, and asking them to drive more carefully in the future.

A similar program involving police officers and civilians is in effect in a number of communities in Ontario to deter speeding. The key ingredient is the use of a radar message board, whereby the speed of vehicles is detected by a radar gun, and the speed is displayed on a board so the driver can see it. One such initiative, approved by Peterborough City Council on Oct. 5, 1998, is co-sponsored by the City of Peterborough, Peterborough Community Police, and the Insurance Brokers Association of Peterborough. The radar message board is operated by citizen groups, and the licence number of vehicles exceeding the speed limit by a predetermined margin is recorded. Later a letter is sent to the registered owner advising of the speeding and including a safety message.

Because of the high traffic volume and higher speed characteristics of major arterials in the City of Toronto, the radar message board may not be effective on major arterial roads. However, there may be opportunities for similar civilian partnering initiatives if auxiliary police officers were available to assist. These activities on major arterial roads may then be primarily restricted to evenings and weekends.

The City of Hamilton, in co-operation with and at the initiative of the Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police, is testing another method of increasing the number of personnel available for traffic enforcement. They are deploying a few of their Parking Control Officers, in conjunction with a Police

Officer, to enforce moving violations which are regulated by municipal by-law, primarily turn prohibitions and truck prohibitions. According to a staff report, the police are quite satisfied with the assistance being provided, but City staff want to assess the program further before recommending whether the City should commit to the arrangement on a permanent basis.

During public debate about the speed compliance issue in the City of Toronto, concerns have been raised that if police officers exercise discretion when dealing with speeding infractions, by either issuing a warning or issuing a Provincial Offences Notice for a lesser speed, the overall deterrent value is weakened. This in turn could even contribute to an increase in operating speeds throughout the network of major arterial roads.

Furthermore some members of the public have suggested that the police show too much tolerance when enforcing speeding offences.

Because of the number of drivers who are exceeding the speed limit on major arterial roads, even by a few kilometres per hour, it is obviously impractical for the police to be targeting such large volumes of traffic by conventional enforcement means. Furthermore, in the early history of speed enforcement, the courts may have assumed a degree of inaccuracy in the performance of speedometers of the day, and made an allowance for this. In the present, there is concern that if the courts are swamped by a multitude of offenders appealing minor speeding infractions, the prosecutions may be prematurely terminated.

With respect to the use of discretion, police officers are independent agents of the crown and they

have the latitude to exercise their judgement in a variety of situations. In the case of speeding infractions, police officers cannot be forced to issue speeding tickets in every instance.

The conduct of police officers is governed by the Police Services Act (PSA). There is a range of interpretations of the PSA concerning the level of discretion which can be exercised by individual officers. In practice, police officers would likely have to display a continued, extreme level of tolerance before their actions would be considered neglect of duty.

Furthermore, it may be erroneous to draw the conclusion that police officers exercising discretion in the issuance of speeding tickets are contributing to an overall speeding problem. Individual officers assess the circumstances surrounding each violation and exercise their judgement with respect to the most appropriate intervention in each case. Police officers are not necessarily just "giving drivers a break" when they exercise discretion. They are trying to assess what is best for the community as a whole. The use of discretion may have a valuable educational component, and may contribute to improved driver behaviour in many cases.

The debate about the use of discretion also applies to enforcement programs which emphasize elements of public education. These types of programs are not limited to traffic enforcement - john schools being a prime example. Recently there has been media coverage of traffic offender education programs administered by police services in Ontario. Staff are aware of three very similar programs; Kingston’s Traffic Offender Program established in 1996; Niagara’s Traffic Education Program initiated in 1997; and Peterborough’s Safe Driver Program launched in 1998. Basically, drivers who have been apprehended in the commission of a variety (but not all) traffic offences, and who themselves are eligible, are offered a choice of either receiving a provincial offences notice, or registering for a short training course on traffic rules and paying a $55.00 registration fee. The purpose of these programs is to educate and modify driver attitudes and behaviour, and drivers are only eligible to enter the program once in a 12 month period.

However, there are concerns at the provincial level about these types of programs. For instance the MTO is concerned that motorists who register for these programs avoid licence sanctioning. Furthermore there are no provincial records of drivers registering for these courses which can be accessed by all other police services. This would be important if a police officer, in another jurisdiction offering this program, were considering this option for a driver they just apprehended. (One solution to this would be to limit eligibility to drivers who are apprehended in the police jurisdiction where they reside.) There is also conjecture that the Attorney General’s office is investigating legal aspects of this practice.

The revenue generated by these programs is relatively small in these smaller jurisdictions. For instance, registration fees generated approximately $33,000.00 gross revenue for the Peterborough Community Police from April 1st to Sept. 30th, 1998. For the time being these programs would potentially reduce fine revenue for the province, because provincial offence notices would not be issued when the program option is exercised by the driver. However, over the next two years there will be transfers of Provincial Offences Act (POA) administration from the province to municipalities. Municipalities may benefit by receiving more fine revenue than the costs to administer the courts. It is anticipated that the POA Transfer in the City of Toronto will occur in the fall of 1999.

However staff involved in Traffic Offender Programs and the POA Transfer stress that the generation of revenue cannot be the primary motivator. In the case of the POA Transfer, fair and equitable delivery of justice is paramount, and in the case of community safety programs, educating and influencing the driving habits of road users is critical. Because the legal status of traffic offender programs is vague, the province could be asked to clarify the situation, and amend legislation if necessary to remove any ambiguity and allow these programs to continue.

E. Traffic Safety Programs

As mentioned earlier, the success of techniques aimed at reducing the operating speeds of motorists on major arterial roads, especially enforcement, is heightened by complementary educational and promotional activities, and media coverage. However, to instill the message at the deepest level and to provide a greater potential for long lasting impacts, the public should not only feel an increased risk of prosecution, but also a greater sense of personal risk or loss associated with speeding.

In the 1997 Transport Canada report "Safety, Speed and Speed Management: A Canadian Review", successful collision reduction programs from Australia are cited. Speed management programs, credited with impressive results in the states of New South Wales and Victoria, include engineering, enforcement and educational approaches.

In England the national government has recently awarded its first Safer City grant to Gloucester, committing 5 million pounds to a five-year program of traffic safety initiatives, including road improvements, in order to reduce road casualties by 33%. Essentially the program involves an accurate assessment of existing traffic routing and conditions, and detailed analysis of recent collision experience. Reduction in collision frequency will be achieved by:

"These aims can be achieved through traffic management, through physical engineering measures, through land use measures, through education, through enforcement, through encouragement and through training. The Safer City project brings together all those professionals whose urban policies affect road safety so that they can develop a co-ordinated approach to achieving the common aim."

Education in the Gloucester Safer City Project includes public surveys and consultation at various stages of the project, a routine series of articles in the local paper, and public safety advertisements and posters.

Public traffic safety campaigns in the City of Toronto, primarily aimed at the driving public, have been initiated by coalitions of interested agencies and companies, most notably the Toronto Police Service and Sunnybrook Health Sciences Centre. There have been limited resources in the past to effect large-scale promotions and campaigns.

As part of the City amalgamation and re-organization of Transportation Services, staff have recommended that the role of the Traffic Data Centre be expanded to include a Traffic Safety Bureau. Currently, due to the budget constraints, no funding has been identified in the 1999 Operating Budget for this expanded role.

When funded, the purpose of the Traffic Safety Bureau will be to function as a Centre of Information for traffic safety for the City. The Traffic Safety Bureau will add value to the data that currently exists with respect to traffic collisions, volumes and, in particular, speed information by:

An integral requirement for the Traffic Safety Bureau will be to develop strong links to groups internal and external to the division. In terms of speed compliance and enforcement, a natural link will be to provide the Toronto Police Service with detailed speed, volume and incident location information, thus enabling the police to better deploy their limited resources. Specifically, detailed time-of-day volume and speed profiles would be supplied to the police to ensure that enforcement is focussed during the high frequency time periods and locations.

In addition, the Traffic Safety Bureau would play a key role in other transportation system initiatives such as red-light cameras and photo radar. Specific activities would include processing collision and volume information for site selection and before and after monitoring studies.

Toronto City Council could develop a comprehensive program of traffic management, targeted enforcement and a wide-scale promotional campaign, and challenge both the federal and provincial government to match the local funding of the program, especially the promotional component.

Conclusions:

This third report on speed compliance on major arterial roads summarizes the status of speed zoning practices and the results of traffic management tests to influence driver speeds. Staff recommend that speed limits be based upon traffic analysis because the use of inappropriate speed limits will potentially lead to general driver disrespect for speed limits and other traffic management measures, and an overall reduction in road safety.

In order to accommodate the vulnerable road users (pedestrians and cyclists) on our major arterial roads, work is on-going to identify appropriate crossing devices and to identify a network of bike facilities. However, changes to our design standards will be introduced if they can enhance safety for pedestrians, cyclists and motorists, are cost-effective, and maintain the integrity of the network of major arterial roads.

There are a number of traffic management techniques which potentially will provide modest impacts on driver behaviour, and which should be used and tested further. However, enforcement has the greatest single impact upon speeds on major arterial roads and there is world-wide interest in the effectiveness and practicality of photo radar. Therefore this report recommends that the Toronto Police Services comment on this issue further before the province is asked to pass enabling legislation. The Toronto Police Services Board is currently reviewing Community Road Safety enforcement through a staff sub-committee.

Complementary to the police speed enforcement initiatives would be the valuable information the future Traffic Safety Bureau would be able to offer in terms of identifying high-risk locations and time periods for enforcement. In addition, the future Traffic Safety Bureau would be able to develop links with internal groups (District Traffic Operations, Health Department, Planning Department, etc.) and external groups (Toronto School Board, Safety Coalitions etc.) to provide valuable assistance in the development of city-wide coordinated traffic safety initiatives.

Contact Name and Telephone Number:

Peter Hillier, Manager

Traffic Operations, District 4

(416) 396-7148

David C. Kaufman

General Manager, Transportation Services

Barry H. Gutteridge

Commissioner, Works and Emergency Services

PKH/jr;fc

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

* In all cases Toronto means the amalgamated (previous Metro) area boundary

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

APPENDIX 1 (cont’d)

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

*Safety, Speed and Speed Management:

A Canadian Review. (IBI, March 1997)

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

SPEED LIMIT COMPLIANCE ON MAJOR ARTERIAL ROADS

The enforcement of nearly all traffic regulations is the responsibility of police (the key legislation is the Police Act 1964). The police constabularies are responsible to their local authorities through a police committee, which has local councillors, Home Secretary appointees and magistrates among their members. An exception to this is the Metropolitan Police Service in London, which is directly responsible to the Home Secretary and Parliament. In 1995 the non-statutory Metropolitan Police Committee was formed to act as a link between the MPS and the Home Secretary.

The police have three basic objectives with respect to traffic:

The police use various means to enforce the traffic laws, the most obvious of which is the uniformed police officer patrolling the streets. Traffic patrol officers receive expert training and their work includes many aspects such as car and motor cycle patrol, preventing and investigating collisions, traffic management and high speed pursuit. (Only full-time Police Constables are permitted to pursue with lights and sirens.) The enforcement of traffic laws (for instance by breath testing or traffic speed recording devices) is carried out to deter drivers whose irresponsible driving may cause injury or death to other road users.

There are four types of officers used to conduct traffic enforcement (including parking).

Every full-time police officer holds the office of "Constable." All police officers in uniform have the power to take enforcement action against drivers or vehicles whenever an offence occurs. This gives them special powers including the right, when in uniform, to stop a vehicle and to demand a person’s name and address. Furthermore, when they stop a vehicle they have the discretion to verbally warn the offending person or, if the matter appears to be serious, to report the alleged offender which may lead to trial at court. In the most serious cases, such as DWI (driving while intoxicated), they will arrest the offender.

Helping to police a community has been one of the country's oldest traditions and dates from Anglo-Saxon times. The principle of using citizens as voluntary peace officers was established by the Statute of Winchester in 1285. The first Special Constable Act was passed in 1820. Communities relied upon an assortment of volunteers and conscripted citizens until regular police forces had been developed. Since then, "Specials" have given their support to the "Regulars" for over 150 years.

"Specials" are in essence volunteer police under the control of full-time officers. "Specials" come from all walks of life and all sections of society. They are the vital link between the regular police and the community. Men and women, aged between 18 years and five months and 50, of good character and in good health can become Special Constables. They have to be prepared to make the commitment to give time regularly to serve their community and undertake training without financial reward (apart from out-of-pocket expenses that are reimbursed) in a variety of different ways.

Special Constables are trained by the Chief Constable for whom they work. They have a thorough training in many aspects of police work before they are expected to carry out duties. They learn about the police service and the duties of police officers, including powers of arrest, criminal law, court procedures and how to give evidence. They are also taught how to defend themselves. Specialist training is also available, depending on the variety of duties they want to do and the extent of their commitment.

Their uniform, very similar to the full-time police, is provided free. "Specials" don't have to work fixed hours or shifts. They contribute what time they can - whatever fits best with their job, career or family. If they are injured on duty, they receive compensation for loss of earnings. If they have to resign from their full-time occupation as a result of a permanent injury received while on duty, they are eligible for a gratuity and a pension. There are several ranks with the "Specials". As with "Regulars", promotion is achieved through good performance, dedication to duty and proof of leadership qualities. They can resign any time they wish to do so.

The main role of the Special Constables is to support regular police officers in their job which, in turn, frees them for work demanding their wider skills and experience. Often though, they work alongside them, facing the same situations and challenges. They are sworn as constables and are a 'hands on' force to assist during patrol duty. They are also called out when emergencies occur. The duties of "Specials" include assisting regular officers on patrol, crime prevention work, schools liaison and helping out at local fairs, county shows and sporting events. However, they also have to deal with other situations such as fires, fights, burglaries and road collisions.

Traffic Wardens are uniformed civilians, employed by the police, to enforce some traffic regulations. They have been established to deal with stationary vehicle offences (parking and waiting). For instance, the Traffic Warden Scheme has been introduced in London in 1960, to enforce the parking regulations. Since their original formation the Traffic Warden service has seen its powers extended to allow wardens to regulate traffic (point duty), authorize the removal or clamping of illegally parked cars and, more recently, to issue Endorsable Fixed Penalty notices for offences such as parking on pedestrian crossings. In 1968 the Metropolitan Police introduced civil Vehicle Removal Officers who assist in removing vehicles causing an obstruction or parked contrary to regulations. Following the Road Traffic Act, 1991, the enforcement of the majority of parking within London was de-criminalized and became the responsibility of the local authorities. However, police are still responsible for enforcing the designated priority routes (Red Routes) in London, and Traffic Wardens are deployed to assist them.

Originally Traffic Wardens dealt purely with parking, but over time they have received powers to direct traffic, (i.e. when there is a collision or when traffic signals fail and there is a need to have someone take control of the situation and attempt to keep traffic flowing). Drivers are legally required to obey directions given by Traffic Wardens, which include instructions to motorists to stop. If a driver ignores their directions they are committing an offence. (NOTE: It is the only time they have such a power although there has been a great deal of debate as to whether their powers should be widened. They have no power of arrest other than that available to everyone under common law, in the UK.) Their main job is to issue parking tickets.

Traffic Wardens have virtually the same powers available to an ordinary person, other than the power to direct traffic. (NOTE: In the UK there are enforcement activities called multi agency checks during which vehicles are stopped and examined by a number of officials. For example: drivers hours, weight, vehicle tax, emissions, vehicle condition etc. At present there has to be a uniformed police constable to actually stop the vehicles. It has been suggested that this could be extended to Traffic Wardens in uniform.)

These are uniformed civilians employed by private companies to enforce parking in "special parking zones". A few years ago the law was changed to make parking in such zones a civil, not a criminal offence. Local authorities appoint a private company by competitive tender to run the enforcement, and the local authority keeps any excess revenue from fines. They are only allowed to use these funds for specified purposes, such as road safety or public transport. Today all of London except for "Red Routes" (major roads) is a special parking zone. The enforcement is very effective because the resources used can rapidly respond to the level of illegal parking. (For example, in the past, the offence of parking on the footway was hardly ever enforced, and had become a problem, but it's no longer a major problem now.)

There are three forms of penalty. A ticket for which there is a big discount for early payment. Wheel clamping, which is a "real pain" and inconvenience, and towing away which is extremely expensive and can take hours to sort out. There is a right of appeal to a parking adjudicator and ultimately one can argue the case in a civil court. The overwhelming majority of people pay up immediately. Because they no longer have responsibility for the majority of roads, police and Traffic Wardens can concentrate on "Red Routes". (For example, they have tow trucks constantly on patrol during the rush hours.).

All police forces employ civilians in a variety of capacities. (They can employ two clerks for the price of one police constable.) For example, in most forces cameras are operated almost entirely by civilians under the control of the police. However, a police constable has to supervise them and is entirely responsible for the quality of their work. Furthermore, with the use of cameras, the law requires a police constable to be satisfied that an offence has taken place before a letter is sent to the owner demanding payment. The civilians are in effect an extension of the police officer. The Road Traffic Act requires that a police constable is satisfied that an offence has taken place. Most police forces have interpreted this as meaning that the Police Constable has to be satisfied that the clerks know what they are doing. (This has never been tested in the courts but is supported by senior legal advice.) A civilian will load the film, set the trigger speed, remove the film, have it developed - all the time ensuring a complete chain of evidence. Clerks examine the pictures, retrieve the name and address of the registered owner, and send out the ticket. If necessary the civilians can give evidence in court. (This is not uncommon - many offences are enforced by civilians.)